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ABSTRACT 
 
Gender Quotas and The Representation of Women:  
Empowerment, Decision-making, and Public Policy 
 
 
By 
 
Tiffany D. Barnes 
 
Over the past two decades governments worldwide have begun to take action to 
correct gender disparity in representative bodies, resulting in drastic increases in 
women’s numeric representation. It is unclear, however, how these increases influence 
legislative behavior. This research contributes to our understanding of how increases in 
women’s numeric representation influences substantive representation of women. I 
collected an original dataset to examine this relationship across twenty-three subnational 
Argentine legislatures over eighteen years. This project represents one of the first 
empirical efforts to examine women’s substantive representation over a large number of 
legislatures over a long duration of time.  
A key piece of the puzzle is to understand if female exhibit distinct preferences 
from their male colleagues. The second chapter of the dissertation uses a new data set of 
ideal point estimates recovered from cosponsorship data to examine gender differences in 
legislative preferences. I find strong evidence to suggest women display different 
legislative preferences than their male colleagues. Chapter three investigates how 
increases in women’s numeric representation influence women’s legislative behavior. 
Previous research suggests that increasing women’s numeric representation should 
enhance the probability that women work together to pursue common legislative agendas. 
Yet, I demonstrate that as the percentage of women in the chamber increases, women are 
increasingly less likely to work together. I argue that this unexpected finding can be 
!!
explained by considering how institutions shape women’s legislative incentives. In 
chapter four, I develop theoretical expectations about the conditions under which 
increases in the proportion of female legislators, in combination with institutional 
arrangements, will foster or stifle women’s opportunities and incentives to represent 
women’s interests. The chapter provides strong empirical support for the hypothesis that 
women behave differently conditional on institutional incentives. These findings imply 
that understanding institutions is key to understanding how and when female 
representatives will stand for women. Taken together, this dissertation makes an 
important contribution to our understanding of how changes in the proportion of female 
legislators and differences in institutional contexts shape women’s legislative behavior.
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
Women are underrepresented in virtually all of the world’s legislatures. In the 
early nineties, there was a widespread call for national governments to take action in 
correcting gender disparity at all levels of political representation. To date, constitutional, 
electoral, or political party gender quotas have been adopted in 98 countries.1 While 
quotas have been demonstrated under certain conditions to increase the numerical 
representation of women, and are designed to achieve equality in legislative power and 
decision-making, it is unclear if electing more women to legislative office is sufficient to 
influence policymaking. The extant literature has contributed to an understanding of how 
quota laws in combination with electoral laws affect the election of women legislators. 
What is less understood is the substantive impact of increased numbers of women in the 
legislature resulting from the use of gender quotas. In this dissertation I examine this 
relationship. It is impossible however, to understand how changes in women’s numeric 
representation influence women’s legislative behavior without considering how 
institutional contexts shape women’s legislative behavior. As such, this dissertation 
develops a theoretical explanation about changes in women’s numeric representation 
influences women’s legislative behavior conditional on institutional incentives.  
 
The Argentine Provincial Legislatures: An Ideal Setting to Study Women’s 
Representation 
                                                 
"!A gender quota is an electoral law that mandates the inclusion of women on the 
electoral ballot or in some cases, reserves seats in the legislative chamber.!
! # 
This research represents one of the first empirical efforts to examine women’s 
legislative behavior across a large number of chambers over a long duration of time. 
Previous research that addresses this question typically examines case studies or only a 
small number of legislative chambers. However, to disentangle how the adoption of 
gender quotas, changes in the proportion of women in the legislative chamber, and 
different legislative institutions each independently impact women’s legislative behavior 
it is necessary to examine this question over a large number of legislative chambers—
which vary on each of these three dimensions—over a significant duration of time. I have 
therefore chosen to study women’s legislative behavior at the subnational level in 
Argentina. The Argentine setting allows me to evaluate women’s legislative behavior 
over a long temporal domain (18 years) for a large number of legislative chambers, which 
vary on three important dimensions. First, the legislative chambers vary in their adoption 
of a gender quota law. Second, they vary with respect to proportion of women in the 
legislature. Finally, the different legislative chambers each use different types of electoral 
systems. To illustrate this point, I will discuss the variation of each of these dimensions in 
detail.  
 
Widespread Adoption of Gender Quotas  
First, the widespread adoption of gender quotas makes the Argentine provinces 
ideal for studying women’s legislative behavior. As the first country to adopt legislative 
gender quotas (in 1993 at the provincial level), Argentina is the only context in the world 
that offers a long time line for such quotas (over 15 years) and a large degree of variation 
in the initiation and success of quotas.  
! $ 
Table 1.1: Gender Quota Laws in the Argentine Provinces  
District Uni/Bicameral Gender Quota Law 
Sanction 
Date 
Election Year 
Implemented 
Placement 
Mandate 
% 
Women 
Federal 
District 
Unicameral Constitution, Article 36 10/1/96 1996 Yes 30% 
Buenos 
Aires3 
Bicameral Law 11.733 11/16/95 1997 Yes 30% 
  
Decree 439 (Enforcing Placement 
Mandate) 
3/8/97 1997 Yes 30% 
Catamarca1 Bicameral Law 4.916 7/10/97 1999 Yes 30% 
Chaco Unicameral Law 3.858 5/5/93 1993 Yes 30% 
Chubut Unicameral 
Law National 24.012 & Decree 
137/95 (Decree mandates 
compliance with national gender 
quota law) 
2/17/95 1995 Yes 30% 
Cordoba Unicameral Law 8.365 3/3/94 1995 No 30% 
  Law 8.901 (Placement Mandate) 12/12/00 2001 Yes 50% 
Corrientes Bicameral Law 4.673 11/25/92 1993 No 30% 
  Decree 1.332  (Placement Mandate) 6/11/03 2003 Yes 30% 
Entre Rios Bicameral -- -- -- -- -- 
Formosa2 Unicameral Law 1.155 7/26/95 1997 Yes 33% 
Jujuy Unicameral Law 5.668 11/25/10 2011 Yes 33% 
La Pampa Unicameral Law 1.593, Article 18 12/1/94 1995 Yes 30% 
La Rioja Unicameral Law 5.705 5/7/92 1993 Yes 30% 
Mendoza3 Bicameral Law 5.888 8/6/92 1993 Yes 30% 
  
Law 6.831 (Stronger Language for 
Placement Mandate) 
10/10/00 2001 Yes 30% 
  
Decree 1.641(New Language for 
Placement Mandate) 
8/23/01 2001 Yes 30% 
Misiones Unicameral Law 3.011 4/28/93 1993 Yes 30% 
  
Law 4.080 (Voided Law 3.011; 
Same Language) 
7/30/04 2005 Yes 30% 
Neuquén Unicameral Law 2.161 3/8/96 1997 Yes 30% 
Rio Negro Unicameral Law 2.642 6/17/93 1993 No 33% 
  Law 3.717 (Placement Mandate) 12/17/02 2003 Yes 50% 
Salta1 Bicameral Law 6.782 12/29/94 1995 Yes 30% 
  
Law 7.008 (Voided Law 6.782; 
Same Language) 
11/24/98 1999 Yes 30% 
San Luis Bicameral Law 5.105 3/31/97 1997 Yes 30% 
  
Law XI-0346-2004 (5542*R) 
(Voided Law 5.105) 
7/16/03 2003 Yes 30% 
San Juan1 Unicameral Law 6.515 10/13/94 1995 No 30% 
Santa Cruz Unicameral Law 2.302 10/29/92 1993 Yes 30% 
Santa Fe1 Bicameral Law 10.802 5/7/92 1993 Yes 33% 
Santiago Del 
Estero 
Unicameral Law 6.509 9/5/00 2001 Yes 50% 
Tierra Del 
Fuego 
Unicameral Law 408 7/2/98 1999 Yes 30% 
Tucuman Unicameral Law 6.592 9/8/94 1995 No 30% 
  Decree 269/14 (Placement Mandate) 2/18/02 2003 Yes 30% 
1 The quota law is not applicable to the upper chamber because representatives are elected in single member districts.  
2 The quota law was adopted before the 1995 election, but the law stipulated that parties must comply beginning in the 1997 election.  
3 Each of these provinces initially adopted gender quotas with vague placement mandate language (similar to many of the provinces) 
and later adopted more specific placement mandate language.     
! % 
 
Table 1.1 details the adoption of gender quota laws in the Argentine provinces. Gender 
quotas were first adopted in Argentina at the national level.  After the adoption of quotas 
the national level, quota adoption spread rapidly across the provincial legislatures in 
Argentina. The adoption of quotas was staggered across the 1990s, with eight legislative 
chambers implementing quotas for the first time in the 1993 legislative elections. In the 
following legislative election two years later, an additional six legislative chambers 
implemented quotas. Then in 1997 five additional chambers implemented quotas, 
followed by an additional three chambers in the 1999 legislative election. By the end of 
the 1990s, the vast majority of the legislative chambers in Argentina adopted a gender 
quota of at least 30%. In the following decade three of these chambers (Córdoba House 
[2001], Córdoba Senate [2001], and Río Negro [2003]) increased their legislative quota 
to 50% and Santiago del Estero implemented its first legislative quota (2003), also at 
50%. As a result, most of the chambers in my sample have a small proportion of women 
in the legislature prior to quota adoption and a sizeable proportion of women for several 
consecutive legislative sessions after the adoption of quotas.  
Still, there are a few exceptions. For the past decade numerous debates have 
ensued regarding the potential adoption of gender quota laws in Jujuy and Entre Ríos. 
Until recently, quota advocates have not had success in these two provinces. Indeed, 
neither of these provinces used gender quotas during the election years included in my 
analysis. Recently, however, after years of persistence from quota advocates, a 30% 
gender quota was adopted in Jujuy on November 25, 2010.  It will be implemented for 
the first time in the October 2011 election. As a result, to date, all but one Argentine 
! & 
province (Entre Ríos) has adopted a gender quota law (or implements the national gender 
quota law as in the cases of Chubut and the Federal District). Additionally, multiple 
upper level chambers do no use gender quotas because they are not compatible with the 
single member district electoral systems used to elect senators in some districts (i.e., 
Catamarca Senate, Salta Senate, San Luis Senate, and Santa Fe Senate). Despite these 
few cases, the widespread adoption of gender quotas in the Argentine provincial 
legislatures makes the sub-national setting in Argentina an excellent place to examine 
how changes in women’s numeric representation influences women’s legislative 
behavior.  
 
Variation in Women’s Numeric Representation  
Second, despite the near ubiquitous adoption of gender quotas in the Argentine 
provincial legislatures, there is still significant variation in the proportion of female 
legislators represented in each chamber. This variation in the actual proportion of female 
legislators is necessary to address the question of how changes in women’s numeric 
representation shapes women’s legislative behavior independent from the adoption of 
gender quotas. Increases in women’s numeric representation in Argentina can largely be 
attributed to the adoption of gender quotas, which results in nice temporal variation in 
women’s numeric representation within individual provinces. Is important however, to 
note that the adoption of gender quotas did not produce the same outcomes in each 
legislative chamber, thus resulting in variation across provinces. In 1992, the first year of 
my sample women held on average less than 10% of seats in provincial legislative 
chambers. During this time women did not occupy a single legislative seat in some 
! ' 
provinces (e.g., Corrientes Lower Chamber, Cordoba Upper Chamber, and both 
Chambers in Entre Ríos), while other provinces elected a significant percentage of female 
representatives prior to the adoption of a gender quota (about 20% in Formosa and 33% 
in Tierra del Fuego). This proportion increased drastically over the course of the next ten 
years. As I mentioned above, throughout the course of the 1990’s the majority of the 
chambers in Argentina adopted a gender quota law. Yet, there was significant variation in 
the success of the gender quotas. The wide variety in the representation of women across 
these systems is due to a large variety of electoral rules as well as the existence of 
provinces where gender quotas were never implemented (or implemented later than in 
other provinces). The three most important electoral rules influencing the success of 
gender quotas are the use of placement mandates, variation in legislative election cycles, 
and variation in district sizes. The remainder of this section will discuss how these 
factors, in combination with gender quotas, influenced women’s numeric representation.   
Placement Mandates: There is variation with respect to the adoption and 
implementation of placement mandates. While most provinces adopted some language 
requiring political parties to place women in positions on the list where they have a 
possibility of being elected (i.e., placement mandates), some provinces omitted placemen 
mandate language. In every province except for San Juan, a placement mandate was 
eventually implemented.  In the case of Corrientes, for example, a gender quota law 
without a placement mandate was adopted in 1993. The adoption of this law did not 
result in an increase in women’s numeric representation because women were not being 
placed in positions on the ballot where they had to possibility of being elected. In 2003, 
the governor issued a decree mandating that the political parties comply with a placement 
! ( 
mandate and providing clarifying language for how the placement mandate should be 
implemented. After the placement mandate was implemented women have always 
occupied at least 30% of the seats in the lower house in Corrientes.   
Legislative Election Cycles: Another source of variation in women’s numeric 
representation in the Argentine legislatures is the provincial level legislative election 
cycles. Some provinces hold elections once every four years and renew every seat in the 
legislative chamber in one election (total renovation) and others hold elections every two 
years and only renew half of the legislative chamber in each election (partial renovation). 
When total renovation is combined with gender quotas, these elections typically result in 
an immediate increase in women’s representation. Whereas partial renovation only cause 
a moderate increase in women’s representation in the first election (typically resulting in 
about 15% women in the chamber) and then becomes fully effective in the second 
election in which the gender quota is employed. This is clearly illustrated by comparing 
the legislative elections in Santa Fe and Chaco. Santa Fe use total renovation; therefore, 
when gender quotas were first implemented in the 1995 election, the proportion of 
women in the legislature immediately rose from 4% to 28%. By comparison, Chaco uses 
partial renovation. When gender quotas were first implemented in Chaco in the 1993 
election, the quotas initially resulted in an increase to 18% women in the legislative 
chamber. After the 1995 election, when the second half of the chamber was renewed, 
women’s numeric representation rose to 31.2%. It is clear from Figure 1.1 that gender 
quotas almost always result in an increase in women’s numeric representation. In some 
cases, however, the adoption of legislative gender quotas results in a big increase, where 
as other legislatures only incur small benefits. Further, the figure illustrates that the 
! ) 
increases in the proportion of female legislators are not always immediate; some 
chambers take multiple legislative cycles before the quota is fully realized. 
 
Figure 1.1: Percentage of Female Legislators by Legislative Chamber 
 
 
 
In 2002 Cordoba moved from a bicameral legislature to a unicameral legislature.  
 
District Magnitude: Finally, provinces vary significantly in district sizes (i.e., 
district magnitudes). Previous research has demonstrated that gender quotas are more 
effective when they are combined with large district magnitudes (Jones 2009). For this 
reason, gender quotas typically result in larger increases in provinces with large district 
magnitudes than in districts with small or medium districts. For example, in systems with 
large district magnitudes, such as the Federal District (magnitude of 30 and 60) properly 
implemented gender quotas result in a significant percentage of female legislators. In the 
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case of the Federal district, women consistently occupy 30% of the legislative seats.  
Other electoral systems are far less compatible with gender quotas.  Electoral systems 
with small district magnitudes typically do not result in large proportions of female 
legislators. For example, in the lower chamber in Salta the district size ranges from 1 to 
10. The gender quota successfully augments the proportion of women elected in the large 
districts, however few women are elected in the smaller districts. As a result, the average 
percentage of seats occupied by women in the lower chamber in Salta rarely rises above 
20%, despite the use of a 30% gender quota. It is evident from this comparison that the 
wide variety of electoral rules used in the Argentine legislatures also contributes to the 
variation in women’s numeric representation.  
Every province that adopted legislative gender quotas has had a different 
experience with the implementation and success of quotas, thus resulting in significant 
variation in women’s numeric representation across the Argentine legislatures, despite 
the widespread adoption of gender quotas. This significant variation in the proportion of 
women in legislative chambers is essential to understand how increases in the proportion 
of female legislators influences women’s legislative behavior. Although it took several 
years for most provinces to adopt and adjust the gender quota laws to be compatible with 
the electoral system and ensure proper implementation, as of today, most legislative 
chambers have implemented successful gender quota legislation. In 2009, the last year of 
my sample, the vast majority of the chambers in Argentina had about 30% or more 
women in the chamber.  
 
 
! "+ 
Variation in Electoral Institutions  
The third reason why the Argentine legislatures are an ideal setting for studying 
women’s legislative behavior is the significant variation in the electoral institutions used 
in each of these legislatures. This is important for the reasons explained above (i.e., 
gender quotas are more compatible with some electoral systems than others), but also, it 
is important because different electoral systems create different legislative incentives, 
which will likely influence women’s legislative behavior. The wide variety of electoral 
systems enables me to examine the independent influence of electoral incentives on 
women’s legislative behavior.  
If we want to understand women’s legislative behavior, it is important to examine 
how women behave under different institutional settings.  For example, some electoral 
systems are known to create strong party-centered incentives (Carey and Shugart 1995), 
which I argue will discourage women from exhibiting behavior that differs from their 
male copartisans. Whereas, other electoral systems are known to foster personalizing 
incentives (Shugart, Valdini and Suominen 2005), which I argue may encourage women 
do distinguish themselves from male colleagues. The Argentine legislatures are an ideal 
setting to examine how institutions influence women’s legislative behavior because each 
legislative chamber is unique. Some legislative chambers elect representatives from at-
large districts, single member districts, or multi-member districts. Multiple legislative 
chambers in my sample employ mixed-member districts in which some members are 
elected from at-large districts and the remaining members are elected from single 
member or multi-member districts.  Equally important, the type of electoral system does 
not vary systematically with the level of development in a given province. It is often the 
! "" 
case that more developed and urban regions have higher district magnitudes and less 
developed and rural regions have smaller district magnitudes. However in the case of the 
Argentine provinces the most developed district (i.e., the Federal District) and some of 
the least developed districts (i.e., Chaco, Jujuy, and Misiones) all elect legislators from 
districts with very large magnitudes; the magnitudes of these districts are: 60 (Federal 
District from 1996 to 2005); 30 (Federal District from 2006 to 2009); 16 (Chaco); 24 
(Jujuy); and 20 (Misiones). This variation in electoral systems, combined with both cross-
sectional and temporal variation in the proportion of female legislators, provides an 
excellent opportunity to compare how electoral incentives shape women’s legislative 
behavior.  
Taken together, these three key sources of variation –variation in the adoption of 
gender quotas, variation in the proportion of women represented in the legislative 
chambers, and variation in electoral systems—make the Argentine legislatures an 
excellent place to examine women’s legislative behavior. This is the only setting where 
one can examine the effects of gender quotas on substantive representation using a large 
number of observations with different electoral systems while making controlled 
comparisons holding many contextual, historical, and cultural variables constant, which 
is impossible in cross-national analyses. 
 
Cosponsorship Behavior  
To carry out this research I collected an original data set containing information 
on women’s political involvement and activities. This dissertation is unique in that it 
focuses exclusively on cosponsorship activity. Previous research on women’s legislative 
! "# 
behavior has not examined women’s cosponsorship patterns.2 This dissertation addresses 
this gap in the literature by examining 1) how women’s cosponsorship differs from their 
male colleagues, 2) how the adoption of gender quotas and changes in women’s numeric 
representation influences women’s cosponsorship behavior and 3) how different 
institutional incentives shape women’s cosponsorship behavior.     
Cosponsorship activity is important for a number of reasons. First, cosponsorship 
activity can provide information about legislators’ preferences relative to their 
colleagues. Second, cosponsoring legislation is a way for legislators to form networks 
with likeminded colleagues, and galvanizing support for shared interests. Third, 
cosponsorship activity can be a powerful tool for building a legislative reputation. These 
three concepts are interrelated, and should not be thought of in complete isolation from 
the others. It is important, however, to recognize each of the distinct attributes.  
 
Cosponsorship as a Preference Indicator 
 One of the most fundamental ways to think about cosponsorship is as a tool for 
legislators to signal their preferences to their colleagues and constituents. Cosponsoring 
legislation is a relatively low cost activity legislators can use to take positions on 
important issues (Balla and Nemacheck 2000; Campbell 1982; Highton and Rocca 2005; 
Koger 2003; and Mayhew 1974). Crisp et al. 2004b explain that the coauthors with whom 
a legislator collaborates may be just as important as the content of legislation for 
signaling the legislators’ preferences. This is because, if we assume that legislators only 
work with likeminded colleagues, those who have similar preferences and agendas, than 
                                                 
#!,-./01!21314256!7647!895:313!9-!761!7;<1!98!.1=/3.47/9-!>9?1-!cosponsor (Swers 
2002; Swindt-Bayer 2010), this research examines the nature of cosponsorship coalitions.!
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we can learn a lot about legislators’ preferences, relative to their colleagues, by observing 
who works with whom. Moreover, legislators can use cosponsorship activity to make 
themselves appear more similar to some colleagues while distinguishing themselves from 
other colleagues. As such, who a legislator coauthors with may be even more informative 
than the content of the legislation. Along a similar vein, Alemán et al. (2009) measure 
legislative preferences by using cosponsorship data to recover ideal point estimates. They 
rely only on the cosponsorship coalitions (and not on the content of legislation) to 
determine legislators ideologically positions, and demonstrate that evaluating 
cosponsorship activity is useful for understanding legislators ideological positions. In 
sum, cosponsorship coalitions can be viewed as a means of communicating legislative 
preferences.  
 
Cosponsorship as a Networking Tool 
Cosponsorship can also be a tool to network with likeminded colleagues and build 
support networks for shared interests. I conducted a large number of interviews in the 
Argentine provinces, and numerous respondents indicate that one of the primary 
motivations for cosponsoring legislation is to demonstrate to their colleagues that there is 
strong support for a piece of legislation.3 When multiple legislators come together in 
support of an issue it is more likely to receive some attention in the chamber and it can 
even increase the probability that an issue gets on the legislative agenda (Kurtz 2005, 
Wilson and Young 1997). It signals to both their colleagues and party bosses that the 
                                                 
3Interviews were conducted with approximately 175 Argentine deputies, party officials 
and elite political observers between August 2009 and June 2010. In keeping with the 
Institutional Review Board requirements for this project, interviewees will remain 
anonymous.  
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legislation is of particular interests to multiple party members. While interviewees 
indicate that cosponsoring legislation with copartisans may not increase the probability a 
bill passing, they believe bills are more likely to pass when they have cosponsors from 
multiple political parties.   
Thinking about cosponsorship as a networking tool is particularly useful when we 
think about women’s legislative behavior. Since women were previously excluded from 
the legislative arena there are many issues that impact women’s daily lives that have 
previously gone unaddressed. Cosponsoring legislation is a constructive way for women 
to demonstrate to their colleagues that issues of this nature are important to a number of 
legislators and have widespread support. Previous research often conceptualizes women’s 
substantive representation as women forming “alliances” to accomplish shared goals 
(Beckwidth 2007:37; Kanter 1977: 966) and as women “networking-with likeminded 
women inside [the legislature]” (Franceschet and Piscopo 2008: 397), but empirical work 
has not attempted to measure this concept. In this research I evaluate women’s propensity 
to form gender-based alliances and network with likeminded women by examining their 
cosponsorship patterns.  
 
Cosponsorship as a Reputation Builder  
Finally, cosponsorship is an important tool for credit claiming and advertising 
(Fenno 1978, Bratton and Haynie 1999). It is true that most voters are not likely to recall 
a single piece of legislation that their state or national legislators authored or coauthored; 
other groups (i.e., interests groups, unions, the media, and other elite political observers) 
however, pay close attention to how legislators behave in office. These groups provide 
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information short cuts to voters, telling them what leaders stands for and who to support 
in elections. For example, one interviewee explained that legislators might choose to 
author and coauthor legislation on education issues in effort to curry favor with teachers 
unions. While individual voters are likely not privy to their legislative behavior, union 
leaders do pay attention and use their position of influence to shape voters’ views of 
legislators. As such, cosponsoring legislation is a tool legislators can use to brand 
themselves as caring about certain issues. Legislators can do this both by coauthoring 
legislation that focuses on specific issues and by affiliating with political networks that 
reflect a certain image. Legislators can signal their legislative preferences to observers 
and curry favor with watch groups by coauthoring relevant legislation with a colleague 
that has a strong rapport with that group. In this way, legislators can use cosponsorship to 
claim credit for and advertise their position on a larger number of issue than they could if 
they choose to author alone. Moreover, they can brand themselves as being similar to 
other legislators. This may help them build favor with watch groups of interests, which 
has clear electoral payoffs. Therefore, scholars can use this cosponsorship information to 
draw inferences about the types of reputations legislators are trying to establish.  
  
Conclusion 
 This dissertation makes three broad contributions. First, it addresses theoretically 
interesting questions regarding the factors that influence women’s legislative behavior. It 
does so by examining how changes in the proportion of female legislators and the 
adoption of gender quotas influence women’s legislative behavior. Then, it builds on this 
body of literature to develop expectation about how different electoral institutions shape 
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women’s legislative behavior. This research explains one of the ways that institutions 
structure legislative behavior to produce outcomes that deviate from expectations 
developed by behavioral approaches. This is an important step for the literature on gender 
and politics as scholars began to develop our understanding of how institutions may 
structure women’s legislative behavior in slightly different ways than it does men’s.   
 Second, this dissertation contributes to the study of women in politics by 
introducing a new conceptualization of women’s legislative behavior and a new 
measurement. Specifically I use cosponsorship data to examine legislative behavior. 
Cosponsorship data offer multiple qualities that are desirable for scholars of legislative 
studies. Cosponsorship data is useful for assessing legislative preferences, political 
networks, and understanding how legislators target their reputations. These are some of 
the most important concepts analyzed by scholars of legislative behavior. Still, legislative 
studies that examine cosponsorship behavior are typically limited to a very small number 
of legislative chambers. I move beyond this limitation by collecting an original data set of 
cosponsorship data that permits me to examine legislative behavior for 23 different 
legislative chambers. Moreover, little work has been done to improve our understanding 
of women’s legislative behavior using cosponsorship data. This dissertation offers a 
unique approach to the study of women’s legislative behavior. I use cosponsorship data to 
contribute to our understanding of how women’s and men’s legislative preferences differ 
from one another’s, and to enhance our understanding of how changes in the adoption of 
gender quotas, changes in the proportion of female legislators, and institutional incentives 
influence women’s legislative networks and the way they build their legislative 
reputations.  
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Finally, this dissertation contributes to the literature on legislative institutions by 
developing a new and exciting data set that will be used to answer a number of questions 
beyond the dissertation. This dissertation project produced a data set that contains 
legislative activities and political appointments across a large number of legislative 
chambers (as many as 32 chambers for some variables) over a long time span. It is among 
the few data sets that offer a systematic collection of legislative behavioral variables for a 
large number of legislative chambers. Typically, even when scholars pool their resources, 
it is uncommon that datasets contain more than several legislative chambers. It is difficult 
to draw systematic conclusions from such a limited number of observations. As such, this 
data set will be useful for a number of projects beyond the dissertation.
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Chapter 2 
Gender and Legislative Preferences 
Women are underrepresented in most of the world’s legislatures. While the 
scarcity of female representation is problematic for multiple reasons, one of the central 
concerns of advocates and scholars alike rests on the assumption that women have 
different legislative preferences than their male counterpart. If this is the case, then this 
implies that where women do not occupy an equitable proportion of the legislature, their 
interests are not well represented.  
Despite this, there is reason to believe that the lack of female legislators may not 
be problematic for women’s representation. This is because many scholars assume that 
all legislators have an electoral incentive to represent constituents’ interests. This implies 
that, even if female legislators have different preferences, they will not behave differently 
than their male collogues. Given the divergent expectations of these two assumptions, 
scholars have developed a keen interest in understanding if gender shapes legislative 
preferences and the extent to which this is observable through legislative behavior.  
To assess this question multiple studies have used roll call voting to measure 
legislators’ preferences. These analyses result in mixed findings. I argue that while male 
and female legislators are likely to exhibit distinct legislative preferences, roll call data 
has limitations that make it difficult to assess these differences. Legislative roll call 
voting is highly structured by party discipline, negative agenda control, and constituency 
influences. Consequently, few intra-party differences emerge in roll call data. Given these 
limitations, other types of political behavior that can be used to measure legislative 
preferences may be preferable for examining within party differences.  
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Alemán et al. (2009) demonstrate that political scientists can measure legislative 
preferences by using cosponsorship data to recover ideal point estimates relatively 
comparable to those recovered from roll call voting.  But, unlike roll call voting, 
cosponsorship activity is not structured by party discipline or negative agenda control 
(Talbert and Potoski 2002). As a result, cosponsorship data reveals significantly more 
intra-party variation and a higher dimensionality than roll call data. As a result, 
cosponsorship analysis may be a more useful tool for exploring how intra-party 
differences, such as gender, influence legislators’ preferences. The goal of this research is 
to examine if gender differences emerge when cosponsorship behavior is used to measure 
legislative preferences.   
The next section briefly reviews the literature that uses roll call data to examine 
gender differences in legislative preferences. Next, I discuss the drawbacks of roll call 
analysis, which make it difficult to uncover gender differences. In the third section I 
discuss cosponsorship analysis as an alternative for examining legislative preferences. 
Finally, I use an original data set that includes cosponsorship data from 18 legislative 
chambers to examine gender differences in legislative preferences.  
 
Gender and Roll Call Voting 
Despite significant gains over the past decade, women remain underrepresented in 
most of the world’s legislatures. While there is a strong normative concern for electing 
representatives who reflect the demographics of a constituency, the implications of 
gender inequality in representative bodies extends far beyond the debate of descriptive 
representation. One of the chief concerns rests on the assumption that female legislators 
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exhibit different legislative preferences than their male colleagues. These divergent 
legislative preferences influence how legislators govern and how they represent their 
constituents. If female legislators do, in fact, exhibit different preferences than males, 
than the disparity between the number of female and male legislators may indicate that 
women’s interests are underrepresented.   
This argument is based on the idea that historically marginalized groups have 
shared life experiences that give them different perspectives on a broad set of issues 
(Phillips 1995; Mansbridge 1999). In this view, members of these groups, or “descriptive 
representatives” may be better suited to represent their interests (Pitkin 1967). This is 
because personal traits (e.g., gender or race) may influence legislators’ behavior “above 
and beyond the extent motivated by constituency and party pressures” (Bratton and 
Haynie, 1991: 659). This does not imply that all female legislators represent the same 
perspective, but rather that they represent a host of female perspectives that are distinct 
from their male colleagues (Piscopo 2011). Additional research supports the notion that 
female legislators are more likely to view women as an important and distinct part of 
their constituency (Reingold 1992; Thomas 1997). Women elected via gender quotas may 
even feel a mandate or obligation to act on behalf of women (Franceschet and Piscopo 
2008). As a result, many studies suggest that women’s descriptive representation is a 
necessary component to sufficiently represent female constituents.  
On the other hand, there is reason to believe that female legislators may not 
represent women differently. This argument is based on rationale that the primary 
objective of all legislators is reelection (or advancing one’s political career). Regardless 
of their sex, all legislators have an incentive to represent their district’s interests 
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(Mayhew 1974). Female legislators, by implication, will not represent constituents 
differently than their male colleagues and gender differences will not be observable via 
legislative behavior. Given these opposing expectations, scholars of gender and politics 
have developed an interest in understanding if gender shapes legislative preferences. 
Over the past few decades analyses of roll call voting has become a standard 
practice for measuring legislative preferences. These analyses rely on multiple different 
scaling techniques (e.g., Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers 2004; Londregan 2000; Martin and 
Quinn 2002; Poole 2000; Poole and Rosenthal 1991; 1997) as well as various interest 
group scores (e.g., Americans for Democratic Action, and the American Conservative 
Union) to determine legislators’ preferences in relation to one another. As a result, 
numerous studies have used roll call voting to examine the extent to which female 
legislators exhibit different preferences than male legislators. Yet, findings from roll call 
voting analyses are mixed. Several studies find that gender does affect voting patterns of 
female legislators (Burrell 1994; Clark 1998; Frankovich 1977; Hogan 2008; Leader 
1977; Welch 1985). At the same time, other studies find no, or only qualified support for 
gender differences (Vega and Firestone 1995; Barnello 1999; Schwindt-Bayer and 
Corbetta 2004; Thomas 1989).  
Schwindt-Bayer and Corbetta (2004) argue that one reason previous research has 
delivered mixed findings is because most research designs do not properly account for 
constituency characteristics. While they grant that women may be more liberal than men, 
they suggest that more liberal roll call voting patterns result among women because they 
are often elected in more liberal districts. Moreover, district characteristics are difficult to 
account for using conventional control variables. They employ a research design that 
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relies on legislative turnover to hold constituency characteristics constant across 
legislators, and find no gender differences in roll call voting.  
Studies that limit the analysis to roll call votes on women’s issues also result in 
mixed findings. Some find that gender is a significant predictor of vote choice 
(Tatolovich and Schier 1993), and women are more likely to vote together across party 
lines (Swers 1998, 2002). For example, Swers finds that Republican women are 
particularly more likely to defect from the party line to support women’s issues in the 
U.S. Congress. Yet, in a study with a similar research design, Barnello (1999) shows this 
finding is not generalizable to the New York State Assembly. In sum, previous research 
that uses roll call voting to measure legislative preferences finds, at best, mixed support 
that for the hypothesis that women display different preferences than their male 
colleagues.  
 
The Drawbacks Roll Call Data 
While there is considerable reason to believe that men and women have different 
legislative preferences, there is reason to believe that roll call voting may not be the best 
place look for gender differences among legislators (Norton 1997; Poggione 2004; 
Schwint-Bayer and Corbetta 2004). First, a number of studies rely on interest group 
scores to examine gender differences in legislative preferences Yet, Norton shows that 
interests group indices often exclude votes of particular interests to women (1997). The 
exclusion of key votes makes it unlikely that gender differences will emerge.  
 Second, roll call voting is highly structured by negative agenda control. 
Legislative institutions give party leaders control over which bills come up for a vote. 
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Since party leaders have an incentive to protect the party brand name, it is rare that they 
permit legislation that divides the governing party to come to a vote on the floor (Cox and 
McCubbins 2005). Thus, roll call voting does not reveal information about the full range 
of legislator’s preferences, rather it only shows where they stand on a small set of 
issues—issues that do not divide the majority party. Even in legislative chambers where 
legislators come under the pressure of multiple factions within the party, leadership can 
mitigate conflict within the party by negotiating policy outcomes before legislation is 
brought to a vote. Federalism, for example, can divide or weaken national level parties 
(Chhibber and Kollman 1998; Mainwaring 1999). In Argentina, for instance, provincial-
level party leaders have considerable control over legislators’ career prospects, causing 
legislators have a stronger incentive to represent the interests of provincial party leaders 
than those of national party leaders (Jones 2008).  Nevertheless, such divisions do not 
diminish party voting unity because the governing party uses negative agenda control to 
keep issues that divide the party from coming to a floor vote (Carry 2009; Desposato 
2004; Jones and Hwang 2005a). As a result, negative agenda control makes it difficult to 
identify divisions within political parties via roll call voting analyses. 
Third, it is difficult to identify intra-party differences because roll call votes are 
highly structured by party discipline. Individual votes are typically decided by the party 
as a whole and members are expected to represent the party’s preference, not their own. 
Party discipline is particularly strong outside of the U.S.4 For example, in an analysis of 
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may be governed by party discipline. McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal (2001) argue that 
while party is an extremely strong predictor of legislators’ ideal points, it is less clear the 
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15 countries, Carey (2009) explains that in most legislative chambers in Latin America 
roll call votes are a matter of party discipline, and legislators who break discipline are 
typically sanctioned. Thus, roll call data strongly reflect partisan divisions and provide 
little information about the intra-party relationship between legislators.  
The combination of negative agenda control and high party discipline result in roll 
call behavior that is highly polarized and exhibits low-dimensionality. Although the large 
majority of research on roll call behavior focuses on the U.S. congress, low-dimensional 
special models have been found in a wide-variety of settings, including the United 
Nations, multiple countries across Europe, and all throughout Latin America (Poole and 
Rosenthal 2001, Carey 2009). Findings from Argentina are consistent with the broader 
literature on roll call data. In Jones and Hwang’s detailed roll call analysis of the 
Argentine National Congress they demonstrate that an average of 93.2% of bills are 
correctly classified by the first (i.e., partisan) dimension (2005a). Given the small number 
of roll call votes in Argentina, this means that there were never more than 11 votes that 
were incorrectly classified, but more frequently there were as few as one or two (see 
Table 1 in Jones and Hwang 2005a). To account for the small number of bills that were 
not correctly classified by the partisan dimension, Jones and Hwang labored over 
newspapers, parliamentary debates, and personal interviews with deputies to identify any 
discernable commonalities in these bills. They conclude that, “no conceivable second 
dimension was detected” (2005a: 271). Given the highly polarized and low-dimensional 
                                                 
extent to which legislators’ positions are a product of party discipline or ideological 
discipline, electoral pressures, and other external pressures. 
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properties of roll call behavior, even if gender differences do exist, we may not expect to 
see them emerge in roll call voting.  
Finally, roll call analysis poses practical problems for researchers looking beyond 
the U.S. Many legislatures do not record roll call votes at all making it impossible to use 
roll call analysis. Other chambers only record votes when a member formally requests a 
record vote. Selectively recording votes creates a biased sample. Taken together, the 
qualities of roll call analysis discussed in this section may explain why previous research 
has produced inconsistent evidence that gender influences legislative preferences. 
 
Cosponsorship Analysis: A Possible Alternative 
Given the challenges posed by roll call analysis, scholars of gender and politics 
have advocated looking beyond roll call analysis to uncover gender differences in policy 
preferences (Norton 1997; Poggione 2004). Similarly, recent literature has begun to 
explore how different types of legislative behavior, such as cosponsorship activity can be 
used to examine legislative preferences (e.g., Alemán el al. 2009; Talbert and Potoski 
2002). In a recent study, Alemán et al. (2009) demonstrate that political scientists can 
measure legislative preferences using cosponsorship data to recover ideal point estimates 
relatively comparable to those recovered from roll call voting.  But, unlike roll call 
voting, cosponsorship activity is not structured by party discipline or negative agenda 
control (Talbert and Potoski 2002). As a result, cosponsorship data reveals significantly 
more intra-party variation than roll call data and may be better suited for exploring more 
subtle intra-party differences. Given this, I use cosponsorship data to explore if women 
have different legislative preferences than men. Before proceeding to the analysis, it is 
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necessary to understand what I mean by legislative preferences with respect to 
cosponsorship data, as well as the disadvantages and advantages of using cosponsorship 
data to measure preferences. 
 
Cosponsorship as a Preference Indicator 
One of the most fundamental ways to think about cosponsorship is as a tool for 
legislators to signal their preferences to their colleagues and constituents. Cosponsoring 
legislation is a relatively low cost activity legislators can use to take positions on 
important issues (Balla and Nemacheck 2000; Campbell 1982; Highton and Rocca 2005; 
Koger 2003; and Mayhew 1974; Swers 2002). Crisp et al. (2004) explain that the 
coauthors with whom a legislator collaborates may be just as important as the subject 
matter of legislation for signaling the legislator’s preferences. Legislators can use 
cosponsorship activity to make themselves appear more similar to some colleagues while 
distinguishing themselves from others. As such, whom a legislator coauthors with may be 
even more informative than the content of the legislation. Along a similar vein, Alemán 
et al. (2009) measure legislative preferences using cosponsorship data to recover ideal 
point estimates. They rely only on the cosponsorship coalitions—not the content of 
legislation—to determine legislators’ positions. Unlike previous literature that examines 
women’s preferences by examining if women sponsor and cosponsor legislation that is of 
particular interests to women (e.g., Schwindt-Bayer 2010; Swers 1998, 2002), their 
analysis of cosponsorship data allows us to understand representatives preferences vis-à-
vi other representatives.  
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However, unlike ideal point estimates recovered from roll call votes, 
cosponsorship analysis results in a higher dimensionality (Alemán el al. 2009; Talbert 
and Potoski 2002). While the first dimension represents the primary cleavage in a 
legislature (e.g., often the partisan cleavage), other dimensions can be thought of as 
salient issue cleavages within the chamber. Taken together, when I refer to legislative 
preferences, I am examining if women exhibit distinguishable policy preferences from 
men, which manifest in distinct cosponsorship coalitions.  
 
Disadvantages of Cosponsorship Data  
 It is also important to be familiar with the shortcomings of cosponsorship data. 
First, cosponsorship is a voluntary activity. Unlike roll call voting, where all members 
vote on the same issues, representatives must pick and choose which legislation they will 
cosponsor (Highton and Rocca 2005). While, roll call votes provide information about 
every member on every issue that comes to the floor, cosponsorship data only provides 
information about some members on some issues.  When a representative chooses to 
cosponsor legislation, this activity provides a large amount of information about the 
legislator vis-à-vi other legislators, and it sends a clear signal that the representative 
supports the proposed policy location over the status quo. But, when a legislator does not 
cosponsor, there is no information about the representative’s position. It is not clear what 
it means for a representative to refrain from cosponsoring. Not cosponsoring may signal 
that a representative is opposed to, not interested in, or simply not aware of the proposed 
legislation. Scholars cannot distinguish between the intentions of representatives who do 
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not cosponsor and therefore treat all choices to not cosign the same (Alemán et al. 2009).  
This is the primary shortcoming of cosponsorship analysis.  
Second, some scholars question the amount of information that can be obtained 
from cosponsorship data because it is essentially “cheap talk” (Fowler 2006:459). 
Representatives who cosponsor legislation do not have to spend time drafting legislation, 
they just sign on. Cosponsorship is a low-cost way to signal one’s position on issues 
(Kessler and Krehbiel 1996; Wilson and Young 1997). Cosponsorship cannot “reveal the 
depth of members’ commitment” to issues (nor can roll call voting), but it is still a good 
indicator of their general interests (Swers 2002:57).   
 
Advantages of Cosponsorship Data 
Despite these shortcomings, cosponsorship analysis has substantial merits. The 
first benefit is that cosponsorship activity is not subject to negative agenda control. 
Legislative rules enable party leaders to reduce a multidimensional issue space into one-
dimensional roll call votes via negative agenda control (e.g., Shepsle 1979). Conversely, 
legislative rules do not allow party leaders to formally monitor and restrict what 
legislation is introduced. Instead, legislators are relatively free to decide what legislation 
they would like to introduce and with whom they will cosponsor legislation. As a result, 
pre-floor decisions, such as cosponsorship, reflect a higher dimensionality and more 
intra-party variation than roll call votes (Talbert and Potoski 2002).  
The second benefit is that cosponsorship activity is not governed by strong party 
discipline. In many chambers, legislators are required to vote in lock step with the party. 
This limits the amount of useful information scholars can extract from roll call votes. 
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Cosponsorship data remedies this problem by providing more intra-party information. 
Party leaders have relatively little incentive to exercise party discipline over bill 
cosponsorship for two reasons (Highton and Rocca 2005). First, cosponsorship activity it 
is not deterministic of policy outcomes. Most bills never come to a vote. Given this, it is 
more costly for party leaders to exercise party discipline in the pre-floor stage than to use 
institutional rules to prevent bills from advancing to the floor.  Second, bill cosponsorship 
is less likely than roll call voting to adversely impact the party brand name. This is 
because news media and opposition campaigns tend to draw more attention to a 
legislator’s voting record than the member’s cosponsorship record (Sulkin and Swigger 
2008). Since partisan and constituent pressures impose less structure on cosponsorship 
activity, cosponsorship analysis uncovers more dimensions than does roll call vote 
analysis, particularly in chambers with strong party discipline (Alemán et al. 2009). 
Additionally, cosponsorship analysis has practical benefits. Cosponsorship data 
allows scholars to recover legislators’ policy positions in chambers where roll call voting 
is not well recorded, or not recorded at all (as is the case in the Argentine provinces and 
many developing democracies) (Carey 2009). Moreover, scholars can measure 
cosponsorship behavior with practically no error. Given the attractive qualities of 
cosponsorship analysis for examining intra-party differences, I use this method to explore 
the extent to which women exhibit different legislative preferences than their male 
colleagues.  
 
Sample Selection and Research Design 
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The Argentine provinces provide an ideal setting to examine if female 
representatives exhibit different preferences than their male colleagues. First, in many of 
the Argentine legislatures, representatives are elected from at-large electoral districts. At-
large districts are adventitious because they allow me to hold district and constituency 
characteristics constant across legislators. Previous research argues that, first, it is 
extremely difficult to control for constituency and district influences; and, second, it 
attributes previous finding of gender differences in roll call voting to the lack of adequate 
controls (Schwindt-Bayer and Corbetta 2004). Schwindt-Bayer and Corbetta suggest that 
rather than trying to control for these subtle differences it is best to hold district and 
constituency constant. My research design takes a similar approach. I hold these variables 
constant by examining legislative behavior in at-large districts and districts with large 
district magnitudes. Specifically, 11 of the chambers in my sample use at-large districts 
to elect provincial legislators (see Table 2.2). The remaining six chambers have large 
district magnitudes. At-large districts and large district magnitudes allow me to compare 
legislative preferences of male and female legislators who were elected in the same 
district.  
Second, the vast majority of the Argentine provinces have adopted a legislative 
gender quota. The quotas require that women occupy at least 30% of the candidate list for 
all political parties participating in legislative elections. The ubiquitous adoption of 
legislative gender quotas ensures that women are elected in all districts and also that they 
represent all legislative parties. Since the electoral law requires that every party in every 
district comply with the gender quota, women are not more likely to be elected in more 
liberal districts or by more woman-friendly parties. Every party, in every district must 
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comply with the gender quota to compete in the election.5 The combination of gender 
quotas in at-large districts, allow me to compare the preferences of women and men who 
represent the exact same constituency. Consequently, if only constituency and/or partisan 
influences shape legislators’ preferences then I can expect that on average, women will 
behave no differently than men. However, if personal traits, such as gender do have an 
impact, I can expect to find gender differences.  
Third, the Argentine provinces are good candidates for examining if gender 
differences emerge in other types of legislative behavior, such as cosponsorship behavior, 
because roll call votes are not recorded in the Argentine provinces. Furthermore, even if 
votes were recorded, gender differences would not be discernable because the party 
leaders exercise strong negative agenda control and strict party discipline. As such, roll 
call data would not provide useful information. It is necessary, then, to examine earlier 
stages of the legislative process to understand intra-party differences. I traveled to each of 
the provinces in my sample to interview legislators, conduct archival research, and 
observe legislative sessions.6 In every province, legislators and legislative observers 
described the same voting process. Legislators meet with their political parties in the 
reunión del bloques prior to floor votes to determine the party’s position. On the chamber 
                                                 
5 Placement mandates ensure that every party in the provincial level election complies 
with the gender quota. Not ever province, however, adopted placement mandate language 
when quotas were first adopted. Some provinces adopted the placement mandate 
language in a later legislative session. In my sample this is the case for Buenos Aires, 
Córdoba, Corrientes, Mendoza, Río Negro, and Tucuman. 
6 While in Buenos Aires, I interviewed legislators from Santa Cruz. I did not travel there. 
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floor, all party members vote the same way. The provincial legislatures do not 
systematically record roll call legislation. Members simply raise their hands to signal 
their position, and only the final outcome is recorded. Elite political observers often noted 
that, when voting, legislators do not think for themselves; they simply raise their hands 
when they are told to do so.  
If a member disagrees with the party position, the legislator may abstain from 
voting (which is rare) or risk party sanctions. Legislators who break with the party line 
are typically removed from the party or voluntarily leave the party. Since provincial party 
bosses largely determine the career patterns of Argentine politicians, breaking from the 
party typically means the end of a member’s political career (Jones 2008). Thus, 
members rarely have an incentive to defect.7 Given the strong party discipline that 
governs legislative voting in the Argentine provinces, gender differences would certainly 
not be detectable via roll call behavior (even if it were recorded). Rather, roll call 
behavior in the provinces would look very similar to roll call behavior in the National 
Congress. Recall that roll call analysis at the national level indicate that the Argentine 
Congress can be characterized by a single partisan dimension (Jones and Hwang 2005a). 
Further, additional analysis of roll call data from the Argentine Congress does not 
                                                 
7 There are very few exceptions to this structure of roll call voting. On rare occasions, 
contentious votes are considered an issue of “conscience.” If the chamber votes on an 
issue of conscience, members are permitted to vote as they personally see fit. These 
issues are few and extremely controversial. Consequently, they rarely come to a vote (on 
average no more than one or two per session). 
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uncover any gender differences.8 The strong party discipline and negative agenda control 
that constricts the information available from roll call voting and the absence of record 
votes (a limitation common across Latin America [c.f. Carey 2009]) further illustrates the 
need to examine pre-floor behavior, such as cosponsorship analysis, in effort to discern 
gender differences in legislative preferences.  
Finally, subnational institutions in federal systems merit scholarly attention—
particularly from those scholars studying gender and politics—because subnational 
governments typically have jurisdiction over health and education policies. As 
Franceschet (2011) points out, this jurisdiction gives state governments influence over 
areas of reproductive rights, access to contraceptives, sexual education, and other issues 
that shape women’s lives. Taken together, the Argentine provincial legislatures provide 
an excellent opportunity to examine if gender influences legislative preferences.  
 
Ideal Point Estimates Using Cosponsorship Data  
                                                 
8 I obtained replication data from Jones and Hwang (2005) to examine if gender 
differences emerge in their roll call data. I do not find evidence of gender differences. I 
also obtained replication data from Alemán et al. (2009) to examine if gender differences 
emerge when analyzing cosponsorship data in the Argentine National Congress. Using 
the exact same sample of representatives, I find that gender differences do emerge in the 
cosponsorship analysis of Argentina but not in roll call analysis. These findings can be 
explained by the fact that, as Jones and Hwang demonstrate, roll call data in the 
Argentine Congress is highly structured by party discipline and negative agenda control. 
Yet, cosponsorship data reveals more intra-party differences (Alemán et al. 2009).  
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The first step in my empirical analysis is to calculate ideal point estimates using 
cosponsorship data.9 I employ the technique developed by Alemán et al. (2009). I first 
code the cosponsors of each piece of legislation authored during the period under study. 
For each piece of legislation a representative receives a “1” if they coauthor the 
legislation and a “0” otherwise. Second, I use this information to construct an affiliation 
matrix. This indicates the number of times each pair of legislators coauthor together. For 
example, in 2002 in the Córdoba Chamber Maria Amelia Chiofalo and Maria del Carmen 
Ceballos de Carbonetti coauthored 17 bills together. The affiliation matrix reflects this 
information for each legislator dyad in the chamber. Then, I use the affiliation matrix to 
calculate an agreement matrix. The agreement matrix indicates the ratio of legislation 
each legislator-dyad cosponsors together to the total number sponsored by each of them. 
Diputada Chiofalo coauthored 46 bills and 17 (or 37%) of those were with her colleague 
Diputada Ceballos de Carbonetti. Diputada Ceballos de Carbonetti, on the other hand, 
coauthored a total of 52 bills; so, only 33% of her bills (i.e., 17/52) were coauthored with 
Diputada Chiofalo. Finally, I use a principal component analysis with singular value 
decomposition to recover ideal point estimates from the log-transformed agreement 
matrix. Singular value decomposition is a way of factoring matrices into a series of linear 
approximations that expose the underlying structure of the matrix (or that best explains 
                                                 
9 The cosponsorship data are based on an original dataset that I collected by visiting each 
legislative chamber between August 2009 and May 2010. With the exception of Santa 
Cruz, data was obtained from the parliamentary services or the legislative archives in the 
provincial legislatures. Data for Santa Cruz was collected from the online archive in 
December 2009.  
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the variance in the data). As a result, when two members coauthor together frequently, 
their ideal point estimates will likely be more similar than coauthors that rarely work 
together. Hence, Diputada Chiofalo’s ideal point estimate on the 1st dimension (.67) is 
closer to Diputada Ceballos de Carbonetti’s (.46) with whom she coauthored 17 bills and 
has an agreement score of 37% than it is to Diputado Jose Tanus Rufei’s (.28), with 
whom she only coauthored 4 bills and has an agreement score of 9%. I recover the ideal 
point estimates for the first two dimensions.10  
                                                 
10 See Alemán et al. for a detailed discussion of the method employed here. Alemán et al. 
compare cosponsorship analysis between the U.S. Congress and the Argentine Congress. 
These chambers exhibit different cosponsorship behavior in terms of the size of 
cosponsorship coalitions. There are a number of ways one could create comparability 
between the two chambers. For example, they use a log transformed agreement matrix for 
the Argentine Congress and an agreement matrix without a log transformation for the 
U.S. Congress. There is similar variation in the cosponsorship patterns of the Argentine 
provinces. In some provinces it is common for members to form small cosponsorship 
coalitions (two to five members). In other provinces it is not uncommon that whole 
parties mobilize to coauthor legislation together (20 to 30 members). Since party level 
decisions to cosponsors bills are not consistent with the underlying assumptions of the 
research and do not reveal intra-party differences, in addition to using the log transformed 
agreement matrix, the results presented here omit bills coauthored by nearly the whole 
chamber or those coauthored by the vast majority of the dominant parties. The results are 
robust to this decision. 
! $' 
Plots of the ideal point estimates reveal that similar to the National Argentine 
Chamber of Deputies, the provincial legislatures in Argentina are organized along a 
government vs. opposition continuum, which can be interpreted as a partisan index. As an 
illustration of this pattern, Figure 2.1 plots the ideal point estimates recovered from 1st 
and 2nd dimension from the Unicameral Chamber in Córdoba from the 2002-2003 period. 
During this period two political parties controlled the Chamber of Deputies: the Partido 
Justicialista (PJ—the governing party) and Unión Cívica Radical (UCR).11 As Figure 2.1 
illustrates, this inter-party dynamic largely explains the 1st dimension. There is relatively 
high and stable inter-party heterogeneity in legislators’ cosponsorship behavior. This is 
exemplified by the division in ideal point estimates between parties and the relatively 
limited intra-party variation on the 1st dimension.  
During this legislative period in Córdoba, the 1st dimension only explains about 
.40 of the variance in cosponsorship behavior.  The 2nd dimension explains an additional 
.16 of the variance. Given the relatively unstructured nature of cosponsorship behavior, 
the significant proportion of variance explained by the second dimension (relative to 
analyses of roll call voting) is not surprising. It is consistent with the discussion of 
cosponsorship behavior, and it provides evidence that the 2nd dimension merits attention. 
Whereas the 1st dimension in this plot illustrates a sharp partisan divide, the 2nd dimension 
illustrates more intra-party heterogeneity. The 2nd dimension represents salient issue 
cleavages within the political parties. While multiple issue cleavages may arise within the 
parties this research is primarily focused on identifying gender differences. The plot 
clearly shows that gender differences emerge in the 2nd dimension. The ideal point 
                                                 
11 In 2002 in Córdoba the PJ was part of the Alliance for the Union of Córdoba. 
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estimates for the PJ and the UCR demonstrate that women tend to have more similar 
preferences to their female copartisans than to their male copartisans. This difference is 
evident from the way that female legislators cluster on the north end of the plot.  
 
Figure 2.1: Scatter Plot of Ideal Point Estimates: Example from The Unicameral 
Chamber of Deputies in Córdoba 2002-2003. 
 
 
The clustering of ideal point estimates represent the propensity of women to work 
together in an effort to introduce legislation that raises awareness around social issues; 
! $) 
and secondly, to coauthor important legislation for women, children, and families. For 
example, in 2000, ten females from the Córdoba Chamber of Deputies coauthored 
legislation to create the Provincial Council of Women. The goal of the agency is to bring 
together a range of political actors to promote women’s rights. While, ten women initially 
created the agency, the coalition of actors who influenced the development of the council 
grew to include the vast majority of female legislators. In 2002, 23 females coauthored 
legislation amending the structure of the council’s executive bureau. This is only one of 
the 25 bills in the Córdoba Chamber in 2002 that was coauthored by a coalition of five or 
more women.  
Consistent with the example from Córdoba, in most of the legislative chambers in 
my sample, the 1st dimension reflects sharp partisan divisions. This is because it is more 
common for representatives to coauthor with copartisans than with colleagues outside 
their party. Interviews with representatives in all chambers suggest that it is rare for 
legislators to seek out a coauthor from the opposition party, and this norm is clearly 
reflected in the data. The 2nd dimension tends to reveal more intra-party variation, which 
indicates that gender differences may be more likely to emerge here. As such, I will 
examine ideal point estimates from both the 1st and 2nd.  
 
Measuring Gender Differences 
In this section I use the ideal point estimates to measure differences between 
women’s and men’s legislative preferences. I am specifically interested in evaluating 
gender differences within political parties. Therefore, I only evaluate differences between 
members from the same political party. I measure these differences by taking the absolute 
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value of the dyadic difference between each female legislator’s ideal point and each of 
her copartisans. This allows me to measure if women’s preferences are closer to their 
female copartisans than they are to their male copartisans.  
This measurement is particularly appropriate for the Argentine context. Like 
many political party systems in Latin America, Argentine political parties do not have 
strong ideological differences and do not exhibit stable policy preferences over time (De 
Riz 1995; Gibson and Calvo 2000; Manzetti 1993). (Jones and Hwang 2005a). Rather, 
Jones and Hwang characterize the National Chamber as being organized along 
government vs. opposition continuum. While this can be interpreted as a partisan index, 
the left-right ordering of the parties cannot be directly interpreted as liberal-conservative. 
Political parties, in other words, do not consistently occupy the same ideological position 
from year to year, from province to province, or even from legislator to legislator within 
the same chamber (Jones and Hwang 2005b). For example, Barnes and Jones (2011) 
point out that in the past two decades, presidents from the Partido Justicialista have 
occupied multiple ideological positions (i.e., President Menem [conservative, 1989-
1999], President De la Rúa [centrist, 2000-2001], President Kirchner [progressive, 2004-
2007], and President Fernández [progressive, 2008-present]). Similarly, Jones and 
Hwang uses elite survey data to demonstrate that Congress members from the main 
Argentine parties (i.e., the PJ and the UCR) are often “indistinguishable in terms of their 
ideological self-placement” despite that their voting behavior on the floor is “quite 
distinct and polarized” (2005b: 133). By contrast to the U.S. Congress, political party 
affiliation in Argentina is not indicative of a representative’s ideology. Moreover, 
Argentina is unique in that there are a large number of political parties that compete in 
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only one province (De Luca, Jones, and Tula 2002). These characteristics of the 
Argentine political system make it impossible to develop expectations about how female 
legislators will differ from male legislators on a left-right continuum, or to apply one 
expectation to all provinces.  
I can, however, assume that legislators who are located close to one another on a 
given dimension are more similar than legislators who are located further apart. 
Therefore, I measure gender differences as the absolute value of the difference between 
each female legislator and each of her copartisans (i.e., |ideal pointL1 – ideal pointL2|). The 
theoretical distance ranges from 0 to 2.  It is worth repeating that I am only interested in 
gender differences within political parties, so I limit my analysis to copartisan dyads. If 
gender differences do exist within parties, than the average distance between female-
female dyads will be smaller than the difference between female-male dyads. Since the 1st 
dimension reflects a sharp partisan divide, and the 2nd dimension reveals more intra-party 
variation I examine both dimensions.  
 
Estimation Technique  
To see if a gender difference exists between these two groups (i.e., female-female 
dyads compared to female-male dyads), I regress the gender composition of the dyad 
onto my dependent variable. This variable labeled Female is coded “1” for female-female 
dyads and “0” for female-male dyads.  Since my sample selection holds district and 
constituency characteristics constant for all legislators in the same legislative session and 
only compares copartisans, I do not need to control for these variables. Still, there is 
variation across legislative chambers and within legislative sessions. For example, one 
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may think that the status of women within the province or the legislative chamber may 
influence women’s behavior. To account for this variation, I control for the percentage of 
women in the legislative chamber during each session, the economic development of the 
province (measured as GDP), the Gender-related Development Index (GDI) in each 
province. Secondly, it is possible that different electoral rules influence the way 
representatives behave. I control for the type of district used to elect members (i.e., multi-
member or at-large).  
Given the structure of my data (i.e., there are three levels: dyads are nested within 
legislators, legislators are nested within legislative sessions, and legislative sessions are 
nested within legislative chambers) I estimate this relationship using a hierarchical linear 
model (Gelman and Hill 2007). I include three random intercepts, one for each level in 
the data: individual legislators, legislative sessions, and legislative chambers.  The 
inclusion of a random intercept relaxes the assumption of independence of errors for 
observations within the same level. Omitting the random intercepts would produce biased 
standard errors; potentially biasing the results in favor of gender differences. The results 
for the pooled analysis are in Table 2.1.  
 
Do Gender Differences Exist? 
Look first at Model 1 in Table 2.1. Model 1 indicates the average distance 
between female-female dyads compared to the average distance between female-male 
dyads using ideal point estimates obtained from the 1st dimension. In the pooled analysis 
the coefficient for female-female dyad (-.025) is negative and the p-value is significant at 
the .001 level. The results indicate that on average, the ideal point estimates of females 
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are closer to the ideal point estimates of their female copartisans than they are to the ideal 
point estimates of their male copartisans, signifying that the preferences of female 
legislators are more similar to other females. The analysis indicates that gender 
differences emerge in the 1st dimension.  
Table 2.1: Intra-Partisan Gender Differences in Legislators’ Ideal Point Estimates, 
Estimated Coefficients from HLM using the Pooled Sample.  
 
 Model (1) Model (2) 
 1st Dimension 2nd Dimension 
Female -0.025*** -0.052*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) 
% Women 0.190 -0.289 
 (0.244) (0.235) 
GDI -1.668 -2.146 
 (1.627) (1.672) 
GDP 0.208 0.329 
 (0.473) (0.479) 
At-Large -0.007 -0.009 
 (0.054) (0.057) 
Constant 1.621 2.182* 
 (1.265) (1.302) 
St. Dev. Of the Random Effects Intercepts 
Chamber-Level -2.508*** -2.384*** 
 (0.306) (0.262) 
Session-Level -1.981*** -2.078*** 
 (0.090) (0.098) 
Legislator-Level -1.930*** -1.912*** 
 (0.036) (0.035) 
St. Dev. Residual -1.262*** -1.233*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) 
Chambers 18 18 
Sessions 118 118 
Legislator-Dyads 11512 11512 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<.10, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
Coefficients from HLM and pooled sample Standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable for 
Model 1 (Model 2) uses ideal point estimates from the 1st dimension (2nd dimension).  
 
Given that the 1st dimension is largely structured by partisan differences and, 
secondly, that it only explains about half (on average .44) of the variance in 
cosponsorship behavior, it seems reasonable to assume that gender differences will also 
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be present in the 2nd dimension.12 The 2nd dimension reveals more intra-party 
heterogeneity and explains, on average, an additional .16 of the variation in 
cosponsorship behavior.  
Model 2 in Table 2.1 reports the results for the analysis of the 2nd dimension. 
First, notice the size of the coefficient for the constant (2.182). This indicates the average 
distance between female and male representatives from the same party. The coefficient is 
much larger than the constant reported for Model 1 (1.621). The larger coefficient 
indicates that the average distance between female and male copartisans is larger on the 
2nd dimension than it is on the 1st, providing further evidence that the second dimension 
exhibits more intra-party heterogeneity. Next, look at the coefficient for Female (-.052). 
Similar to the 1st dimension, the negative coefficient indicates that female legislators have 
preferences that are more similar to their female colleagues than to their male colleagues. 
Moreover, the coefficient is more than double the size of the coefficient reported in 
Model 1 (-.025). The larger coefficient indicates that gender better predicts differences on 
the 2nd dimension than it does on the 1st dimension. This finding is not surprising since the 
2nd dimension reveals more intra-party variance. These analyses support the widespread 
hypothesis that gender shape legislative preferences and behaviors.  
                                                 
1212 From a comparative prospective, one may anticipate the 1st dimension to explain more 
variance in chambers that exhibit more ideological structure. Nonetheless, since 
cosponsorship data are not subject to the same partisan pressures as roll call data, it is 
probable that intra-partisan variation will emerge in later dimensions. As such, gender 
differences are likely to emerge in any chamber where women work together frequently 
to promote shared interests.   
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Chamber Level Analysis 
The pooled analysis indicates that gender differences emerge in both the 1st and 
2nd dimensions. Still, gender differences may not be present in each of the legislatures in 
my sample. To better understand how widespread gender differences are I estimate 
individual models for each of the 18 legislative chambers in my sample. Excluding the 
(now unnecessary) chamber-level intercept as well as the chamber-level and session-level 
indicators, I use the same estimation technique as before to evaluate the difference in 
female-female dyads compared female-male dyads.13  
The results from the chamber-level analysis are summarized in Table 2.2. 
Although the 1st dimension tends to represent sharp partisan divisions, gender differences 
between co-partisans emerge in 8 of the 18 chambers. These findings may be surprising 
given the partisan nature of the 1st dimension. While the 1st dimension explains a large 
proportion of the variance in cosponsorship behavior, it is slightly less than half (see 
Table 2.2 row 7). The relatively small proportion of variance explained by the 1st 
dimension indicates that the ideal points obtained from cosponsorship data are far from 
being one-dimensional and illustrates the value of looking beyond the 1st dimension.   
The sixth column in Table 2.2 summarizes the results from the 2nd dimension. 
Again, it is important to note, in each case, the 2nd dimension accounts for a significant 
amount of the variance. The proportion of variance explained in the 2nd dimension ranges 
from .10 to .20; indicating that in every chamber analyzed in my sample, cosponsorship 
                                                 
13 Given the small number of female legislators elected to each chamber I do not limit this 
analysis to women within the same district for the chamber-level analysis of multi-
member districts. But, I only consider the at-large portion of the mixed member districts.  
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behavior reveals a higher dimensionality than is typically revealed in analyses of roll call 
voting. This further illustrates how the lack of partisan and institutional structures (which 
influence roll call voting behavior) allows me to extract more information about 
legislators’ preferences from cosponsorship behavior. The significant amount of variance 
explained by the 2nd dimensions demonstrates the importance of analyzing the 2nd 
dimension.  
The analyses of the 2nd dimension provide additional support for my finding, 
revealing gender differences for eight additional chambers (i.e., Buenos Aires House, 
Chaco, Córdoba House, Córdoba Senate, Corrientes, Mendoza House, Salta, and 
Tucuman). The Federal District, Mendoza Senate, Misiones, and Santa Cruz, revealed 
gender differences in the 1st dimension but not in the 2nd. In the case of the Federal 
District, Mendoza Senate, and Misiones, the coefficient was in the expected direction but 
is not statistically significant. Santa Cruz, on the other hand, is an outlier in the sample. 
Historically, the PJ has dominated the Santa Cruz legislature. The influence of the PJ is 
particularly pronounced since 2004. During the 2004 to 2007 period the PJ occupied 85% 
of the seats in the Santa Cruz legislature.  During the 2008-2009 period the PJ occupied 
77% of the seats in the chamber.  Given the small presence of the opposition, the same 
partisan cleavage that is present in the other legislative chambers does not dominate the 
1st dimension. Instead, the 1st dimension reveals more intra-party heterogeneity than in 
other chambers, and explains a larger proportion of the variance (.76). Considering this, it 
is not surprising that gender differences emerge in the 1st dimension and not in the 2nd in 
the case of Santa Cruz. A similar result emerges from the Misiones analysis where the 1st 
dimension explains .65 of the variance.  
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Conversely, the Federal District has a higher than average party fragmentation, as 
compared to the other provinces. This may help explain why gender differences do not 
emerge in the 2nd dimension in the Federal District. When there are more parties in the 
chamber, the partisan dynamics may not be as fully explained by the 1st dimension. As 
such, there may be less intra-party heterogeneity revealed in the 2nd dimension. 
Additionally, when party fragmentation is high, fewer members—and hence fewer 
women—are elected into each party. Since my analysis is focused only on copartisans, 
the smaller number of females per party would make it difficult to uncover gender 
differences among copartisans. It is less clear, why gender differences do not emerge in 
the 2nd dimension of the Mendoza Senate.  
Overall, of 18 chambers I examine in this analysis, there are statistically 
significant gender differences in all but two of the legislative chambers, Chubut and 
Formosa. One the one hand, it is unexpected that gender differences do not emerge in the 
Chubut. This may be a product of the small number of cosponsors who sign on to every 
bill. There are generally only 2 or 3 cosponsors (an average of 2.38 on each bill in this 
analysis) in Chubut. On the other hand, in the case of Formosa the coefficient is in the 
expected direction. Give the small number of legislators in the chamber it is not unusual 
that there are not significant differences.  
 Finally, it is worth reiterating that the findings from this analysis are not a 
product of constituency characteristics or district demographics. Rather, gender 
differences are present in nine chambers that use at-large districts to elect legislators (i.e., 
Chaco, Córdoba House, Córdoba Unicameral, Corrientes House, Federal District, 
Misiones, Río Negro, Santa Fe, Santa Cruz). In these chambers, each legislator represents 
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the exact same district. Since constituency and district characteristics are held constant, 
we can be certain that these results are not driven by constituency differences.  
The gender differences revealed in these analyses reflect women’s propensity to 
promote shared interests by cosponsoring legislation. A female legislator I interviewed 
from Río Negro, explained that women work together on issues that affect women. She 
noted that since everyone has different ideologies and perspectives, they discuss their 
points of view to develop legislation that better represents a range of women. She has 
worked frequently with female colleagues to address issues concerning women’s health 
and violence against women and children. This type of collaboration is evident in most of 
the provinces. For example, after the protection against family violence law was passed 
in the National Congress in 1994, groups of women in provinces across Argentina, 
formed coalitions to introduce legislation to raising awareness about family violence and 
encourage their province to adopt measures to comply with the national law. Women 
coalescing to promote issues of mutual concern such as the protection against family 
violence law are the types of behaviors that distinguish them in this analysis.  
 
Conclusion 
Democratic theorists often debate the significance of descriptive representation 
and its importance for democracy. In particular, scholars of gender and politics are 
interested in understanding if female legislators represent women constituents differently 
than their male colleagues. A key piece of this puzzle is to understand if female 
legislators exhibit different legislative preferences than male legislators and the extent to 
which this is observable in their legislative behavior.  
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Extant research that examines this question results in mixed findings. I suggest 
that it is difficult to uncover gender differences in legislative preferences with roll call 
data because roll call behavior is highly structured by party influences. Since 
cosponsorship behavior is less structured by party pressures, cosponsorship data may be 
more appropriate for examining intra-party differences such as gender. Using a new 
dataset based on cosponsorship data from 18 Argentine provincial-level legislative 
chambers I find that gender does influence legislative preferences. I demonstrate that 
gender differences are present within political parties in approximately 90% of the 
legislative chambers in my sample. Differences in women’s and men’s cosponsorship 
behavior emerge as a product of women coalescing to promote shared interests, to 
galvanize support for important policies, and to raise awareness around issues that 
disproportionately impact women’s lives. Cosponsoring legislation with colleagues who 
share similar priorities provides a venue for women in legislative bodies to exhibit 
distinct preferences over policy outcomes. 
The finding that men and women exhibit different legislative preferences suggests 
that the disparity in the numeric representation of men and women throughout the 
world’s legislatures might be problematic for the representation of women’s interests. 
Where women do not comprise an equitable proportion of legislative chambers, their 
preferences are likely not being given adequate weight and their perspectives do not have 
a sufficient influence in the legislative process.  This finding illustrates the importance of 
women’s descriptive representation and further legitimizes efforts to increase women’s 
presence in decision-making bodies. 
Table 2.2: Summary of Results from Chamber-Level Analyses and Sample Selection 
Legislative 
Chamber 
Years in 
Sample Percent Women Dimension 
Proportion of 
Variance 
Explained 
District Type  
& Size 
  Average Range 1
st  2nd  1st  2nd   
Buenos Aires 
House 
HHHoHouseHHHo
useHouse 
1996-2009 26 13-32  X 
 
0.42 0.14 Multi-Member  
Buenos Aires 
Senate 
1996-2009 23 17-31 X X 0.59 0.15 Multi-Member  
Córd ba Senate 1996-2003 15 27-30  X 0.35 0.17 Multi-Member 
M ndoza House 1994-2009 20 15-25 X X 0.24 0.13 Multi-Member  
Mendoza Senate  1994-2009 19 13-24 X X 0.31 0.16 Multi-Member  
Salta House 1996-2009 18 13-27  X 0.43 0.16 Multi-Member  
Tucuman 1996-2009 19 13-23  X 0.35 0.17 Multi-Member  
Córdoba 
Unicameral 
2004-2009 32 27-34 X X 0.40 0.16 Mixed with At Large  
Río Negro 1996-2009 29 21-38 X X 0.49 0.18 Mixed with At Large  
Santa Cruz 1994-2009 14 4-21 X  0.76 0.10 Mixed with At Large  
Chaco 1994-2009 29 13-38 X X 0.48 0.17 At Large  
Chubut 1996-2009 38 22-33   0.47 0.19 At Large  
Córdoba House 1996-2003 27 8-31  X 0.36 0.13 At Large  
Corrientes House 1994-2009 27 8-38 X X 0.49 0.20 At Large  
Federal District 1998-2009 36 33-38 X X 0.35 0.16 At Large  
Formosa 1996-2009 30 20-33 X X 0.45 0.17 At Large  
Misiones 1996-2009 27 23-30 X X 0.65 0.15 At Large  
Santa Fe House 1996-2009 27 26-28 X X 0.40 0.14 At Large  
* Columns 5 and 6 (labeled Dimension 1st and 2nd) summarize the findings from the chamber-level analyses. The results in 
column 5 (column 6) are based on a HLM that uses ideal point estimates from the 1st dimension (2nd dimension) to calculate the 
dependent variable. An X indicates the results are in the expected direction. Gray cells indicate p< .10 one-tailed.  
Santa Cruz, Río Negro, and Córdoba Unicameral employ mixed-member electoral systems. In these districts a portion of the 
members are elected from single member districts (as is the case in Santa Cruz and Córdoba Unicameral) or small multi-
member districts (Río Negro) and the rest of the legislators are elected from one at-large district. This analysis only includes 
members elected in the at-large district in order to hold constituency variables constant.
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Chapter 3 
Does Women’s Descriptive Representation Influence Legislative Behavior? 
 
Women are underrepresented in virtually all of the world’s legislatures. In the 
early nineties, there was a widespread call for national governments to take action in 
correcting gender disparity at all levels of political representation. To date, constitutional, 
electoral, or political party gender quotas have been adopted in 98 countries. Campaigns 
to adopt gender quotas are often mobilized and justified by the claim that increases in 
women’s presence in the legislature will result in more attention to women’s issues 
(Sawer 2000). While quotas have been demonstrated under certain conditions to increase 
the numerical representation of women, and are designed to achieve equality in 
legislative power and decision-making, it is unclear if electing more women to legislative 
office is sufficient to influence policymaking. The extant literature has contributed to an 
understanding of how quota laws in combination with electoral laws affect the election of 
women legislators. What is less understood is the substantive impact of increased 
numbers of women in the legislature resulting from the use of gender quotas. In this 
chapter I explore how increases in women’s numeric representation has influenced 
women’s legislative behavior.  
Previous research demonstrates, that increased descriptive representation leads to 
higher levels of substantive representation in the legislature (Chattopadhyay and Duflo 
2004; Darcy, Welch and Clark 1994; Kathlene 1998; Kittilson 2008; Schwindt-Bayer and 
Mischler 2005; Thomas and Wilcox 1998). However this relationship is inconsistent 
across legislative chambers. Some studies have been able to demonstrate a strong positive 
relationship between descriptive and substantive representation, while other studies have 
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null results or even find a negative relationship (Franceschet and Piscopo 2008; Grey 
2002; Marx, Borner, and Caminotti 2007; Taylor-Robinson and Heath 2003; Weldon 
2002). Why is there so much variation in findings on substantive representation?  
Extant research has identified multiple reasons why there is a lack of consensus 
regarding this relationship. This chapter will examine three of those reasons. One reason 
why there is no consensus with regards to how changes in the proportion of women 
impact women’s legislative behavior is that few legislative chambers have a significant 
proportion of female legislators (Grey 2006). This makes it difficult to systematically 
evaluate the relationship between women’s numeric representation and legislative 
behavior. Recently, many countries have significantly increased women’s share of 
legislative seats, however this leaves scholars with a short timeline to this relationship. It 
is likely that the adoption of gender quotas will not result in immediate changes in 
women’s legislative behavior. Thus, the second reason why there is likely no consensus 
in extent research is that it may take multiple legislative sessions before change is 
realized (Franceschet and Krook 2008; Grey 2006). As such, it is important for scholars 
to consider the duration of time that quotas have been in place to better understand how 
and when increases in women’s representation will influence women’s legislative 
behavior. Few studies, however, are able to examine this relationship over a significant 
timeline. Finally, the third reason why there is likely no consensus in the literature is that 
previous research rarely considers the institutional context that influence women’s 
legislative behavior (Weldon 2002). This chapter seeks to address these three 
shortcomings.  
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I address the first two limitations by evaluating how increases in women’s 
numeric representation influences women’s legislative behavior over a large number of 
legislative chambers that host a significant proportion of female legislators for a 
extensive period of time.  Specifically, I evaluate my hypotheses using legislator-level 
data from 23 Argentine provincial legislatures from 1992 to 2009 (i.e., data from both 
before and after the adoption of quotas). As the first country to adopt legislative gender 
quotas (in 1993 at the provincial level), Argentina is the only context in the world that 
offers a long time line of gender quotas (over 15 years) and a large degree of variation in 
the initiation and success of quotas. This is the only setting where one can examine the 
effects of gender quotas on substantive representation using a large number of 
observations across a diverse set of legislative institutions while making controlled 
comparisons (e.g., holding many contextual, historical, and cultural variables constant).  
I address the third shortcoming in previous research by considering how the 
institutional context in the Argentine legislatures influences women’s legislative 
behavior.  I argue that similar to other forms of representation, the relationship between 
descriptive representation and substantive representation is conditional upon institutional 
incentives. Not all women have the same electoral incentive to represent women’s 
substantive interests. In particular, I argue that women who were elected into legislative 
chambers where women are not well represented faced different election barriers than 
women who are elected in chambers where women are represented in higher proportions.  
These election barriers create incentives for women to distinguish themselves from their 
copartisans. Since women were largely absent from the political arena, women capitalize 
on their gender identity to distinguish themselves from the typical male copartisans. This 
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explanation of women’s legislative behavior implies that as the percentage of women in 
the legislature increases women are less likely to work together to pursuer common 
agendas. This is the exact opposite of what the critical mass explanation implies.  
This chapter will make several contributions. This project represents the first 
empirical efforts to examine women’s legislative behavior over a large number of 
legislatures and is among the first to examine the impact of gender quotas by examining 
data from both before and after the onset of quotas.14 Equally important, it develops and 
tests new hypotheses to explain how institutional incentives structure women’s legislative 
behavior. Finally, in this project I develop a new measure of women’s substantive 
representation. Previous research often conceptualizes women’s substantive 
representation as women forming “alliances” (Beckwidth 2007: 37) and “networking-
with likeminded women inside [the legislature]” (Franceschet and Piscopo 2008: 397), 
but empirical work has not attempted to measure this concept. I use cosponsorship data 
from 180 legislative sessions to operationalize the concept of gender-based alliances.      
 In the text that follows, I first discuss why we may expect there to be a direct 
relationship between the percentage of women in the legislature and women’s substantive 
representation and how the duration of time since the implementation of quotas influence 
women’s legislative behavior. Second, I develop an alternative explanation for when 
women will represent women. In the third section I provide an empirical test of the 
hypothesis that posits a direct relationship between women’s presence in the legislature 
and women’s legislative behavior and my alternative hypothesis. I demonstrate empirical 
                                                 
14 This research is the first to consider women’s legislative behavior over a large number 
of legislative chambers; see however, Kittlison (2008) and Weldon (2002) for studies that 
examine policy outcomes over a large number of legislative chambers.  
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support for the alternative explanation of women’s substantive representation. I reserve 
the final section for concluding remarks.  
 
The Direct Relationship 
While there is a strong normative concern for electing representatives who reflect 
the demographics of a constituency, demands for increases in women’s presence in the 
legislature extend far beyond the debate of equitable numeric representation. Campaigns 
to adopt gender quotas are often justified by the claim that increases in women presence 
in the legislature will result in more attention to women’s issues (Karam and Lovenduski 
2005; Krook 2009; Sawer 2000). There are many reasons to believe that increases in the 
number of representatives of historically marginalized groups will lead to increases in 
substantive representation of those groups (Mansbridge 1999; Phillips 1995; Weldon 
2002; William 1998; Young 1990). This argument is based on the idea that historically 
marginalized groups have “overlooked interests” (Phillips 1995). Since many of these 
issues have not previously been part of the legislative agenda, they are often not fully 
articulated (Mansbridge 1999). Given the often-ambiguous nature of these issues, 
members of these groups (descriptive representatives) may be more likely and better 
suited to represent these interests. This may be because descriptive representatives are 
more likely have shared life experiences that give them different perspectives on a broad 
set of issues (Phillips 1995; Mansbridge 1999). Alternatively, it may simply be because 
they are more likely to empathize with the group’s concerns and take interest in learning 
about its welfare (Weldon 2002). This does not imply that all female legislators represent 
the same perspective, but that they represent a host of female perspectives that are 
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distinct from their male colleagues (Piscopo 2011). Thus, many studies suggest that 
increases in women’s descriptive representation will lead to increased attention to 
women’s issues (substantive representation).  
 
Critical Mass  
 Despite that there is good reason to believe that increases in women’s numeric 
representation may lead to increases in women’s substantive representation, existing 
literature is unable to demonstrate consistent findings for this relationship. Some scholars 
argue that this is because the percentage of women in a legislature must reach some 
critical threshold before women will work together and produce substantive outputs. This 
idea is commonly known as the critical mass hypothesis (Dahlerup 1988). This reasoning 
relies on the assumption that women behave differently depending on the proportion of 
the group that they occupy. The concept of critical mass is based on a sociological theory 
of organizational tokenism (Kanter 1977).15 Kanter theorizes that when women occupy 
less than 15% of the organization (i.e., a token position) they will experience social 
isolation and be subject to “loyalty tests” (978) by the dominant group, preventing them 
from allying with other women. They will also be subject to “roll entrapment” (984), 
which results in adaptive behavior and minimize change potentially brought about by 
female presence in an organization. Once women comprise more than 15% (i.e., a 
minority), they will feel less restricted by these pressures. Women in a minority should 
experience less pressure to align with the dominant group, and feel more freedom to work 
with other minorities.  
                                                 
15 Other variations of the theory, which develop similar expectations, are based on nuclear 
physics (Norris and Lovenduski 2001). 
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In applying these ideas to legislatures it is necessary to consider pressures of party 
discipline (Beckwith 2007). Scholars assume that when women only occupy a token 
status of a group they will feel social pressure to maintain the status quo. In the case of 
legislatures, the status quo is defined by party politics. Moreover, they assume that the 
typical party platform does not emphasize women’s issues. Thus, when women only 
occupy a token status of the group they are more likely to toe the party line and unlikely 
to represent women’s issues. Further it assumes that once women comprise a critical 
mass they will feel less restricted by party pressures and feel more freedom to work with 
other minorities. Given that gender is a crosscutting cleavage, that impacts members from 
multiple political parties, it is plausible that women will want to collaborate with women 
outside their own political party.  If reaching a critical mass in the legislative chambers 
relieves some of the pressure to toe the party line then women may also be more likely to 
cross party lines to work with women from other political parties. This discussion of how 
leads to two competing hypothesis. The first portion of the discussion implies that there 
may be a direct and linear relationship between increases in women’s numeric 
representation and women’s legislative behavior.   
Hypothesis 1: As the percentage of women in the legislature increases women will 
be more likely to organize a gender-based alliance within the legislature. 
 
However, if the relationship is not linear and women must occupy some threshold of the 
legislature before increases in numeric representation influences women’s representation, 
than this implies the familiar critical mass hypothesis. Moreover, Beckwith suggests that 
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increases in women’s numeric representation may make them more likely to cross party 
lines to collaborate with female colleagues.  
Hypothesis 2: When women occupy token status they will be less likely to 
organize a gender-based alliance within the legislature than in legislatures where 
women comprise a critical mass (Beckwith 2007).  
Hypothesis 3: When women occupy a token status they will be less likely to cross 
party lines to organize a gender-based alliance within the legislature than in 
legislatures where women comprise a critical mass (Beckwith 2007).  
 
The principle difference between Hypotheses 1 and Hypotheses 2 and 3 is that the 
former posits a direct and liner relationship between women’s numeric representation and 
women’s legislative behavior. The later posits that women must reach some threshold 
before increases in numeric representation will influence legislative behavior. For 
decades now, political scientists have drawn on the idea that once women reach some 
threshold we will observe change in their political behavior. Scholars have applied this 
logic to their research in effort to determine what percentage of women is necessary to 
constitute a critical mass and how critical mass influences legislative outputs. Scholars 
have examined, for example, the effects of critical mass on legislation (Thomas 1994), 
political agendas and floor debates (Freedman 2002; Perceval 2001), and parliamentary 
culture (Lovenduski and Norris 2003; Grey 2002). Yet, few are able to confirm a clear 
critical mass. Some posit the necessary proportion is 15% (Staudt 1996; Saint-Germain 
1989), 20% (Thomas 1994), or as much as 30% (Dahlerup 1988). Extant research posits 
that one reason for this inconsistency is that there has been no comparison of the effects 
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of varying levels of women’s representation across a large number of legislatures with 
varying proportions of female legislators. This chapter contributes to our understanding 
of the critical mass hypothesis by examining this relationship across many different levels 
of women’s representation. This allows me to evaluate if there is a direct relationship 
between women’s numeric representation and women’s legislative behavior and if this 
relationship is dependent of women occupying some critical threshold.  
 
Duration of Time 
Another reason for lack of consensus in the literature may be that previous 
research does not adequately account for the possibility that the effect of gender quotas 
may not be realized immediately.  Grey argues that most literature works under the 
“misconception” that gender quotas will have an immediate impact on substantive 
representation, when in reality, “time may be a crucial factor in gaining lasting change” 
(2006: 196). In other words, substantive representation will not be realized at once. One 
reason for this may be that gender quotas typically lead to a sudden increase in the 
number of women in office. It is likely that the majority of these women do not have 
legislative experience. Thus, they may want to promote women’s interest but lack the 
skills necessary to do so (Franceschet and Krook 2008). It may take time for women to 
learn the institutional rules and norms. As women gain more experience in the legislature 
they will overcome institutional barriers and develop institutional knowledge that will 
better equipped them to work within the legislature to accomplish their goals. However, 
previous research has not empirically examined this relationship. It is likely that increases 
in the number of years since quota adoption increases the propensity for women to form 
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gender-based alliances, conditional on women occupying a significant proportion of 
legislative seats.16  
Hypothesis 4: Conditional on woman holding a significant proportion of seats in 
the legislature, number years since quota adoption increases, the propensity for 
women to form gender-based alliances also increases. 
 
There are theoretical reasons to believe that as women move from token status to 
a minority group they will behave differently, however findings are inconsistent across 
samples and measures. Indeed, in my own empirical investigation, I find virtually no 
support for the hypothesis that increases in women’s numeric representation has a direct 
effect on women’s legislative behavior. Rather, I find that as the percentage of women in 
the legislature increases, women are less likely to work together. Why are women less 
likely to work together as their proportion of the legislature increases? I argue that one 
reason previous research has such incongruent findings is because it ignores the larger 
institutional context in which female legislatures function. The relationship between 
descriptive representation and substantive representation is conditional upon institutional 
incentives. In the section that follows I develop an alternative explanation that considers 
how institutions structure women’s incentives to representation women. Then I offer an 
empirical test of both the direct relationship hypothesis and my alternative hypothesis.  
 
                                                 
16 Since not all quotas result in actual gains for women’s numeric representation it is 
important to consider how the number of quota years impacts women’s legislative 
behavior in those chambers that actually benefited from the adoption of quotas. 
Conflating the analysis of successful and unsuccessful gender quotas could bias the 
results in favor of the null hypothesis, particularly if increases in women’s numeric 
representation influences women’s legislative behavior.   
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Institutional Context 
To better understand the relationship between descriptive and substantive 
representation it is necessary to consider how institutions shape legislators’ incentives. I 
argue that women who were elected into chambers where women were not well 
represented faced significant election barriers, unlike women who were elected into 
chambers where women are well represented.  This is based on the assumption that 
politics is largely viewed as a man’s game. Men are the gatekeepers and determine who 
gets placed on the party ballot and where they will be placed. Since positions on the party 
ballot are limited men have little incentive to place women on the party ballot, because 
they would be replacing men with women. Thus, women who are interested in running 
have to make a credible claim that the party will benefit from their presence. Since 
women were largely absent from the political arena, one strategy is for women to 
capitalize on their gender identity to set themselves apart. By making a name for 
themselves within the party, as a candidate who represent women, an otherwise 
unrepresented constituency, women can improve their election prospects. Party leaders 
are more likely to believe that the party will benefit electorally from including a woman 
on the ballot. Thus, when women are not well represented in the legislature, women may 
be more likely to try to appeal to party leaders and constituents by representing women 
and issues that are typically viewed as women’s issues.   
However, when women are well represented in a legislative chamber, we should 
not expect the same outcome. This is because the obstacle is no longer a female facing 
entry barriers into a man’s domain. Moreover, given that there are many women in the 
legislature, advertising one’s self as a legislator who represents women, is no longer a 
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credible way to distinguish one’s self from their copartisans. Thus, women elected into 
legislatures with many women will be less likely to represent women.  Empirically, this 
explanation suggests that as the percentage of women in the legislature increases, women 
will work together at a decreasing rate. This is the exact opposite prediction of hypothesis 
1.  
 
Gender as an Electoral Barrier 
I argue that the obstacles women faced, when elected in to a chamber where 
women are sparsely represented, created incentives for women to distinguish themselves 
from their copartisans in effort to boost their election prospects. Antidotal evidence from 
previous research illustrates this argument. After the transition to democracy in 1983, 
women faced significant obstacles in their efforts to obtain political office. According to 
Bonder and Nari (1995) most women who obtained office in Argentina prior to quotas 
had significant prior political experience and strong commitments to gender equality. 
Politically, these women had to be more ambitious than their male colleagues and they 
had to work harder to be elected. A common perception among Argentine women was 
that they had to be “more qualified then men to compete for the same positions” (Bonder 
and Nari 1995: 187). Given these electoral challenges, women sought to distinguish 
themselves from typical male politician. Women could (and often did) do this by 
exploiting their feminine image in society (Chaney 1979). Women viewed their work in 
politics as an extension of their work at home and often saw themselves as “tending the 
needs of [their] big family in the larger casa of the municipality or even nation” (Chaney 
1979: 21). This maternal image gave women indubitable power within society. As a 
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result, in the rare cases that women did enter the political domain, they were most 
successful when they “emphasize the positive aspects of the womanly image” (Chaney 
1979: 49). They could use their feminine image distinguish themselves from copartisans. 
One way to do this was to work with other women and establish a personal reputation for 
promoting distinct policy issues that are considered women’s issues. Bonder and Mari 
report that female leaders realized that they could more easily achieve their goals and be 
more convincing in their policy initiatives if women worked together. As a result, early 
cohorts of women would have had strong incentives to organize alliances among women 
to work both within and across political parties to achieve their objectives.  
On the contrary, women elected in chambers where women are well represented 
do not face the same challenges accessing political office. They do not have to prove that 
they are “more qualified” to gain office. When women are better represented on the 
party’s ballot, women are less likely to feel like they have to compete against men to be 
placed on the ballot. Moreover, once they are in office they may have little incentive to 
build a personal reputation for themselves as a legislator who represents women. Rather, 
we can anticipate they will act more like the typical male politician. Bonder and Marcela 
(1995) explain that in Argentina, after the adoption of gender quotas, many women were 
placed on the list based on their ties to powerful men or their loyalty to male party 
leaders, not their previous political experience or their commitment to gender issues. As a 
result, one may expect that women elected under the quota law, are less likely to 
distinguish themselves as women or even as individual politicians. They would be no 
more likely to form alliances with other women in the legislature and no more likely to 
organize around gender specific issues than the average politician. However, this cannot 
! "# 
be generalized to all women who are elected in provinces that have adopted gender quota 
laws. This is because, some provinces adopted gender quotas only as a political gesture. 
They did not, however, enforce placement mandates or put women in positions on the list 
where they had the possibility of being elected. Since there is significant variation in the 
implementation and success of gender quotas, the argument cannot be generalized to the 
adoption of gender quotas. Rather, women’s access to the ballot should be evaluated in 
terms of women’s success obtaining office.  Taken together, this argument suggests that 
where women are not well represented in office, they face significant barriers to election. 
Further, where women face significant barriers to office they are more likely to 
distinguish themselves from the typical male copartisan by working with other women on 
issues that are typically assumed to be women’s issues.  
Hypothesis 5: When female legislators were elected in chambers where gender is 
an electoral barrier, they are more likely to distinguish themselves from the typical 
copartisans.   
 
Empirical Analysis  
To evaluate these relationships, it is necessary to examine women’s legislative 
behavior over a long temporal domain. Grey (2006) suggests that one of the primary 
shortcomings in previous research that wrestles with the critical mass question is the lack 
of legislatures that have “anything near 30% of women”—scholars often posit 30% is 
necessary for a critical mass.  In recent years the gender composition of many legislatures 
has changed drastically, however this leaves us with a very short timeline to evaluate the 
effect of women’s descriptive representation. As a result, I have chosen to evaluate the 
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above hypotheses using original legislator-level data from 23 Argentine provincial 
legislative chambers from 1992 to 2009. As the first country to adopt legislative gender 
quotas (in 1993 at the provincial level), Argentina is the only context that offers a long 
time line of gender quotas (over 15 years) and a large degree of variation in the initiation 
and success of quotas. In the 1990s all but four of the chambers in my sample adopted a 
gender quota of at least 30% (see Table 3.1). In 2000 three of these chambers increased 
their legislative quota to 50%. As a result, most of the chambers in my sample are 
composed of about 30% for several consecutive legislative sessions. Given the vast 
adoption of gender quotas at the sub-national level in Argentina, I can readily examine 
the effects of gender quotas on substantive representation across a large number of 
observations with different electoral systems while making controlled comparisons (e.g., 
holding many contextual, historical, and cultural variables constant that is impossible in 
cross-national analyses). To better understand how increases in women’s descriptive 
representation influences women’s legislative behavior, I analyze data from before and 
after the adoption and implementation of gender quotas. My analysis is based on data I 
collected during twelve months of fieldwork in Argentina. I visited twenty different 
provincial capitals where I conducted archival research and elite interviews to inform my 
research.  
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Table 3.1: Sample Selection for Descriptive Representation Analysis 
District Years in 
Sample 
Chamber District Type 
Electoral 
Formula 
Gender 
Quotas 
Year 
Adopted 
# of 
Seats 
Federal 
District 
1998-2009 Deputies At Large District PR 30% 1991 60 
1992-2009 Senators 
8 Multi Member 
Districts 
PR 30% 1995 46 Buenos 
Aires 
1992-2009 Deputies 
8 Multi Member 
Districts 
PR 30% 1995 92 
Chaco 1992-2009 Deputies At Large District PR 30% 1992 32 
Chubut 1994-2009 Deputies At Large District PR 30% 1994 27 
1992-2000 Senators 
26 Multi-Member 
Districts  
PR 30% 1994 67 
Córdoba 
1992-2000 Deputies At Large District PR 30% 1994 26 
Córdoba 2002-2009 Deputies Mixed-Member 
Plurality & 
PR 
50% 1994 60 
1992-2009 Senators At Large District PR 30% 1992 13 
Corrientes 
1992-2009 Deputies At Large District PR 30% 1992 26 
Entre Ríos 1992-2009 Deputies At Large District 
Fixed 
Allocation 
No -- 28 
Formosa 1996-2009 Deputies At Large District PR 30% 1995 30 
Jujuy 1992-2009 Deputies At Large District PR No -- 48 
1992-2009 Senators 
4 Multi-Member 
Districts 
PR 30% 1992 38 
Mendoza 
1992-2009 Deputies 
4 Multi-Member 
Districts 
PR 30% 1992 50 
Misiones 1992-2009 Deputies At Large District PR 30% 1993 40 
Río Negro 1996-2009 Deputies Mixed Member PR 50% 1993 46 
1992-2009 Senators 
23 Single-Member 
Districts 
Plurality No -- 23 
Salta 
1992-2009 Deputies 
23 Multi-Member 
Districts 
PR 30% 1994 60 
Santa Cruz 1992-2009 Deputies Mixed-Member PR 30% 1992 28 
1992-2009 Senators 
19 Single Member 
Districts 
Plurality No -- 19 
Santa Fe 
1992-2009 Deputies At Large District PR 30% 1992 50 
Tucumán 1992-2009 Deputies 
3 Multi-Member 
Districts 
PR 30% 1994 49 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Gender Cosponsorship Score 
When and where will women form gender-based alliances? There are several 
places where we may expect to find gender-based alliances within the legislature. For 
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example, some scholarship looks at informal voting coalitions among woman. However, 
it is difficult to tease out the effects of women voting together given their loyalties to 
political parties, thus roll-call votes rarely reveal such differences (Thomas 1994; Vega 
and Firestone 1995; Schwindt-Bayer and Corbetta 2004). Since party leaders controlled 
which bills come up for a vote, via negative agenda, it is rare that legislation gets to the 
floor that divides the party. Thus we would not expect to see women vote distinctly 
different than men.  
Yet, scholars maintain that women have distinct legislative agendas (Swers 2005; 
Schwindt-Bayer 2006) and that understanding the collective behavior of women in 
legislatures (e.g., how they network with other women within the chamber (Francheschet 
and Piscopo 2008)) is important for understanding when and how women represent 
women (Beckwidth 2007; Vega and Firestone 1995). If women do have a unique 
legislative agenda a logical place we may expect to observe gender-based alliances is in 
the bill sponsorship process. More specifically, if women are forming gender-based 
alliances to pursue common legislative agendas, we can expect to see them frequently 
cosponsoring legislation together.   
Legislators introduce and cosponsor legislation for a number of reasons, but the 
primary reason is credit claiming (Fenno 1978; Bratton and Haynie 1999; Crisp et al. 
2004). It is a way for legislators to publicly express support for legislation, thus providing 
information about legislators’ preferences. Moreover, cosponsorship highlights intra-
party differences that are not otherwise apparent via roll call records or other more 
conventional measures (Alemán et al 2009), and it serves as a powerful network tool for 
political scientist to examine which legislators work together (Fowler 2005, 2006) and 
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under what conditions. Thus, if women are working together in informal groups to 
promote common interests this should be reflected in their cosponsorship patterns. I use 
cosponsorship data from each of the 23 provincial legislatures in my sample to assess the 
informal gender-based alliances that arise in legislative chambers.  
I will examine how this dynamic changes as the gender composition of the 
legislature increases. It may seem obvious that as the percentage of women in the 
legislative chamber increases, women (and men) will naturally cosponsor legislation 
more with women. That is, even if the data generating process for cosponsorship were 
completely random, increasing the percentage of women in the legislature increases the 
probability that legislators will coauthor with other women. To account for this I measure 
my dependent variable as the difference between the rate at which each individual 
legislator coauthors with female legislators and the rate at which the legislator would 
coauthor with female legislators if the data generating process were completely random. I 
refer to this as the gender cosponsorship score (GCS). The GCS ranges from -.4167 to  
.9333. Negative (positive) values indicate that the individual legislator works with 
women less (more) than one would expect if the data generating process for 
cosponsorship were completely random, and a value of zero indicates that the legislature 
works with women at the same rate that one would expect if the cosponsorship process 
were completely random.  
Additionally, hypothesis 3 suggests that when women are a token minority they 
will be more likely to toe the party line and less likely work with members from the 
opposition. As such, it may not be uncommon for women to work together with women 
from their own political party, however what would be unexpected is for women to work 
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together frequently with women from other political parties. To examine how likely 
women are to cross party lines to work with other female legislators I calculate the rate 
that women cosponsor with women outside their party minus the rate they would 
coauthor with women outside their party if the data generating process for cosponsorship 
were completely random. Finally, women may be more likely to form gender-based 
alliances to collaborate on legislation that is more likely to affect the lives of women. To 
account for this I identify a subset of issues and evaluate the dependent variable with 
respect to these issues for both of the aforementioned specifications. To identify issues 
that are more likely to affect the lives of women in Argentina, I rely on the United 
Nations Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination against Women 
country reports for Argentina and other supplemental material that directly pertain to this 
issue. Taken together, there are four specifications of the GCS: 1) rate that women 
cosponsor with other women, 2) rate that women cross party lines to cosponsor with 
other women, 3) rate that women cosponsor with other women on women’s domain 
issues, and 4) rate that women cross party lines to cosponsor with other women on 
women’s domain issues.   
 
Independent Variables  
To test hypothesis 1, 2, and 3, the main independent variable of interest is the 
percentage of women in the legislature. The theory suggests that the rate at which women 
coauthor with women is conditional on the gender composition of the legislature.  That is, 
hypothesis 1 suggests that there will be a linear relationship between increases in the 
percentage of women in the chamber and their propensity to coauthor legislation 
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together. Hypothesis 2 posits that women will work less with women when they comprise 
a token position in the legislature and more with women when they comprise a minority. 
I control for the percentage of women in the chamber to account for the possibility of a 
linear relationship and the percentage squared to account for the possibility of a nonlinear 
relationship. I plot this relationship to examine if the function takes on a linear form or a 
nonlinear form. Then I include an interaction between the sex of the legislator and the 
percentage of women in the chamber as well as the percentage squared. The interaction 
allows me to examine if increases in women’s numeric representation has an independent 
effect on women’s legislative behavior.  
Next, if there is a sudden change in the composition of the legislature, due to the 
adoption and implementation of a gender quota women’s behavior may not change right 
away. That is, some scholars argue that time may be a crucial factor in bringing about 
change (Grey 2006).  Therefore, I control for the number of quota years and the number 
of quota years squared. As before I include an interaction between the sex of the 
legislator and the quota year measurements. Additionally, I include a control for 
economic development for each province-year. I measure this using the province level 
infant mortality rate. I also control for gender development using the Gender 
Development Index for each province in 2006 (Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el 
Desarrollo 2010).  
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Table 3.2: Determinants of Gender Cosponsorship Score  
 All Legislation  Women's Domain  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Whole Chamber  Other Party Whole Chamber  Other Party 
Female Legislator 0.028 0.046** 0.021 0.039 
 (0.027) (0.016) (0.038) (0.023) 
% Women -0.365* -0.351*** -0.074 -0.330* 
 (0.157) (0.097) (0.205) (0.132) 
(% Women)2 0.798* -0.009 0.179 -0.097 
 (0.380) (0.236) (0.498) (0.320) 
% Women * Female 0.392 -0.009 0.874* 0.371 
 (0.248) (0.148) (0.356) (0.217) 
(% Women)2 * Female -1.536** -0.142 -2.660*** -1.088* 
 (0.519) (0.310) (0.747) (0.456) 
Quota Years 0.004 -0.002 0.007 -0.001 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) 
(Quota Years)2 -0.000 0.000* -0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Quota Years * Female 0.017*** 0.002 0.019*** 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) 
(Quota Years)2 * Female -0.001*** -0.000 -0.001*** -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Economic Development 0.000 -0.002** 0.001 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
GDI -0.220 -0.080 0.005 0.188 
 (0.273) (0.186) (0.311) (0.206) 
Legislation Authored -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 0.190 0.111 -0.011 -0.129 
 (0.230) (0.155) (0.264) (0.174) 
Random-effects Parameters    
Province -3.852*** -4.155*** -3.951*** -4.302*** 
 (0.264) (0.224) (0.402) (0.348) 
Year -3.296*** -3.795*** -3.016*** -3.447*** 
 (0.081) (0.078) (0.087) (0.084) 
Residual -1.953*** -2.468*** -1.638*** -2.133*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) 
Observations 7246 7246 6377 6377 
Provinces 23 23 23 23 
Legislative Sessions 181 181 181 181 
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Coefficients from HLM. Standard errors in parentheses.  Dependent variables 
are as follows: Model 1 rate that women cosponsor with other women chamber wide; Model 2 rate that 
women cosponsor with other women when working within their own party; Model 3 rate that women 
cosponsor with other women when working outside their party. 
 
Given the nature of my data (i.e., legislators are nested within legislative sessions, 
which are nested within legislative chambers) I estimate this relationship using a 
! "# 
hierarchical linear model (Gelman and Hill 2007)17. I include a random intercept for each 
legislative session, to relax the assumption of independence of errors between the 
legislators in a given legislative session. I also include a random intercept for each 
legislative chamber to relax the assumption of independence of errors between legislative 
sessions in a given legislative chamber. My results are presented in Table 3.2. 
Findings  
Given the difficult of interpreting interaction terms and squared functions I have 
graphed my results in Figures 3.1. Figure 3.1 plots the expected value of the GCS on the 
y-axis as the percentage of women in the legislative chamber increases across the x-axis. 
Recall, the GCS is the difference in the actual rate of cosponsorship and the random 
probability that a legislator will coauthor with a female. Thus, negative (positive) values 
suggest that legislators coauthor with female legislators at a lower (higher) rate then they 
would if the cosponsorship process were completely random. A value of zero indicates 
that female legislators are likely to cosponsor with their female colleagues at the same 
rate they would if cosponsorship were completely random.   
The top left panel of Figure 3.1 indicates that women coauthor with women more 
than they would under random assignment when women comprise only a small 
proportion of the legislature. As the percentage of women in the legislature increases the 
rate of cosponsorship with female legislators decreases significantly. As the percentage of 
women approaches 30 percent of the legislature women are about as likely to work with 
women as they would if they were randomly selecting their cosponsors. This finding is  
                                                 
17 My results are robust to estimations using province and year fixed effects and clustered 
standard errors. Additionally, the overall analysis is consistent with individual province-
level analysis.  
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Figure 3.1: Change in Cosponsorship Score as the Percentage of Women in the Legislature Increases  
 
 
 
 
This figure plots the expected value of gender women’s cosponsorship score as the percentage of women in 
the legislature increases with 95% confidence intervals surrounding each estimate. Estimates are based on 
the HLM presented in Table 3.2.  
 
the opposite of what hypothesis 1 suggest. Rather than women feeling less pressure to 
align with the dominant group as the proportion of women in the chamber increases, 
women actually respond by aligning with their male colleagues more frequently. 
Moreover, the plot of the line is linear, which suggests that there is not a critical threshold 
at which women change their legislative behavior. The top left panel in Figure 3.2 tells a 
similar story. In this plot the depended variable is restricted to women’s domain 
legislation (Table 3.2 Model 3). The slope for this line is not as steep as the slope in the 
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top left panel, however it collaborates the finding that increases in women’s numeric 
representation do not increase women’s propensity to work together.  
Hypothesis 3 posits that as women move from a small to large percentage in the 
legislature they will be more likely to cross party lines to work with female legislators 
outside their party. Models 2 and 4 examine the rate that women cross party lines to 
coauthor with female colleagues on all legislation and on women’s domain legislation 
respectively. These results are graphed in the bottomed panel of Figure 3.1. Recall that in 
this analysis, the GCS is calculated as the rate at which women work with women outside 
their party, minus the rate they would coauthor with women outside their party if they 
were randomly selecting their coauthors. A value of zero indicates that women are 
crossing party lines to work with other women at the same rate that they would if they 
were randomly choosing their cosponsors. Given that legislators typically intentionally 
cosponsor with people outside the party less than they would if they were randomly 
choosing their cosponsors, a value of 0 is quite surprising. Both specifications of the GCS 
indicate that when women occupy a small proportion of the legislature they are more 
likely to cross party lines to cosponsor than if they were randomly choosing their 
cosponsors. This is surprisingly high, and offers strong support for the idea that women 
are intentionally seeking out female cosponsors from outside their party when women 
less than ten percent of the chamber. These models, however, indicate that regardless of 
whether women are working on women’s domain legislation or a broader set of policy 
issues, they are less likely to cross party lines to work with women outside their party as 
the percentage of women in the legislative chamber increases. This analysis does not find 
support for Hypothesis 3.  Rather, it appears that as the proportion of women in the 
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legislative chamber increases, women are less likely to cross party lines to collaborate 
with women outside their party, regardless of the issue domain.  
 
The Adoption of Gender Quotas  
Hypothesis 4 posits that conditional on woman holding a significant 
proportion of seats in the legislature, number years since quota adoption increases, the 
propensity for women to form gender-based alliances also increases. This hypothesis is 
based on the logic that increases in women’s numeric representation will not be realized 
immediately, but as the amount of time increases that successful quotas are in place 
women are more likely to work together to achieve common goals. To test this 
hypothesis I use the same model as before, however this time I limit my analysis to 
legislative chambers with a significant proportion of female legislators and I include a 
count of successful gender quotas years in the place of quota years. Given that each of the 
gender quotas that were adopted in the Argentine provinces establish a 30% minimum for 
the positions women should occupy on the ballot, I defined a significant proportion of 
women as 20%. Given how the gender quotas interact with the different electoral systems 
in the provinces it is not realistic to expect all of the quotas to result in 30% women in the 
legislature. However, even in provinces with small districts if the quotas are being 
properly implemented (and women are not being simply placed at the bottom of the 
ballot) than women should occupy at least 20% of the chamber. These results are 
reported in Table 3.3 and graphed in Figure 3.2. Figure 3.2 is organized in the same way 
as before. The top panel graphs the expected value of the GCS for women chamber wide 
as the number of successful quota years increase, the bottom panel graphs the GCS for 
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crossing party lines to cosponsor with other women, the left panel looks at all legislation 
and the right panel looks at women’s domain legislation. All figure specifications of the 
GCS reveal the same relationship. The number of successful quota years does not have a 
significant impact on women’s legislative behavior under any of the four circumstances. 
It is clear from each of the graphs in Figure 3.2 that a flat horizontal line could be fitted 
across each of the plots and would cross the confidence bounds at each point in the plot. 
This indicates that women’s legislative behavior is not statistically different at time t than 
it is at time t+1. This analysis does not provide support for hypothesis 4.  
Despite the null findings, this analysis does serve an important purpose. It 
indicates that the findings in from the first analysis are due primarily to increases in 
women’s numeric representation and not the adoption of gender quotas. At first glance, it 
may appear as though the findings from the first analysis (Table 3.2, Figure 3.1) could be 
the result of either increases in the proportion of female legislators or the adoption of 
gender quotas. This is because, if quotas are properly implemented that the proportion of 
female legislators should be highly correlated with the adoption of gender quotas. 
Nonetheless, due to the wide variety of electoral institutions and the enforcement and 
compliance with placement mandates, these two variables are not highly correlated in this 
sample (see Figure 3.1 in the introduction). This analysis serves to further alleviate any 
concern that the findings in Table 3.3 are a result of quota adoption and not increases in 
the proportion of female legislators.  
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Table 3.3: Gender Cosponsorship Score as the Number of Quota Years Increases, Conditional on a 
Significant Proportion of Female Legislators  
 All Legislation  Women's Domain  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Whole Chamber  Other Party Whole Chamber  Other Party 
Female Legislator 0.114 0.244 -0.011 0.412* 
 (0.198) (0.126) (0.281) (0.181) 
% Women 2.203 -0.592 1.341 -0.247 
 (1.413) (0.906) (1.972) (1.307) 
(% Women)2 -3.236 0.458 -1.895 -0.048 
 (2.419) (1.551) (3.375) (2.229) 
% Women -0.379 -1.229 1.249 -1.905 
X Female (1.406) (0.894) (2.000) (1.290) 
(% Women)2 -0.456 1.848 -3.685 2.524 
* Female (2.376) (1.511) (3.383) (2.182) 
Quota Years -0.005 -0.005 -0.001 -0.004 
 (0.007) (0.004) (0.010) (0.007) 
(Quota Years)2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Quota Years 0.029*** -0.002 0.024* -0.002 
* Female (0.007) (0.005) (0.010) (0.006) 
(Quota Years)2 -0.002*** -0.000 -0.001** -0.000 
* Female (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Economic 
Development 
0.002 -0.002 0.002 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) 
GDI -0.002 -0.128 0.096 0.277 
 (0.427) (0.271) (0.572) (0.315) 
Legislation Authored -0.000* -0.000*** -0.000 -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant -0.386 0.195 -0.322 -0.214 
 (0.412) (0.262) (0.559) (0.331) 
Random-effects Parameters    
Province -3.488*** -3.956*** -3.215*** -4.213*** 
 (0.300) (0.321) (0.333) (0.625) 
Year -3.173*** -3.610*** -2.889*** -3.204*** 
 (0.122) (0.117) (0.129) (0.121) 
Residual -1.857*** -2.309*** -1.566*** -2.004*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Observations 3810 3810 3451 3451 
Provinces 18 18 18 18 
Legislative Sessions 88 88 88 88 
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Coefficients from HLM. Standard errors in parentheses.  Dependent variables 
are as follows: (5 & 6 ) rate that women cosponsor with other women chamber wide on all types of 
legislation; (7 & 8) rate that women cross party lines to cosponsor legislation with other women on all 
types of legislation; (9 & 10) rate that women cosponsor with other women chamber wide on Women’s 
Domain legislation; (11 & 12) rate that women cross party lines to cosponsor legislation with other women 
on Women’s Domain legislation. 
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Figure 3.2: Cosponsorship Rate with Female Coauthors: Legislators Elected Before the Adoption of 
Quotas or in the First Year of Implementation vs. Legislators elected After the Adoption of Quotas  
 
 
 
 
 
This figure plots the expected value of gender women’s cosponsorship score as the percentage of women in 
the legislature increases for chambers with gender quotas compared to chambers without gender quotas. 
95% confidence intervals surround each estimate. Estimates are based on the HLM presented in Table 3.3.  
 
 
 
Institutional Context 
Hypothesis 5 posits that female legislators who are elected under hostile 
conditions (e.g., into legislature where women were not well represented) had to work 
harder to distinguish themselves from the typical copartisans in order to have electoral 
success. One way women can distinguish themselves from the typical copartisans is by 
forming alliances with other female legislators and promoting their image as women who 
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represent’s women. Empirically this hypothesis implies that women will work together 
less as the percentage of women who gain electoral office increases. This relationship is 
investigated in Table 3.2. Recall, that Table 3.2 examines how increases in women’s 
numeric representation influences women’s legislative behavior. Figure 3.1, illustrates 
that where women occupy a small proportion of the legislative chamber they are more 
likely to work with other women on all types of legislative issues and they are more 
likely to cross party lines to do so. On face value, it appears as though this explanation 
could be useful in understanding how women’s political behavior changes as the gender 
composition of the legislature changes. However, if it is the case that women work 
together more frequently with other women when they have institutional incentives to 
distinguish themselves from the typical copartisan, then there should be additional 
implications of this argument that allow me to test the empirical validity of the argument. 
In the following chapter I will develop additional implications of this argument and 
empirically examine the extent to which institutions influence women’s legislative 
behavior.  
 
Conclusions 
This research suggests that scholars need to consider the broader institutional 
context when developing expectations for women’s substantive representation. Previous 
research relies heavily on a behavioral explanation to inform our expectations of when 
descriptive representation will influence women’s legislative behavior. Support for this 
relationship is inconsistent. In this chapter I offer an empirical test of the hypotheses the 
follow from the behavioral explanation and I do not find support for these hypotheses. I 
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offer an explanation for this inconsistency. I argue that our expectations for substantive 
representation should be conditioned by the institutional rules and norms that govern a 
given legislature. Different institutions provide different incentives for legislators. Thus, 
not all women have the same incentive to represent the female constituency.  
In this chapter, I argue that women who were elected prior to the adoption of 
quotas faced significant electoral barriers. Electoral barriers created incentives for women 
to exploit their feminine image and distinguish themselves from male copartisans in 
effort to improve her electoral prospects. As a result these women were more likely their 
later cohorts of women to work with other women in the legislature. I find empirical 
support for this argument. Empirically, however, this hypothesis implies the exact 
opposite of the behavioral hypotheses. It suggests that women will work together less as 
the percentage of women who gain electoral office increases. If it is the case that electoral 
barriers shaped women’s incentives and thereby their legislative behavior, other 
implications will follow that will allow me test the validity of this explanation. In the 
following chapters I will develop additional implications that follow from this theory and 
offer an empirical test of these implications to demonstrate further support for argument 
that institutional contexts shape women’s legislative behavior.  
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 Chapter 4 
Women’s Legislative Behavior and the Crucial Impact of Electoral Incentives 
Women are underrepresented in virtually all of the world’s legislatures. In the 
early nineties, there was a widespread call for national governments to take action to 
correct gender disparities at all levels of political representation. As a result, 
constitutional, electoral, or political party gender quotas have been adopted in almost 100 
countries. Campaigns to adopt gender quotas are often mobilized and justified by the 
claim that increases in women’s presence in the legislature will result in more attention to 
women’s issues (Sawer 2000). While this claim makes for a successful mobilization tool, 
empirical investigations that examine the actual link between numeric representation and 
attention to women’s issues result in mixed findings.  Some scholars find a strong 
positive relationship between women’s numeric representation and attention to women’s 
issues, while other find no relationship. One possible reason for the lack of consensus in 
the literature regarding the impact of increases in numeric representation on women’s 
legislative behavior is that not all women have the same institutional opportunity or 
electoral incentive to represent women’s interests. Broadly speaking, electoral systems 
affect representatives’ incentives to either enhance a personal reputation or exhibit party 
loyalty (Carey and Shugart 1995). It is likely that institutional incentives influence 
women’s propensity and ability to represent women.  
Consider, on the one hand, electoral systems in which voters vote for individual 
candidates as opposed to political parties. Since voters choose between politicians, 
individual candidates have strong incentives to distinguish themselves from their 
copartisans by cultivating their personal reputations in an effort to bolster their electoral 
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prospects (personalizing incentives). On the other hand, if voters choose between 
political parties, rather than individuals, candidates have an incentive to display strong 
party loyalty and enhance the party’s reputation (party-centered incentives). This is 
because party leaders (not voters) determine which individuals will represent the party.  
These different incentives fostered by different electoral systems mediate the link 
between women’s numeric representation and women’s ability to represent female 
constituencies (i.e., substantive representation). If we assume that legislators are rational 
actors who seek to enhance their political careers, then female legislators who are elected 
in districts that encourage them to develop their personal reputations may signal to voters 
that they stand for women in order to distinguish themselves from their male copartisans. 
As a result, women may be more inclined to champion women’s issues or work with 
female colleagues. Conversely, legislators who are elected in districts that encourage 
party loyalty have no incentive to deviate from the party platform or to distinguish 
themselves from their copartisans. Therefore, women who are elected into these districts 
may be less likely to signal to voters that they represent women’s interests. Instead, they 
are more likely to exhibit the same behavior and interests as their male colleagues in 
order to demonstrate their commitment to the party.  
This argument provides a plausible explanation for how institutional incentives 
condition women’s legislative behavior; however, this relationship is difficult to test 
empirically. To give this question proper treatment it is necessary to operationalize 
women’s legislative behavior across a large number of legislative chambers that vary 
significantly in their types of electoral institutions and in their proportion of female 
legislators over a long period of time. The Argentine legislatures provide an ideal setting 
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for examining this question because they feature a large variety of electoral rules in 
combination with a long time span of both successful and unsuccessful gender quotas. 
For example, Argentine legislatures utilize at-large, mixed-member, and single-member 
electoral districts. These districts use of a variety of district magnitudes, ranging from 
very large and large district magnitudes, which produce strong party-centered incentives, 
to medium and small district magnitudes, which foster more personalizing incentives.  
Therefore, I collect an original data set that measures individual-level legislative 
behavior for 23 Argentine legislative chambers from 1992 to 2009. I operationalize 
women’s efforts to distinguish themselves from their male colleagues as their propensity 
to coauthor legislation with their female colleagues. Building on previous literature, I 
argue that cosponsorship is an important tool that legislators can use to signal to their 
colleagues and constituents who they represent (Crisp et al. 2004b). To do this, I 
collected a comprehensive database containing all coauthored legislation from each of the 
23 legislative chambers in my sample.  
I use this novel data set to demonstrate that women who are elected in electoral 
systems with personalizing incentives are overwhelmingly more likely to cooperate with 
female colleagues than male colleagues. By doing so, they signal to their colleagues and 
constituents that they are different from male copartisans and that they stand for women. 
Meanwhile, women who are elected in electoral systems with strong party-centered 
incentives cooperate with female colleagues at about the same rate we would expect if 
they were randomly selecting the sex of their coauthors, and they are much less likely to 
cross the party line to work with women from other parties. Instead, women from districts 
with strong party-centered incentives behave more like the typical male legislator. This 
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allows them to signal to party leaders that they are loyal party members. Using multiple 
specifications of the dependent variable, I demonstrate robust empirical support for my 
hypothesis. I then derive multiple implications for my argument that allow me to test the 
validity of my theory empirically. This research contributes to our understanding of how 
electoral incentives modify women’s legislative behavior. Moreover, it illustrates that 
electoral institutions are important not only for determining if women get into office, but 
also how they behave once they are there.  
 
Women’s Representation 
While there is a strong normative concern for electing representatives who reflect 
the demographics of a constituency, demands for increases in women’s presence in the 
legislature extend far beyond the debate of equitable numeric representation. Campaigns 
to adopt gender quotas are often justified by the claim that increases in women presence 
in the legislature will result in more attention to women’s issues (Karam and Lovenduski 
2005; Krook 2009; Sawer 2000). There are many reasons to believe that increases in the 
number of representatives of historically marginalized groups will lead to increases in 
substantive representation of those groups (Mansbridge 1999; Phillips 1995; Weldon 
2002; William 1998; Young 1990). This argument is based on the idea that historically 
marginalized groups have “overlooked interests” (Phillips 1995). Since many of these 
issues have not previously been part of the legislative agenda, they are often not fully 
articulated (Mansbridge 1999). Given the often-ambiguous nature of these issues, 
members of these groups (descriptive representatives) may be more likely and better 
suited to represent these interests. This may be because descriptive representatives are 
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more likely have shared life experiences that give them different perspectives on a broad 
set of issues (Phillips 1995; Mansbridge 1999). Alternatively, it may simply be because 
they are more likely to empathize with the group’s concerns and take interest in learning 
about its welfare (Weldon 2002). This does not imply that all female legislators represent 
the same perspective, but that they represent a host of female perspectives that are 
distinct from their male colleagues (Piscopo 2011). Thus, many studies suggest that 
increases in women’s descriptive representation will lead to increased attention to 
women’s issues (substantive representation).  
Numerous studies examine this relationship, but findings are inconsistent. Some 
research finds strong support for the hypothesis that increases in women’s presence in the 
legislature leads to increased attention to women’s issues, while other studies do not 
support this hypothesis. One likely reason for these inconsistent findings is that different 
institutions provide different incentives that shape legislators’ behavior. Some institutions 
create incentives for legislators to distinguish themselves from their copartisans while 
other incentivize legislators to bolster the party’s reputation and exhibit strong party 
loyalties. It is necessary to consider the institutional context in which legislators are 
elected to understand how they will behave once in office. 
Research that focuses on legislatures known to foster strong personalizing 
incentives tends to find support for the hypothesis that increases in women’s numeric 
representation results in substantive representation. For example, electoral systems in the 
US, the UK, and India are all known to promote personalizing incentives; and studies of 
these regions frequently find that women are more likely than men to represent women’s 
issues (Bratton and Haynie 1999; Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004; Childs 2002; Jones 
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1997; Saint-Germain 1989; Thomas 1991, 1994; Thomas and Welch 1991).
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 Some even 
conclude that increases in numeric representation are not necessary to induce increases in 
substantive representation. Even in small numbers, women are more likely to represent 
women’s interests (Bratton 2005; Crowley 2004; Welch 1985).  
Findings are less consistent with regard to cases in which women have strong 
party-centered incentives. For example, in Argentina, Jones (1997) and Schwindt-Bayer 
(2006, 2010) find that women place a higher priority on legislation involving women’s 
rights and children and family issues. In Honduras, however, Taylor-Robinson and Heath 
(2003) find that this relationship does not hold for legislation concerning children and 
family. Still, Franceschet and Piscopo (2008) argue that increases in women’s numeric 
representation in Argentina, via the adoption of gender quotas, have led to increased 
marginalization of women.  
Gray (2002) examines women’s support for ‘women friendly policies’ in New 
Zealand. She finds that in 1980 these policies received universal support from female 
MPs, but in 1998, when women occupied a larger share of seats in parliament, the 
proportion of women supporting this genera of legislation had decreased. She suggests 
that this unexpected relationship may be explained by the diversity of female MPs in 
1998; however, it is also worth noting that in 1980 MPs were elected from single-
member districts, which foster strong personalizing incentives. But in 1998, the vast 
majority of female MPs were elected from an at-large district with a closed list ballot, 
which cultivate strong party-centered incentives (Baker et al. 2001).  
                                                 
18Research on the Swedish Parliament also supports this hypothesis. Swedish voters can 
choose between voting for the party and voting for individual candidates on the party list. 
Electoral systems that provide voters with the option to vote for specific candidates are 
also known to encourage legislators to develop a personal reputation. 
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Weldon (2002) also fails to find support for the relationship between women’s 
numeric representation and the representation of women’s interests. She draws on a large 
cross-national analysis (36 countries with a wide variety of electoral institutions) to 
examine governments’ responses to violence against women. Her analysis finds no 
support for the hypothesis that greater proportions of women increase the probability that 
governments will address violence against women. Weldon concludes, “feminist policy 
scholars must examine whether political institutions facilitate or obstruct the articulation 
and enactment of policies addressing women’s issues” (207). Electoral systems are an 
example of the type of institution that likely influences the articulation of women’s 
interests.  
Still, Kittilson (2008) finds that increases in women’s numeric representation are 
highly correlated with adoption of family leave policies. Her research draws on 19 
developed democracies that host a wide variety of electoral institutions covering the full 
range from personalizing to party-centered incentives. The variation between Kittilson’s 
findings and those of other researchers may be explained by the fact that her analysis is 
unique in controlling for important institutional variation across legislatures, including 
federalism and disproportionality. Disproportionality is, in part, a product of the number 
of seats per district, one of the key types of electoral system variation that shapes 
legislators’ incentives. Additionally, Kittilson’s finding that federalism decreases the 
probability that national legislatures will adopt family leave policies suggests that 
understanding how institutions influence women’s legislative behavior may be key to 
developing a more comprehensive understanding of how and when numeric 
representation will result in substantive representation.  
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The findings from previous research obviously cannot be explained by a cursory 
review of the institutional incentives that may have shaped women’s political behavior in 
previous sample selections. Many other factors, including those discussed by the 
individual authors and those enumerated by other scholars, influence the variation in 
these findings; however, reviewing the patterns of findings in the context of electoral 
incentives can provide some insight regarding the conditions under which women are 
more likely to represent women’s interests.   
This research suggests that one reason for inconsistent findings in previous 
research may be that different institutions provide a different set of incentives that shape 
how legislators behave. It is necessary to consider the institutional context in which 
women are elected to understand how they behave in office. In the section that follows, I 
develop the logic behind how institutional incentives—shaped by electoral systems—
may foster or quell the propensity for female legislators to distinguish themselves from 
their male colleagues, making them more or less likely to represent women.  
 
Electoral Incentives 
For decades, scholars of legislative politics have examined how electoral 
institutions structure legislators’ incentives. It has been demonstrated that different 
electoral systems can cause representatives to behave in very different ways. It thus 
seems logical that these same electoral incentives should inform expectations about 
women’s behavior in the legislature. In this section, I will examine how electoral 
institutions more generally are expected to influence legislators’ behavior and how this 
informs our expectations about women’s legislative behavior.  
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 Electoral systems affect candidates’ incentives to either enhance a personal 
reputation or bolster the party brand name (Carey and Shugart 1995). Two key 
components of electoral systems influence legislators’ incentives: 1) list type (i.e., open 
or closed) and 2) the number of legislators elected in a given district (i.e., district 
magnitude). In general, previous research demonstrates that where voters cast votes for 
individual politicians (open list), representatives have an incentive to cultivate a personal 
vote. But when voters cast votes for political parties, rather than individuals (closed list), 
legislators have an incentive to enhance the party brand name. Moreover, the incentive 
for legislators to cultivate a personal vote increases with district magnitude in open list 
systems but decreases with district magnitude when lists are closed. Numerous studies 
demonstrate how these electoral incentives shape legislators’ political behavior once in 
office (Ames 1995, 2001; Carey 1996; Cox and McCubbins 2001; Crisp et al. 2004a; 
Crisp et al. 2004b; Taylor 1992) and the personal vote-earning attributes that candidates 
exhibit in the campaign stage (Shugart, Valdini, and Suominen 2005). 
 
Party-Centered Electoral Incentives  
In closed list systems, party bosses are responsible for selecting candidates to run 
on the party ballot and determining the order in which names appear on the ballot. Rank-
and-file members of the party do not have a strong influence in this process (DeLuca, 
Jones, and Tula 2002). Since the career prospects of individual legislators are determined 
by party leaders, and name recognition and popular support for the individual candidate 
do not have a strong bearing on candidates’ legislative careers, these legislators have little 
incentive to promote legislation that increases their own public visibility, nor do they 
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have an incentive to distinguish themselves from their copartisans (Jones 2002). Rather, 
they have an incentive to promote the party brand name and display strong loyalty to the 
party leaders. These systems are known for cultivating party-centered incentives. This 
relationship varies significantly depending on district magnitude. When magnitude is 
sufficiently small, these electoral systems retain a significant number of personalizing 
incentives; these incentives decrease as district magnitude increases (Carey and Shugart 
1995; Crisp et al. 2004a; Shugart, Valdini, and Suominen 2005).  
 
Personalizing Electoral Incentives 
In open list systems, voters decide between individual candidates. Legislators’ 
electoral fates rest largely on their individual reputations. Voters tend to be familiar with 
the individual legislators who represent their district and they either reward or punish 
individual legislators depending on their legislative behavior. Since voters choose 
between individual candidates, and not political parties, the reputations of political parties 
are considerably less important (Cox and McCubbins 2001). Thus, legislators who are 
elected under this type of electoral institution have strong incentives to develop their 
individual reputations and distinguish themselves from their copartisans (Crisp et al. 
2004a). Among other things, legislators try to enhance their personal reputations through 
advertising, credit claiming, and position taking (Mayhew 1974). However, as is also the 
case in a closed list system, district magnitude determines the extent of these incentives, 
only here magnitude has the opposite affect. In very small districts, party-centered 
incentives are subdued. As the size of the district increases, party-centered incentives 
grow. This is because as the number seats available in a district increases, the average 
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number of candidates from each party also increases. To be elected, candidates have to 
distinguish themselves from their copartisans. This requires them to rely more on 
individual reputation and less on party reputation.  
In sum, list type (open or closed) and district magnitude affect legislators’ 
incentives to cultivate a personal vote. When lists are closed, the incentives to cultivate a 
personal vote decrease as district magnitude increases. When lists are open, the incentives 
to cultivate a personal vote increase as district magnitude rises. When districts are small, 
legislators from both open and closed lists have similar incentives. However, as district 
magnitude increases their incentives become more and more divergent.  
 
Institutional Incentives and Women’s Representation 
If we assume that all legislators are ambitious and seek to pursue a political 
career, then it follows that legislators will behave differently depending on the electoral 
systems in which they operate. Some legislators will strive to distinguish themselves 
from their copartisans, while others will endeavor to display strong party loyalties. 
Legislators who depend solely on their reputation with party leaders to further their 
careers have little incentive to promote their own legislative agenda or to coalition with 
other legislators who have similar policy positions. Rather they have an incentive to align 
with party’ bosses and promote the party’s interests. Conversely, legislators whose 
electoral fates depend—at least in part—on the representative’s individual reputation, 
face personalizing incentives. They will aim to distinguish themselves from their 
copartisans and enhance their personal reputations.  
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Assuming that female legislators, like all other legislators, are ambitious 
politicians whose behavior is influenced by institutional incentives further implies that 
institutional incentives mediate the link between women’s numeric representation and 
women’s ability to represent female constituencies. In systems with strong party-centered 
electoral incentives, female legislators have little incentive to distinguish themselves 
from their male colleagues. This may mean that they are unlikely to champion their own 
legislative agenda, improve their public visibility, or ally with other females to promote 
their legislative interests. Instead, these women have an incentive to behave similarly to 
male colleagues in order to display their party loyalties.  
Women who are elected in districts with personalizing incentives are encouraged 
to distinguish themselves from their copartisans and develop their own personal 
reputations. This suggests that women who are subject to personalizing incentives will be 
more likely to pursue activities that will aid them in differentiating themselves, such as 
championing separate legislative agenda and looking for opportunities to collaborate with 
like-minded colleagues. One way women can easily distinguish themselves from their 
typical copartisans is by signaling to their constituents that they stand for women.  
Moreover, for female legislators whose priorities differ from those of their male 
colleagues, personalizing incentives provide an opportunity to pursue those priorities. If it 
is the case that female legislators in districts with personalizing incentives either use their 
gender as a tool to distinguish themselves from their male copartisans or take advantage 
of the relative autonomy encouraged by their electoral system to pursue a more women-
friendly policy agenda, then these women should behave significantly different from their 
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female counterparts in districts with strong party-centered incentives. Thus, I hypothesize 
the following.   
 Hypothesis 1: Women elected in legislatures with some personalizing incentives 
are more likely to use gender as a means to distinguish themselves from their 
male copartisans. Conversely, women who are elected into legislatures with 
strong party-centered electoral incentives are less likely to distinguish themselves 
along gender divisions.  
 
 
Conditional Relationship with Increases in Women’s Representation  
As discussed earlier, previous research suggests that there is a link between 
women’s numeric representation in the legislature and the representation of women’s 
interests. Many scholars have suggested, and tested the hypothesis, that as the proportion 
of women in the legislature increases, female representatives will be more likely to 
articulate women’s interests and act on behalf of women; however, I argue that women’s 
legislative behavior is influenced by institutional incentives. Specifically, women who are 
elected in institutions with personalizing incentives will be more likely to use gender as a 
means distinguish themselves from their male copartisans. Conversely women who are 
elected in districts with party-centered incentives will be unlikely to behave any 
differently from the typical male legislator. This argument suggests that party-centered 
electoral rules may mitigate the relationship between women’s numeric representation 
and women’s legislative behavior. If a relationship does exist, my argument implies that 
it is unlikely to emerge in electoral districts with strong-party centered incentives. It is 
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likely to be more pronounced where institutions encourage women to differentiate 
themselves. This implies the following hypothesis.  
Hypothesis 2a: Conditional on personalizing incentives, female representatives 
are more likely to distinguish themselves along gender lines as the proportion of 
women in the legislature increases.  
Conversely, increases in the proportion of women in the legislature may be 
negatively related to the representation of women’s interests in districts with strong party-
centered incentives. This is because in legislatures where women are not well 
represented, the party (and the female representative) may believe that it can increase its 
vote share by appealing to female voters. When women occupy only a few seats in the 
chamber, the party can send low-cost signals to female constituents that they represent 
their interests better than other political parties that do not have female legislators. 
Having female legislators act on behalf of women, or at least signal to voters that they 
represent women, may secure the party additional votes.  
When women are numerically well represented in the legislature, however, it is 
more difficult for political parties to make a credible claim that they represent women and 
that other parties do not. If every party has a sizable proportion of female representatives 
(or, similarly, if every party is required to comply with a gender quota), female legislators 
are not a rare commodity that parties can simply use to signal to female voters that they 
represent their interests. Hence, from the party’s perspective there is seemingly nothing to 
be gained from targeting female constituents. Each party can easily claim to represent 
women, with credible signals being more costly. Therefore, from a rational choice 
perspective, when the proportion of women in the legislature is small, female politicians 
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may signal to voters and party leaders that they represent women; yet, as the proportion 
of women in the legislature increases, and this signal becomes more and more costly, 
ambitious female politicians may try to appear as though they are first and foremost party 
loyalists. Similarly, party leaders have a stronger incentive to recruit and select women 
who view themselves as party loyalists. As a result, once women make sizable gains in 
the legislature, we may expect that female legislators with party-centered electoral 
incentives will be even less likely to behave differently from their male copartisans. This 
implies the following hypothesis. 
 Hypothesis 2b: Conditional on party-centered incentives, as the percentage of 
women in the legislature increases, women will be less likely to distinguish 
themselves from their male copartisans.  
Empirical Investigation  
Sample Selection  
This argument provides a plausible theory for how institutional incentives mediate 
the link between women’s descriptive representation and women’s legislative behavior. 
Although many scholars have posited that it is important to consider institutions to 
understand this relationship, few existing research designs can adequately evaluate this 
relationship. This is because previous research designs are typically limited to a single 
legislature or a small number of legislatures. To evaluate this relationship, it is necessary 
to have a significant number of legislative chambers that vary in both institutional 
incentives and the proportion of female legislators. I have therefore chosen to study 
women’s legislative behavior at the subnational level in Argentina. To do this I collected 
an original data set that allows me to evaluate women’s legislative behavior over a long 
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temporal domain (18 years) for a large number of legislative chambers (23), which vary 
with respect to the proportion of women in the legislature and electoral incentives (see 
Table 4.1).  
Table 4.1: Sample Selection 23 Argentine Legislative Chambers 
District Years in 
Sample 
Chamber District Type 
Electoral 
Formula 
Gender 
Quotas 
Year 
Adopted 
# of 
Seats 
Federal 
District 
1998-2009 Deputies At Large District PR 30% 1991 60 
1992-2009 Senators 
8 Multi Member 
Districts 
PR 30% 1995 46 Buenos 
Aires 
1992-2009 Deputies 
8 Multi Member 
Districts 
PR 30% 1995 92 
Chaco 1992-2009 Deputies At Large District PR 30% 1992 32 
Chubut 1994-2009 Deputies At Large District PR 30% 1994 27 
1992-2000 Senators 
26 Multi-Member 
Districts  
PR 30% 1994 67 
Córdoba 
1992-2000 Deputies At Large District PR 30% 1994 26 
Córdoba 2002-2009 Deputies Mixed-Member 
Plurality & 
PR 
50% 1994 60 
1992-2009 Senators At Large District PR 30% 1992 13 
Corrientes 
1992-2009 Deputies At Large District PR 30% 1992 26 
Entre Ríos 1992-2009 Deputies At Large District 
Fixed 
Allocation 
No -- 28 
Formosa 1996-2009 Deputies At Large District PR 30% 1995 30 
Jujuy 1992-2009 Deputies At Large District PR No -- 48 
1992-2009 Senators 
4 Multi-Member 
Districts 
PR 30% 1992 38 
Mendoza 
1992-2009 Deputies 
4 Multi-Member 
Districts 
PR 30% 1992 50 
Misiones 1992-2009 Deputies At Large District PR 30% 1993 40 
Río Negro 1996-2009 Deputies Mixed Member PR 50% 1993 46 
1992-2009 Senators 
23 Single-Member 
Districts 
Plurality No -- 23 
Salta 
1992-2009 Deputies 
23 Multi-Member 
Districts 
PR 30% 1994 60 
Santa Cruz 1992-2009 Deputies Mixed-Member PR 30% 1992 28 
1992-2009 Senators 
19 Single Member 
Districts 
Plurality No -- 19 
Santa Fe 
1992-2009 Deputies At Large District PR 30% 1992 50 
Tucumán 1992-2009 Deputies 
3 Multi-Member 
Districts 
PR 30% 1994 49 
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As the first country to adopt legislative gender quotas (in 1993 at the provincial 
level), Argentina is the only context in the world that offers a long time line for such 
quotas (over 15 years) and a large degree of variation in the initiation and success of 
quotas. In the 1990s, all but four of the chambers in my sample adopted a gender quota of 
at least 30%. In 2000 three of these chambers increased their legislative quota to 50%. As 
a result, most of the chambers in my sample have a small proportion of women in the 
legislature prior to quota adoption and a sizeable proportion of women for several 
consecutive legislative sessions after the adoption of quotas.  
Moreover, there is significant variation in the electoral institutions in place in 
each of these legislatures. Several of the legislatures use at-large districts with closed lists 
to elect representatives. These systems are known to create strong party-centered 
incentives, which I argue will discourage women from exhibiting behavior that differs 
from their male copartisans.  Other electoral systems in Argentina use small or medium 
district with closed lists. These systems maintain sizeable personalizing incentives 
(Shugart, Valdini and Suominen 2005), which I argue may encourage women do 
distinguish themselves from male colleagues.  This variation in electoral systems, 
combined with both cross-sectional and temporal variation in the proportion of female 
legislators, provides an excellent opportunity to compare how electoral incentives shape 
women’s legislative behavior.  
 
Dependent Variable: Gender Cosponsorship Score 
This paper argues that under certain conditions female legislators will have an 
incentive to distinguish themselves from their male copartisans. There are many ways in 
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which legislators can attempt to distinguish themselves and cultivate personal 
reputations. For example, legislatures often use bill sponsorship and cosponsorship as a 
credit-claiming opportunity (Fenno 1978). The legislators with whom legislators 
cosponsor may be just as important as the legislation that they cosponsor. Crisp et al. 
explain, “constituents gain information about the legislator’s position not only from the 
content of the bill but also from the legislator(s) with whom it is cosponsored” (2004b: 
704). Legislators can use cosponsorship activity to forge informal legislative coalitions 
that will send signals to their colleagues and constituents about their legislative positions 
and priorities.  
If female legislators have incentives to distinguish themselves from their 
copartisans and if they use their gender as a means to do so, it is likely that these women 
will form cosponsorship coalitions with other female legislators. But if female legislators 
have little incentive to distinguish themselves from their copartisans, they are unlikely to 
coauthor frequently with female colleagues. I thus examine the rate at which legislators 
cosponsor with their female colleagues to gauge whether legislative incentives have a 
distinct impact on women’s legislative behavior.  
It may seem obvious that as the percentage of women in the legislative chamber 
increases, women (and men) will naturally cosponsor legislation more with women than 
with men. That is, even if the data-generating process for cosponsorship were completely 
random, increasing the percentage of women in the legislature increases the probability 
that legislators will coauthor with other women. To account for this increased probability, 
I measure my dependent variable as the difference between the rate at which each 
individual legislator coauthors with female legislators and the rate at which the legislator 
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would coauthor with female legislators if the data-generating process were completely 
random19. In general, we can think of the dependent variable as the Cosponsorship Score. 
As a result, negative (positive) values of the Cosponsorship Score indicate that the 
individual legislator works with women less (more) than one would expect if the data 
generating process for cosponsorship were completely random, and a value of zero 
indicates that the legislature works with women at the same rate that one would expect if 
the cosponsorship process were completely random.  
I utilize four separate specifications of the dependent variable: 1) cooperation 
with all women on all legislative issues; 2) cooperation with women outside their 
political party on all legislative issues; 3) cooperation with all women on women’s 
domain issues; 4) cooperation with women outside the political party on women’s 
domain issues. The first specification of the dependent variable allows me to evaluate the 
general patterns of activities in the legislative chamber. Specifications two through four 
provide a more nuanced understanding of when women cooperate and provide additional 
insights into why they behave as they do.   
To examine cooperation with women outside the political party I calculate the rate 
at which women coauthor with women outside their party with respect to their coauthor 
activity with all other legislators in the chamber, minus the rate that they would coauthor 
with women outside the party if the data generating process were completely random.    
                                                 
19I present findings for this specification of the dependent variable; however I should note 
that the findings are robust to several specifications of the dependent variable. These 
include models in which the dependent variable is specified as a count variable, the actual 
rate of cosponsorship, and a dyadic analysis, the last of which examines the probability 
that each legislator-dyad coauthors legislation together.  
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To assess if women behave differently when they are working on issues that are 
traditionally believed to be in the “women’s domain,” To identify issues that are more 
likely to affect the lives of women in Argentina, I rely on the United Nations Convention 
on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination against Women country reports for 
Argentina and other supplemental material that directly pertain to this issue. I calculate 
the rate of cosponsorship with female legislators on women’s domain issues for the 
whole chamber and for women in the other political party.    
 
Personalizing Incentives versus Party-Centered Incentives 
This paper argues that women’s political behavior will be influenced by 
institutional incentives. Specifically, I hypothesize that women who are subject to some 
personalizing incentives are more likely to use gender as a means to distinguish 
themselves from their male copartisans than are women who are subject to strong party-
centered incentives. In this paper, I operationalize electoral institutions with some 
personalizing incentives as closed list systems with small and medium district 
magnitudes (i.e., a district magnitude ranging from 1 to 9). I operationalize electoral 
systems with strong party-centered incentives as closed and blocked list systems with 
large district magnitudes (i.e., a district magnitude of 10 or larger). This coding decision 
is based on logic presented in previous research.  
First, in closed list proportional representation systems as the district magnitude 
increases, party-centered incentives displace personalizing incentives (Carey and Shugart 
1995). At the one extreme, single-member districts foster strong personalizing incentives. 
At the other extreme, large district magnitudes cultivate strong party-centered incentives. 
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Although there is no exact district magnitude at which party-centered incentives displace 
personalizing incentives, previous research provides insight into what sizes of district 
have strong party-centered incentives and what sizes of district retain personalizing 
incentives. 
Carey and Hix (2011) argue that voters’ cognitive ability to distinguish between 
different alternatives in elections declines gradually in low magnitude districts and then 
sharply drops off as the number of alternatives increases. They explain that voters in 
small to medium districts (i.e., 1 to 9) have clear preferences over alternatives and 
familiarity with candidates competing in their districts.  They posit that voters in large 
districts (i.e., magnitude of 10 or higher) are unlikely to have clear preferences regarding 
their alternatives.  
Shurgat Valdini and Suominen (2005) provide empirical evidence that candidates 
competing in small to moderate districts (in their research a district magnitude of 12 or 
smaller) in closed list systems are no less likely to benefit from some personal vote-
earning attributes than are candidates in the same sized district with open lists. It is clear 
from this research that legislators elected in small and medium districts have more 
incentive to distinguish themselves and cultivate a degree of personal recognition among 
voters. For these reasons, I code districts with a magnitude of nine or smaller as small to 
medium districts, and districts with a magnitude of 10 or larger as large districts. 
Therefore, my hypothesis would suggest that women who are elected in small and 
medium districts are more likely to distinguish themselves from their male colleagues 
than are female legislators who are elected in large districts.  
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Women’s Numeric Representation  
Hypotheses 2a and 2b posit that the relationship between descriptive 
representation and women’s propensity to distinguish themselves from their male 
colleagues is conditional on institutional incentives. First, in order to judge if women 
behave differently from men, I control for the sex of the legislature. This is coded 1 for 
female legislators and 0 otherwise. Second, in order to assess the effect of descriptive 
representation, I control for the percentage of women in the chamber and the percentage 
squared. Additionally, given that changes in the proportion of women in the legislature 
are typically brought about by the adoption of legislative quotas, I control for the number 
of quota years and the number of quota years squared. I also include an interaction 
between the sex of the legislator and each of these measures to evaluate if changes in 
women’s numeric representation influence women’s behavior.  
 
Control Variables  
It is reasonable to believe that women who represent urban and/or economically 
developed districts may behave very differently from women who represent rural and/or 
economically depressed areas. I include a control for economic development for each 
province-year. I measure this using the province-level infant mortality rate. I also control 
for social inequalities between men and women in a given province. It is possible that 
women behave differently in provinces with higher levels of gender equality. I measure 
this using the Gender-Related Development Index (GDI). GDI accounts for gender 
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disparities in life expectancy rates, adult literacy rates, and standards of living. The 
greater the gender disparity is, the lower the country’s GDI score.20 
 
Estimation Technique  
Given the nature of my data (i.e., legislators are nested within legislative sessions, 
which are nested within legislative chambers), I estimate this relationship using a 
hierarchical linear model (Gelman and Hill 2007).21 I include a random intercept for each 
legislative session, to relax the assumption of independence of errors between the 
legislators in a given legislative session. I also include a random intercept for each 
legislative chamber to relax the assumption of independence of errors between legislative 
sessions in a given legislative chamber. I analyze two different sets of models. First, I 
estimate models to consider how institutional incentives impact women’s legislative 
behavior. Then, I estimate a full model to evaluate how increases in women’s descriptive 
representation influence women’s legislative behavior conditional on institutional 
incentives.  
To evaluate the hypothesis that women will behave differently depending on the 
institutional context, I analyze two subsamples of data. The first subsample includes 
                                                 
20In addition to controlling for these variables, it is important to note that economic 
development in my sample varies significantly across district sizes. That is, some of the 
least developed provinces and the most developed provinces use at-large districts. This 
makes my data unique because district magnitude is typically highly correlated with 
development. Indeed, this same analysis could not be done using variation in the 
Argentine national government because large districts are only used in the most 
developed provinces. Moreover, my results are robust to model specifications that 
exclude Buenos Aires and the Federal District (i.e., the two most developed districts, both 
of which host large district magnitudes).  
21My results are robust to estimations using province and year fixed effects and clustered 
standard errors. Additionally, the overall analysis is consistent with individual province-
level analysis.  
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legislators who were elected in small to medium districts (magnitude 1 to 9), and the 
second subsample considers large districts (magnitude 10 to 60). Analyzing subsamples 
of my data is analogous to using a fully interactive model. These two different 
specifications will yield the same results; however, analyzing subsamples in my data has 
one advantage in that it facilitates the interpretation of the results. Given that it is not 
possible to directly interpret coefficients from an interactive model, this approach will 
allow the reader to interpret the results more easily. 
 
Results 
 In the tables below I provide estimates for the coefficients and standard errors for 
the multi-level models. The signs of the coefficient on “female” accurately reflect the 
impact that a legislator’s sex has on the probability of coauthoring with a female 
colleague. It is clear from these models that women coauthor more frequently with 
female colleagues than do men; however, these findings suggests that the magnitude of 
this relationship is conditional on the institutional incentives fostered by the electoral 
institutions and on the composition of the legislature. It is difficult to evaluate the total 
impact of these factors by examining the coefficients. With this difficult in mind, I graph 
the substantive effects for hypothesis 1 and 2 respectively for each of the specifications of 
the dependent variable in Figures 4.1.  
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Table 4.2: The Impact of Institutional Incentives on Women’s Cosponsorship Score 
  All Legislation  Women's Domain  
 Whole Chamber Other Party Whole Chamber Other Party 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Small 
Districts 
Large 
Districts 
Small 
Districts 
Large 
Districts 
Small 
Districts 
Large 
Districts 
Small 
Districts 
Large 
Districts 
Female  0.103*** 0.045*** 0.056*** 0.028*** 0.152*** 0.069*** 0.085*** 0.041*** 
 (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.012) (0.007) (0.007) (0.004) 
Economic  -0.000 0.003*** -0.001 0.003** 0.001 0.004*** -0.001 0.003** 
Developme
nt 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
GDI 0.003 0.118 -0.262 0.330 0.145 0.420 -0.183 0.613* 
 (0.465) (0.526) (0.337) (0.289) (0.655) (0.463) (0.375) (0.304) 
Constant 0.007 -0.187 0.230 -0.389 -0.097 -0.455 0.190 -0.620* 
 (0.375) (0.423) (0.275) (0.237) (0.529) (0.373) (0.309) (0.251) 
Random-effects Parameters      
Province  -3.928*** -3.504*** -3.615*** -3.831*** -3.592*** -3.759*** -3.635*** -3.954*** 
 (0.421) (0.256) (0.292) (0.290) (0.459) (0.318) (0.379) (0.415) 
Year -3.183*** -3.838*** -3.326*** -3.236*** -2.905*** -3.636*** -3.105*** -3.075*** 
 (0.111) (0.134) (0.107) (0.078) (0.124) (0.160) (0.115) (0.084) 
Residual  -2.001*** -2.445*** -1.926*** -2.474*** -1.614*** -2.076*** -1.651*** -2.163*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.011) (0.011) (0.015) (0.015) (0.011) (0.011) 
Observation
s 
2643 2643 4603 4603 2284 2284 4093 4093 
Provinces 12 20 12 20 12 20 12 20 
Sessions 87 152 87 152 87 152 87 152 
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Coefficients from HLM. Standard errors in parentheses.   
 
 
The Effects of Institutional Incentives  
Figure 4.1 compares the expected rate of cosponsorship with female colleagues 
for the four different specifications of the dependent variable. The x-axis specifies the 
rate of cosponsorship and the y-axis delineates the different specifications of the 
dependent variable. Recall that the Cosponsorship Score is the difference in the actual 
rate of cosponsorship and the random probability that a legislator will coauthor with a 
female. Thus, negative (positive) values suggest that legislators coauthor with female 
legislators at a lower (higher) rate then they would if the cosponsorship process were 
completely random. A value of zero indicates that female legislators are likely to  
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Figure 4.1: The Impact of Institutional Incentives on Women’s Gender 
Cosponsorship Score 
This graph shows that women with personalizing incentives are more likely to coauthor 
with female legislators than are their female colleagues with party-centered incentives, 
providing support for Hypothesis 1.  
 
 
This figure plots the expected value of women’s gender cosponsorship score given different institutional 
incentives. Each estimate is surrounded by 95% confidence intervals. Estimates are based on the HLM 
presented in Table 4.2.  
Recall that the gender cosponsorship score is the rate that legislators coauthor with their female colleagues 
minus the rate that they would coauthor with other women if the data-generating process for coauthoring 
were completely random. Negative (positive) values indicate that the legislator works with women less 
(more) than one would if the data generating process for cosponsorship were completely random. A value 
of zero indicates that the legislature works with women at the same rate that one would if the cosponsorship 
process were completely random. 
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cosponsor with their female colleagues at the same rate at which they would if 
cosponsorship were completely random. The top two expected values in the first panel in 
Figure 4.2 depict the expected rate of cosponsorship with female colleagues for women in 
districts with personalizing incentives and for women in districts with party-centered 
incentives. It is clear from this figure that women in districts with personalizing 
incentives cosponsor with female colleagues at a higher rate than do women in districts 
with party-centered incentives.  
It may not seem surprising that women work more with women, on average, than 
they do with men, particularly if we assume that most cosponsorship activity takes place 
between copartisans. This result may only indicate that women work more with women 
within their own party than with men in their own political party. Coauthoring with 
women from the same political party at a higher rate than men may not be a strong signal 
that women are trying to distinguish themselves from their male copartisans. But, it 
would be unexpected if women were working frequently with women from the other 
parties. Working with women from the opposition party may even be viewed as disloyal, 
particularly in legislatures that are known for their strong party discipline.  
Models 3 and 4 examine this relationship. In these models the dependent variable 
is the rate at which women work with women outside of their party compared to the rate 
that they work with all other legislators in the chamber. In other words, Models 3 and 4 
evaluate how frequently women cross party lines to work with other women. Model 3 
illustrates that woman from electoral districts with personalizing incentives coauthor with 
women at the same rate at which they would if they were randomly choosing their 
coauthors. This is unexpectedly high. Under normal circumstances, it seems that 
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representatives would intentionally coauthor less with their colleagues from other parties; 
yet, this finding indicates that women who have an incentive to distinguish themselves 
from their copartisans cross party lines relatively frequently.    
Women who have an incentive to distinguish themselves from copartisans are 
more likely to work with female colleagues.  Conversely, women who have strong 
incentives to please their party bosses are more likely to look for male coauthors. The 
theory suggests that this is because women who face personalizing incentives may use 
gender as a tool to set themselves apart from their copartisans in their district. But women 
who face party-centered incentives are more likely to behave like the typical male 
politician in order to demonstrate their party loyalty. If this is the case, women who are 
confronted with personalizing incentives may be more likely to coauthor with other 
women when they are working on issues traditionally believed to be of particular 
interests to women. Working with other women on women’s issues would be the best 
way to signal to constituents that they stand for women. Women who are subject to party-
centered incentives would be unlikely to change their behavior if they are working on 
issues in this area.  
The bottom panel in Figure 4.1, labeled “women’s domain,” graphs these 
findings. Figure 4.1 illustrates that a similar pattern persists in women’s domain 
legislation. Women from districts with personalizing incentives are more likely to work 
with other women than are their female counterparts in large districts. Women from small 
districts are even more likely to cross party lines to work with female colleagues when 
they are working on women’s domain issues, whereas women from large districts are still 
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less likely to work with women from the other party than they would be if the 
cosponsorship process were completely random.   
Overall, the data presents unified evidence that women who are subject to 
personalizing incentives may be more likely to use gender as a tool to distinguish 
themselves from their male colleagues. Meanwhile, women from districts with party-
centered incentives are more likely to behave similarly to their male colleagues. This 
suggests that incentives created by electoral institutions may provide important insights 
into the relationship between women’s descriptive representation and substantive 
representation. The next section examines this relationship in more detail.  
 
The Effects of Gender Composition Conditional on Institutional Incentives  
Figure 4.2 plots the expected value of women’s cosponsorship rate on the y-axis 
as the percentage of women in the legislative chamber increases across the x-axis. As 
before, I have evaluated this relationship across multiple specifications of the dependent 
variable. Specifically, I examined women’s propensity to work with other women in the 
whole legislative chamber and their tendency to cross party lines to work with women 
from the other party. I considered this relationship for both the full sample of legislation 
and legislation in the “women’s domain.”   
The top panel of Figure 4.2 indicates that when women comprise a small portion 
of the legislature, all women, regardless of their district type, are likely to work with 
other women frequently; yet, as the percentage of women in the legislative chamber 
increases, the probability that women with party-centered incentives will work with other 
women begins to decrease. Once women comprise approximately 30% of the legislature, 
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women are no more likely to work with other women than if cosponsorship were a 
completely random process. Women from districts with personalizing incentives behave 
differently. As the percentage of women in the legislature increases, these women are 
more likely to work with other women in the legislature22.  
The same pattern is present when examining legislation that deals directly with 
women’s issues. The pattern is more pronounced under this specification of the 
dependent variable. While, women from districts with party-centered incentives are no 
more likely to work with female colleagues, women from districts with personalizing 
incentives are much more likely to work with female colleagues. This indicates that 
women from districts with personalizing incentives may be using cosponsorship as an 
opportunity to distinguish themselves from their male colleagues. By working with 
women on women’s issues, women can signal to their constituents and party bosses that 
they represent a constituency that is not well represented.  
The bottom panel in Figure 4.2 examines patterns of cosponsorship with women 
outside the party. A similar trend exists for both specifications of the dependent variable, 
providing additional support for Hypotheses 2a and 2b. The alternative specification 
indicates that women from large districts are quite unlikely to work with other women 
outside their political party. As the percentage of women in the legislature increases this 
relationship becomes more pronounced. This indicates that when women are numerically 
well represented in the legislature, political parties may place less value on signaling to 
                                                 
22 I noted in the introduction that one of the advantages to examining this question in the 
context of the Argentine provinces it that unlike most high magnitude districts, the 
district magnitude in the Argentine provinces is not highly correlated with urbanicity or 
development. The results reported in Appendix B show that these findings are robust to 
the exclusion of the largest legislative chambers (which are also typically in the most 
developed provinces with the biggest urban centers).  
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female constituents that the party represents women’s interests. This is likely because 
when women are represented in all political parties, it is difficult for one party to signal 
that it represents female constituents better than other political parties.  
For women in small districts, they cross party lines quite frequently to coauthor 
with female colleagues. However, this relationship does not change as the proportion of 
females in the legislature increases. These women are just as likely to establish cross-
partisan consensus with female colleagues in effort to represent common interests 
regardless of the proportion of women it the legislature. Taken together, these results 
provide support for the hypothesis that increases in the proportion of women in the 
legislature will strengthen women’s incentives to toe the party line in party-centered 
institutions and (under some conditions) to differentiate themselves when institutions 
create personalizing incentives. Thereby providing additional support for the hypothesis 
that institutional incentives shape women’s legislative behavior in distinct ways.  
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Table 4.3: Explaining Women’s Cosponsorship Score as the Proportion of Women 
in the Legislature Increases, Conditional on Institutional Incentives 
 
 All Legislation Women's Domain 
 Whole Chamber Other Party Whole Chamber Other Party 
 (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
 Small 
Districts 
Large 
Districts 
Small 
Districts 
Large 
Districts 
Small 
Districts 
Large 
Districts 
Small 
Districts 
Large 
Districts 
Female  0.012 0.023 -0.027 0.071*** -0.030 0.018 -0.068 0.077** 
 (0.044) (0.035) (0.028) (0.020) (0.068) (0.048) (0.043) (0.029) 
% Women -0.503* -0.272 -0.280* -0.365* -0.456 0.186 -0.291 -0.254 
 (0.253) (0.210) (0.122) (0.143) (0.328) (0.265) (0.169) (0.189) 
(% 
Women)^2 
0.633 0.678 -0.195 0.026 1.244 -0.366 -0.156 -0.297 
 (0.623) (0.494) (0.302) (0.335) (0.822) (0.623) (0.424) (0.445) 
% Women 0.968* 0.390 0.932** -0.287 2.319** 0.670 1.726*** -0.062 
X Female (0.487) (0.308) (0.310) (0.179) (0.758) (0.427) (0.474) (0.258) 
(% 
Women)^2 
-1.214 -1.789** -1.637* 0.422 -3.810* -2.402** -3.269** -0.204 
X Female (1.063) (0.636) (0.675) (0.371) (1.681) (0.882) (1.050) (0.532) 
Quota Years 0.012* 0.001 0.001 -0.005 0.019** 0.000 0.004 -0.004 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) 
(Quota 
Years)2 
-0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000* -0.001** 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Quota Years -0.003 0.021*** -0.005 0.002 -0.018 0.026*** -0.009 0.003 
X Female (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.010) (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) 
(Quota 
Years)2 
-0.000 -0.001*** 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.002*** 0.000 -0.000 
X Female (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Economic  0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.003 0.001 0.001 -0.001 
Development (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
GDI -0.575 -0.058 -0.181 -0.128 -0.235 0.131 0.060 0.205 
 (0.556) (0.346) (0.226) (0.225) (0.597) (0.375) (0.267) (0.286) 
Constant 0.470 0.046 0.165 0.139 0.158 -0.132 -0.068 -0.148 
 (0.449) (0.294) (0.183) (0.193) (0.483) (0.324) (0.217) (0.245) 
Random-effects Parameters     
Province -3.765*** -3.697*** -4.964*** -4.192*** -4.111*** -3.856*** -22.366* -4.014*** 
 (0.412) (0.318) (0.820) (0.356) (0.920) (0.495) (9.558) (0.384) 
Year -3.224*** -3.322*** -4.120*** -3.604*** -3.003*** -3.111*** -3.811*** -3.365*** 
 (0.117) (0.107) (0.170) (0.091) (0.138) (0.115) (0.186) (0.098) 
Residual -2.005*** -1.931*** -2.447*** -2.474*** -1.617*** -1.655*** -2.079*** -2.164*** 
 (0.014) (0.011) (0.014) (0.011) (0.015) (0.011) (0.021) (0.011) 
Observations 2643 4603 2643 4603 2284 4093 2284 4093 
Provinces 12 20 12 20 12 20 12 20 
Sessions 87 152 87 152 87 152 87 152 
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Coefficients from HLM. Standard errors in parentheses.   
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Figure 4.2: Explaining Women’s Gender Cosponsorship Score as the Proportion of 
Women in the Legislature Increases, Conditional on Institutional Incentives 
These plots show that as the percentage of women in the legislative chamber increases, 
female legislators with personalizing incentives are more likely to coauthor with their 
female colleagues and female legislators with party-centered incentives are less likely to 
coauthor with female colleagues. This supports Hypotheses 2a and 2b 
 
 
 
 
 
This figure plots the expected value of women’s gender cosponsorship score as the proportion of women in 
the legislature increases. Each estimate is surrounded by 95% confidence intervals. Estimates are based on 
the HLM presented in Table 4.3.  
 
Recall that the gender cosponsorship score is the rate that legislators coauthor with their female colleagues 
minus the rate that they would coauthor with other women if the data-generating process for coauthoring 
were completely random. Negative (positive) values indicate that the legislator works with women less 
(more) than one would if the data generating process for cosponsorship were completely random. A value 
of zero indicates that the legislature works with women at the same rate that one would if the cosponsorship 
process were completely random. 
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Additional Implications and Empirical Test 
If it is the case that women who are elected into districts with more personalizing 
incentives are likely use their gender as a way to distinguish themselves from male 
copartisans, there should be additional implications that will allow me to evaluate the 
validity of this argument empirically. That is, other incentive structures, not limited to 
institutional incentives, should also compel women to distinguish themselves from their 
male copartisans. To further assess the validity of my argument, I develop and 
empirically test three additional implications.  
First, in Argentina, some provinces use closed party lists of candidates to elect 
legislators while others use party sublists. Where legislators are elected only by closed 
party list, there is no intra-party competition. This is because each party provides a single 
list and voters choose between parties. In elections with party sublists, however, each 
party can provide multiple lists. Where multiple lists compete against one another under 
the same party name, party cues are no longer sufficient for the voter to distinguish 
between alternatives. In these cases, legislators must distinguish themselves from other 
parties as well as from other lists competing under the same party name. As a result, 
deputies competing in elections with party sublists have a stronger incentive to bolster 
their own personal reputations (Crisp et al. 2004a). This implies that if women who have 
personalizing incentives use gender differences to distinguish themselves from their 
copartisans, then women who are elected in districts utilizing party sublists will be more 
likely to coauthor with female colleagues than women who are elected in simple closed 
list systems.   
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Second, inter-branch relations also shape legislators’ incentives. In presidential 
systems, the executive has a strong incentive to cultivate a positive reputation for the 
party and has all of the tools necessary to do so. For example, the executive typically has 
the power to structure the legislative agenda by introducing legislation, defining the 
legislature’s priorities, and even declaring decrees. When the executive is largely 
responsible for the party’s reputation, as is the case in the Argentine provinces, legislators 
are free to spend more time cultivating their own reputations (Crisp et al. 2004a; Nielson 
and Shugart 1999; Shugart 2001; Shugart and Carey 1992). This implies that women who 
are elected into the governor’s party are more likely to cultivate their personal reputations 
than are women who are elected into opposition parties.  
 Finally, electoral incentives should be most pronounced for legislators who have 
political ambition. If legislators do not intend to pursue a political career, then they 
should not be subject to the incentives created by electoral systems. This implies that 
women who have some personalizing incentives and who have political ambition will be 
more likely to coauthor with female legislators than women who are elected in the same 
electoral system but do not have political ambition.  I will test the following three 
hypotheses to evaluate the validity of my argument.  
Hypothesis 3a: Women elected in districts with party sublists are more likely to 
distinguish themselves from male copartisans than women elected in districts with 
single party lists.  
Hypothesis 3b: Women who are members of the governor’s party are more likely 
to distinguish themselves from male copartisans than women who are not 
members of the governor’s party. 
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Hypothesis 3c: Women with political ambitions are more likely to distinguish 
themselves from male copartisans than women who are not politically ambitious.  
 
Empirical Analysis of Additional Implications  
To evaluate these hypotheses, I examine how women elected into small districts 
(those with some personalizing incentives) behave differently under each of the 
aforementioned conditions. Employing the same estimation technique as before, I first 
compare districts with sublists to districts without sublists, then members of the 
governor’s party to members outside the governor’s party, and finally legislators with 
political ambitions to those without political ambitions. I operationalize politically 
ambitious legislators as those who serve more than one term in office. This term can 
come before or after the current term. Given that I only observe whether legislators 
actually serve a second term and not whether they run for reelection or move to another 
political post, this is a conservative measure of political ambition, which will potentially 
bias the results in favor of the null hypothesis.  
The results are reported in Table 4.4 and Figure 4.3. The top panel in Figure 4.3 
graphs the rate at which women in small and medium districts coauthor with other 
women depending on the type of electoral list used to select candidates. First, it is 
important to note that this figure indicates that all women, regardless of their list type, are 
more likely to coauthor with female colleagues than they would be if they were randomly 
choosing their coauthors. This is consistent with evidence from earlier analysis that 
women from small and medium districts work more with female colleagues than with 
male colleagues. Second, this graph distinguishes between the behavior of women elected 
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using party sublists and women elected in systems with single party lists. As 
hypothesized, the top panel in Figure 4.3 illustrates that women elected in districts with 
party sublist are more likely to distinguish themselves from their male colleagues.  
The second panel in Figure 4.3 provides additional support for the theory by 
illustrating how women who are members of the governor’s party behave differently 
from women who are not members of the governor’s party. Since the governor is largely 
responsible for promoting the party brand name, members of the governor’s party can 
focus more on establishing their own personal reputations among their constituents. My 
results suggest that women do this by working more with female colleagues to become 
known as representatives who stand for women.  
Finally, the third panel in Figure 4.3 exemplifies the relationship between 
ambitious politicians and non-ambitious politicians. Previous literature suggests that 
institutional incentives are more likely to shape the behavior of ambitious legislators 
since they value reelection. Although my measure of political ambition is a conservative 
estimate, this research demonstrates that ambitious female politicians in districts with 
personalizing incentives are more likely to distinguish themselves from their male 
colleagues by cooperating with female colleagues.  
These analyses demonstrate that legislative context plays an important role in 
shaping women’s legislative behavior. These findings suggest that women do use their 
gender as a means to establish a personal reputation. By coauthoring with other female 
representatives, women can signal to their constituents and party bosses that they are 
legislators who stand for women.  
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Table 4.4: Explaining Women’s Cosponsorship Score as the Proportion of Women 
in the Legislature Increases for multiple Legislative Contexts 
 
 Whole Chamber Whole Chamber Whole Chamber 
 (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
 Party SubList No SubList Governors 
Party 
Other Party Ambitious Not 
Ambitious 
Female  0.491*** 0.013 -0.002 -0.060 -0.001 0.058 
 (0.134) (0.050) (0.066) (0.058) (0.087) (0.052) 
% Women 0.207 -0.687 -0.329 -0.709* -0.785* -0.477 
 (0.317) (0.395) (0.323) (0.354) (0.311) (0.282) 
(% Women)^2 -1.859 1.121 0.157 1.509 1.292 0.809 
 (1.055) (0.865) (0.797) (0.870) (0.792) (0.696) 
% Women -6.026*** 1.027 1.166 1.577* 0.142 0.585 
X Female (1.625) (0.593) (0.742) (0.623) (0.981) (0.571) 
(% Women)^2 20.681*** -1.433 -1.106 -3.989** 2.606 -0.921 
X Female (4.549) (1.249) (1.538) (1.484) (2.280) (1.229) 
Quota Years 0.019** 0.013 0.010 0.013 0.015* 0.011* 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) 
(Quota Years)2 -0.001** -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Quota Years 0.051*** -0.006 -0.004 -0.001 0.018 -0.005 
X Female (0.013) (0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.014) (0.007) 
(Quota Years)2 -0.007*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.002* -0.000 
X Female (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Economic  -0.003 0.003 0.002 -0.000 -0.001 0.001 
Development (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
GDI -0.149 -0.849 -0.503 -0.624 -1.585** -0.211 
 (0.639) (0.716) (0.653) (0.786) (0.597) (0.588) 
Constant 0.156 0.662 0.384 0.522 1.326** 0.174 
 (0.537) (0.574) (0.528) (0.632) (0.484) (0.474) 
Random-effects Parameters    
Province -19.284 -3.444*** -3.746*** -3.472*** -3.955*** -3.751*** 
 (1629.930) (0.373) (0.528) (0.406) (0.558) (0.432) 
Year -3.942*** -3.204*** -2.951*** -3.041*** -3.250*** -3.219*** 
 (0.424) (0.142) (0.128) (0.134) (0.172) (0.140) 
Residual -2.193*** -1.963*** -1.970*** -2.139*** -2.006*** -2.009*** 
 (0.029) (0.016) (0.019) (0.022) (0.024) (0.018) 
Observations 620 2023 1528 1115 962 1681 
Provinces 12 20 12 20 12 20 
Sessions 87 152 87 152 87 152 
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Coefficients from HLM. Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Figure 4.3: Explaining Women’s Gender Cosponsorship Score as the Proportion of 
Women in the Legislature Increases for multiple Legislative Contexts 
This graph shows that women who are elected using party sublists, women who are 
members of the governor’s party, and women who are ambitious politicians are more 
likely to coauthor with female colleagues compared to women in other legislative 
contexts. These findings provide support for Hypotheses 3a, 3b, and 3c.  
 
 
 
This figure plots the expected value of women’s gender cosponsorship score as the proportion of women in 
the legislature increases. Each estimate is surrounded by 95% confidence intervals. Estimates are based on 
the HLM presented in Table 4.4.  
 
Recall that the gender cosponsorship score is the rate that legislators coauthor with their female colleagues 
minus the rate that they would coauthor with other women if the data-generating process for coauthoring 
were completely random. Negative (positive) values indicate that the legislator works with women less 
(more) than one would if the data generating process for cosponsorship were completely random. A value 
of zero indicates that the legislature works with women at the same rate that one would if the cosponsorship 
process were completely random. 
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Implications for Women’s Representation 
The findings from this research have some interesting implications for how 
scholars think about institutional designs that maximize women’s representation. 
Although we have developed a clear understanding of how institutions can maximize 
women’s descriptive representation, we know less about the institutional designs that 
maximize women’s substantive representation. This research contributes to our 
understanding of how institutional design influences women’s legislative behavior, which 
has clear implications for how and when women will represent women’s interests. But 
these findings imply that institutional mechanisms that are best for increasing women’s 
descriptive representation are not completely compatible with the goal of maximizing 
women’s substantive representation. This is because the implementation of gender quotas 
is the most immediate way to increase descriptive representation of women (Htun and 
Jones 2002; Norris 2004). Quotas are most effective when they combine placement 
mandates and closed-list proportional representation systems with large district 
magnitudes (Caul 1999; Larserud and Taphorn 2007; Jones 2009). That said, these types 
of electoral institutions foster strong party-centered incentives, which may discorage 
women’s substantive representation.  
Findings from this research demonstrate that women elected in districts with 
strong party-centered incentives are unlikely to behave differently from male colleagues. 
This suggests that women in these districts may be discouraged from representing 
women’s interests. Institutional incentives in these districts discourage women from 
pursuing an independent legislative agenda, building their own reputations or even 
behaving differently than the typical male legislator. These implications are consistent 
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with expectations developed in previous literature, which suggests that strong party-
centered electoral rules are more likely to result in the marginalization of women (Goetz 
and Hassim 2003; Machulay 2006; Schwindt-Bayer 2010; Tinker 2004; Tripp 2006; 
Vincent 2004). This does not mean that women elected in systems with party-centered 
incentives will not stand for women, indeed, women may work from within the party to 
accomplish similar goals. The research does however, suggests that a different 
mechanism is at work in party-centered incentives.   
Figure 4.4: District Magnitude, Party Magnitude and the Election of Women  
 
 
 
 
My results demonstrate that women who are elected in legislative districts that 
preserve some personalizing incentives are likely to distinguish themselves from their 
male colleagues. This implies that women who face personalizing incentives may be 
more likely to ally with other women to represent women’s substantive interests. As these 
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women are not discouraged from behaving differently from their male colleagues, they 
can pursue their own legislative agenda and cooperate with like-minded women more 
freely. With few exceptions, however, women are seldom elected in legislatures that 
foster strong personalizing incentives (Thames and Williams 2010). This suggests that 
electoral systems that promote the descriptive representation of women do not promote 
the substantive representation of women. Findings from this article also imply that there 
may be a sweet spot. That is, in closed-list systems, there is likely an optimal district 
magnitude that is large enough to still elect a large proportion of women but small 
enough to preserve some personalizing incentives.  
I have already made the case that small and medium size districts (magnitude 
from 1 to 9) are small enough to preserve some personalizing incentives. This idea is 
articulated in previous research (e.g., Carey and Hix 2011; Shugart, Valdini, and 
Suominen 2005) and the findings in this present research provide further support for this 
relationship. Still, the question remains: are these districts large enough to advance the 
election of women?  
We can examine this question by looking at some basic descriptive statistics from 
my sample selection. Figure 4.4 illustrates how increases in the average district 
magnitude are related to: 1) increases in the average party magnitude (i.e., the number of 
seats in a given district held by the same party); and 2) increases in the average 
percentage of women elected into systems with closed-list with a 30% gender quota. 
First, with respect to party magnitude, Figure 4.4 illustrates that as the district magnitude 
increases, so to does the average party magnitude. In districts with a magnitude between 
7 and 9, the party magnitude is on average between 3 and 4. Similarly, in larger districts 
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with a magnitude between 10 and 13, the average party magnitude is between 4 and 5. 
This relationship is important for the election of women into office. Given that gender 
quotas in the Argentine provinces require that women occupy at least one of every three 
seats, and political parties typically only meet the minimum quota requirement, women 
fare no better in districts with a magnitude of 10 to 13 than they do in systems with 
slightly smaller districts with a magnitude of 7 to 9.  
This pattern is consistent with the expectations developed in the literature. The 
logic developed by Jones (2009) implies that the optimum party magnitude for women in 
systems in which gender quotas mandate that women must occupy one of every three 
positions on the party list is a multiple of 3. This is because when the party magnitude is 
three (or 6 or 9), the minimum percentage of seats a woman can occupy is 30%. If the 
party magnitude is less than three, there is some likelihood that women will not occupy 
any seats in the legislature. But once the party magnitude is 4 or 5, women can potentially 
occupy as few as 20% of the seats in the legislature. Given this logic, it is evident that the 
proportion of women elected in a district is not likely to increase if the district moves 
from an average party magnitude of three to a party magnitude of nine. Moreover, the 
figure illustrates that as district sizes increases past a district magnitude of nine, the 
probability of electing more women to office increases at a decreasing rate. This implies 
that medium-sized districts are large enough to facilitate the election of women. Taken 
together, these findings suggest that medium-sized districts in closed-list districts may be 
optimal for maximizing both women’s descriptive representation and women’s 
substantive representation. This is because they are large enough to promote the election 
of women but small enough to preserve some personalizing incentives.   
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Conclusions 
Scholars of political representation are keenly interested in understanding when 
the interests of under-represented groups will receive attention from government leaders. 
Previous research often hypothesizes that electing representatives from marginalized 
groups in society will increase the probability that their interests are represented. 
Findings for this hypothesis are mixed, however. Some research supports the idea that 
increases in descriptive representation will result in increased substantive representation, 
while others find no relationship. This paper offers an explanation for these 
inconsistencies. I argue that expectations for substantive representation should be 
conditioned by the institutional rules and norms that govern a given legislature. Different 
institutions provide different incentives for legislators. With respect to women, this 
implies that not all female legislators have the same institutional incentives and 
opportunities to represent women’s interests. With respect to electoral systems, some 
institutions create incentives for legislators to distinguish themselves from their 
copartisans, while other institutions encourage legislators to toe the party line and exhibit 
strong party loyalty. I argue that legislators from under-represented groups are likely to 
behave differently depending on the types of institution used to elect them. For example, 
women who are elected in an institutional context that encourage legislators to display 
strong party loyalty and discourage legislators from cultivating a personal reputation are 
unlikely to behave any differently from their male colleagues. Rather, we would expect to 
see women, like men, toeing the party line and representing the party platform. But 
women who are elected in institutions with strong personalizing incentives are 
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encouraged to distinguish themselves from their colleagues. As a result, they may be 
inclined to use their gender as a means to differentiate themselves from their male 
colleagues. Generally speaking, I hypothesize that some institutions encourage women to 
behave differently from their male colleagues while others encourage them to behave 
similarly.  
Using an original data set, I test this hypothesis across 23 legislatures, which host 
a variety of electoral systems. I find strong empirical support for the hypothesis that 
institutions shape women’s legislative behavior. I additionally find that institutions 
mediate the link between increases in the proportion of female legislators and women’s 
legislative behavior. Specifically, I show that increases in the proportion of women in the 
legislature strengthen women’s incentives to toe the party line in party-centered 
institutions and to differentiate themselves when institutions create personalizing 
incentives. 
The legislative behavior of women elected in districts with party-centered 
incentives compared to that of their colleagues in districts with personalizing incentives is 
even more distinct when I consider cosponsorship patterns for legislation that is typically 
considered to be in the women’s domain. By working with female colleagues on 
women’s issues, representatives who face personalizing incentives can signal to their 
constituents and party bosses that they are representing a part of the district that would 
not otherwise be represented.  
This research has important implications for understanding how and when 
women’s policy interests will be represented in the legislature. The finding that electoral 
institutions influence women’s legislative behavior indicates that electoral institutions 
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likely have a direct impact on how and when female representatives stand for women. 
This research illustrates that women who are discouraged from distinguishing themselves 
from their copartisans are not likely to behave differently from their male colleagues. 
Rather, they are likely to exhibit the same sort of behavior in effort to appeal to party 
bosses. This implies that female legislators in these districts may be less likely to 
articulate women’s issues. Conversely, women who are elected in districts with strong 
personalizing incentives are encouraged to behave differently from their copartisans. As 
such, these women may be more likely to stand for women.  
This research also has important implications for electoral system design. 
Scholars are typically concerned with designing institutions to increase the numeric 
representation of marginalized groups. Moreover, the research explains why it is 
important for scholars to also consider how institutions shape groups’ behavior once 
members of these groups are in office. These findings do not to suggest that considering a 
single source of institutional incentives can entirely explain when women’s descriptive 
representation will influence the substantive representation of women’s interests. Rather, 
they demonstrate the importance of examining the broader conditions under which policy 
is made.   
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion 
 
Scholars of political representation are keenly interested in understanding how to 
increase women’s numeric representation in political office and how these increases will 
influence women’s legislative behavior. This research contributes to our understanding of 
this relationship in three specific ways. First, it examines the extent to which female 
legislators have divergent legislative preferences from their male colleagues. Second, it 
investigates how the adoption of gender quotas and changes in women’s numeric 
representation influence women’s legislative behavior. Third, I develop a theory about 
how institutional incentives foster or quell the propensity of female legislatures to 
represent women. I derive multiple implications from the institutional explanation and 
find strong empirical support. 
To evaluate the aforementioned relationships it is necessary to have a significant 
number of legislative chambers that vary in both institutional incentives and the 
proportion of female legislators. As a result, I have chosen to study women’s legislative 
behavior at the subnational level in Argentina. As the first country to adopt legislative 
gender quotas (in 1993 at the provincial level), Argentina is the only context in the world 
that offers a long time line of gender quotas (over 15 years) and a large degree of 
variation in the initiation and success of quotas. Moreover, there is significant variation in 
the electoral institutions employed in each of these legislatures. On the one extreme, 
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several of the legislatures use at-large districts with closed lists to elect representatives; 
meanwhile others use single member districts.  
Therefore, I collect an original data set that allows me to evaluate women’s 
legislative behavior over a long temporal domain (18 years) for a large number of 
legislative chambers (23), which vary with respect the proportion of women in the 
legislature and the electoral incentives. I conducted extensive field work in Argentina, 
visiting 27 different legislative chambers in 19 of the country’s 24 provinces. In each 
province I conducted elite interviews and carried out archival research to create an 
original dataset on women’s legislative involvement and activities. I collected 
information on bill sponsorship and cosponsorship activity, committee appointments, 
ministerial posts, as well as party and legislative leadership posts. The contribution of my 
research will not be limited to only the literature on gender quotas and women’s 
legislative behavior, but will also further research on the relationship between political 
institutions and legislative behavior more generally.  
 
Gender and Legislative Preferences  
The motivation for this dissertation is to understanding if female and male 
legislators have different legislative behaviors and the extent to which they represent 
constituents differently. A key piece of this puzzle is to understand if female legislators 
have different legislative preferences than male legislators. Conventional research 
examining this question typically uses roll call data to measure legislative preferences. 
Yet extant research using roll call data results in mixed findings. I argue that while male 
and female legislators are likely to have distinct preferences these differences are difficult 
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to detect using roll call data since it is highly structured by party influences. I address this 
shortcoming by drawing on cosponsorship data to measure legislative preferences. Like 
roll call data, cosponsorship data can be used to recover ideal point estimates but 
cosponsorship data is not subject to the same level of party pressures, therefore it is more 
useful for examining intra-party differences such as gender. To test this argument I 
analyze original cosponsorship data from 18 provincial legislative chambers in Argentina 
over a 16-year period of time. Using a principal component analysis to recover ideal 
point estimates from 117 legislative sessions, I find statistically significant gender 
differences in approximately 80% of the chambers. This study provides evidence that 
gender does influence legislative preferences. While this is only one small piece of the 
puzzle, it is an important part of understanding women’s representation. 
 
The Direct Effect: Testing the Relationship Between Descriptive and Substantive 
Representation 
The widespread adoption of gender quotas is based largely on the belief that 
increases in women’s numeric representation will result in more attention to women’s 
issues. However, previous research that examines this relationship rarely finds a direct 
relationship between the two. The second empirical chapter investigates directly the 
relationship between women’s numeric representation and women’s legislative behavior. 
Using an interactive hierarchical linear model I examine both bill introduction and 
cosponsorship behavior for 23 provincial level legislatures from 1992 to 2009. I fail to 
find support for the hypothesis that increases in women’s descriptive representation 
results in increases in attention to women’s interests. Although findings from individual 
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province level analyses are mixed, on average I find that as the percentage of women in 
the legislature increases women are less likely to collaborate with female colleagues to 
pursue a common legislative agenda. This corroborates previous mixed or null findings in 
the literature. Despite findings from the previous chapter, which illustrate that women do 
have divergent legislative preferences, these empirical results suggest that other factors 
condition women’s incentives and abilities to represent women. 
 
Institutional Incentives and Women’s Legislative Behavior  
One possible reason why there is no consensus in the literature regarding the 
impact of increases in numeric representation on women’s legislative behavior is that not 
all women have the same institutional opportunity or electoral incentive to represent 
women’s interests. Broadly speaking electoral systems affect representatives’ incentives 
to either enhance a personal reputation or to exhibit their party loyalty (Carey and 
Shugart 1995). It is likely that institutional incentives influence women’s propensity and 
ability to represent women.  
Consider for example electoral systems where voters vote for individual 
candidates as opposed to political parties. Since voters choose between politicians, 
individual candidates have strong incentives to distinguish themselves from their 
copartisans by cultivating their personal reputation in effort to bolster their electoral 
prospects (personalizing incentives). On the other hand, if voters choose between 
political parties, rather than individuals, candidates have an incentive to display strong 
party loyalty and enhance the party’s reputation (party-centered incentives). This is 
because party leaders (not voters) determine who will represent the party.  
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These different incentives fostered by different electoral systems mediate the link 
between women’s numeric representation and women’s ability to represent female 
constituencies. If we assume that legislators are rational actors who seek to enhance their 
political career, then female legislators who are elected in districts that encourage them to 
develop their personal reputation may signal to voters that they stand for women in effort 
to distinguish themselves from their male copartisans. As a result, women may be more 
inclined to champion women’s issues or work with female colleagues. On the other hand, 
legislators who are elected in districts that encourage party loyalty have no incentive to 
deviate from the party platform or to distinguish themselves from their copartisans. 
Therefore, women who are elected into these districts may be less likely to signal to 
voters that they represent women’s interests. Instead, they are more likely to exhibit the 
same behavior and interests as their male colleagues in order to demonstrate their 
commitment to the party.  
I develop multiple implications for the institutional explanation and empirically 
demonstrate the conditions under which this relationship holds. My research provides 
strong empirical support for the hypothesis that women who face strong party-centered 
incentives are not likely to distinguish themselves from their male colleagues. 
Institutional incentives in these districts discourage women from pursuing an independent 
legislative agenda, building their own reputation, or even from behaving differently than 
the average male legislator. This implies that women in these districts maybe discouraged 
from articulating women’s interests. However, female legislators who are elected in 
legislative districts that preserve some personalizing incentives are likely to distinguish 
themselves from their male colleagues. Since these women are not discouraged from 
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behaving differently than their male colleagues they can more freely pursue their own 
legislative agenda and cooperate with like-minded women. This implies that women who 
face personalizing incentives may be more likely to represent women’s interests. 
In addition to the implications this research has for women’s representation, it 
also has important implications for electoral system design. Scholars are typically 
concerned with designing institutions to increase the numeric representation of 
historically marginalized groups. However, this research explains why it is important for 
scholars to also consider how institutions shape groups’ behavior once they are in office. 
Further, my research has implications for understanding how electoral institutions 
structure legislators’ behavior more generally. While Carey and Shugart (1995) 
hypothesize about this relationship, to date there are few empirical tests. This dissertation 
contributes to our understanding of this relationship by providing rigorous tests of 
multiple empirical implications that fall from their theory.   
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Appendix A: The Impact of Descriptive Representation: Chamber Level Analyses  
 
Table A1: Determinants of Gender Cosponsorship Score by Province: Whole Chamber, All Legislation  
Province 
Buenos 
Aires H. 
Buenos 
Aires S. 
Capital 
Federal Chaco Chubut 
Cordoba 
Unicameral 
Cordoba 
H. 
Cordoba 
S. 
Corrientes 
H. 
Corrientes 
S. 
Entre 
Rios 
Year 1992-2009 1992-2009 1998-2008 1992-2009 1994-2008 2002-2008 1992-2000 1992-2000 1992-2009 1992-2009 1992-2009 
Female Legislator 0.101* -0.119 0.189 -0.003 0.039 -0.121 0.158*** -0.120 0.091 -0.205* 0.078 
 (0.047) (0.105) (0.314) (0.056) (0.201) (0.492) (0.047) (0.074) (0.086) (0.094) (0.060) 
% Women 0.016 -0.235 0.193 0.034 -0.368 0.014 0.765*** 1.061 -1.029* 0.025 0.083 
 (0.145) (0.373) (0.583) (0.143) (0.364) (1.746) (0.159) (0.845) (0.465) (0.184) (0.155) 
% Women -0.064 1.851** -0.511 0.085 -0.413 0.588 -0.816** 1.174 -0.905 0.492 -0.710 
X Female (0.230) (0.605) (0.901) (0.291) (0.744) (1.093) (0.262) (4.531) (0.789) (0.433) (0.479) 
Quota Years 0.003 0.013 -0.010** 0.002 0.006 0.026 0.067*** -0.008 0.023 0.003 . 
 (0.004) (0.010) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.063) (0.011) (0.015) (0.016) (0.017) . 
Quota Years 0.003 -0.027** 0.002 0.001 0.018 0.011 0.026** 0.017 0.015 0.009 . 
X Female (0.004) (0.009) (0.004) (0.005) (0.010) (0.015) (0.009) (0.089) (0.021) (0.017) . 
Economic Development 0.003 0.005 -0.020* 0.003 -0.004 -0.031 0.119*** -0.002 -0.008 0.005 -0.004 
 (0.007) (0.016) (0.010) (0.002) (0.013) (0.058) (0.018) (0.002) (0.006) (0.007) (0.002) 
Legislation Authored -0.000* -0.002** 0.000 -0.000* -0.000 0.000 -0.000** 0.001*** 0.001** 0.001*** 0.000* 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant -0.072 -0.057 0.178 -0.053 0.078 0.278 -2.419*** 0.021 0.202 -0.127 0.039 
 (0.165) (0.385) (0.256) (0.074) (0.287) (0.365) (0.362) (0.032) (0.186) (0.178) (0.048) 
Observations 788 361 355 285 199 279 329 298 198 100 244 
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Table A1 cont.: Determinants of Gender Cosponsorship Score by Province: Whole Chamber, All Legislation  
 
Province Jujuy 
Mendoza 
H. Mendoza S. Misiones Rio Negro Salta Santa Cruz Santa Fe S. Tucuman Santa Fe H. 
Year 1992-2009 1992-2009 1992-2009 1992-2009 1996-2008 1992-2009 1992-2009 1992-2009 1992-2009 1992-2009 
Female Legislator 0.001 0.109 0.191* 0.015 0.669*** 0.199** 0.042 -0.374*** 0.101 -0.010 
 (0.118) (0.069) (0.076) (0.095) (0.145) (0.063) (0.064) (0.065) (0.074) (0.060) 
% Women -0.956** 0.568* -0.357 -0.072 1.753** -0.431** -0.235 -0.450*** -0.343 -0.144 
 (0.353) (0.231) (0.282) (0.199) (0.564) (0.164) (0.124) (0.098) (0.203) (0.105) 
% Women 0.050 0.382 -0.885 -0.322 -0.485 -0.939* 0.558 7.579*** 1.160** 0.611* 
X Female (0.492) (0.463) (0.561) (0.383) (0.893) (0.395) (0.408) (0.724) (0.436) (0.259) 
Quota Years . 0.005 0.002 -0.005 0.008 -0.001 0.002 . -0.003 0.003 
 . (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.004) (0.002) . (0.006) (0.004) 
Quota Years . -0.006 0.003 0.011*** -0.035** -0.001 -0.009* . -0.019*** -0.012** 
X Female . (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.012) (0.004) (0.004) . (0.006) (0.004) 
Economic Development -0.013** 0.020*** 0.005 -0.017*** 0.022* -0.012*** -0.005 0.002 -0.003 -0.002 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.010) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.008) 
Legislation Authored 0.001** 0.001** -0.001** -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.001*** -0.000 0.000*** -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 0.484** -0.604*** -0.068 0.486** -0.837** 0.338*** 0.101 -0.055* 0.089 0.041 
 (0.163) (0.162) (0.167) (0.148) (0.258) (0.086) (0.074) (0.025) (0.105) (0.144) 
 423 422 329 349 283 526 213 170 354 436 
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Table A2: Determinants of Gender Cosponsorship Score by Province: Whole Chamber, Women’s Domain   
 
Province 
Buenos 
Aires H. 
Buenos 
Aires S. 
Capital 
Federal Chaco Chubut 
Cordoba 
Unicameral 
Cordoba 
H. 
Cordoba 
S. 
Corrientes 
H. 
Corrientes 
S. Entre Rios 
Year 1992-2009 1992-2009 1998-2008 1992-2009 1994-2008 2002-2008 1992-2000 1992-2000 1992-2009 1992-2009 1992-2009 
Female Legislator 0.114*** -0.066 0.139 -0.010 -0.030 1.018*** 0.094*** 0.073* -0.023 -0.033 0.064* 
 (0.029) (0.066) (0.282) (0.051) (0.062) (0.271) (0.026) (0.032) (0.066) (0.069) (0.027) 
% Women -0.392*** -0.294 0.537 -0.488*** -0.461*** -4.306*** -0.249** -0.039 -1.180** -0.145 -0.629*** 
 (0.089) (0.234) (0.523) (0.130) (0.112) (0.962) (0.087) (0.363) (0.358) (0.134) (0.071) 
% Women -0.409** 1.157** -0.349 0.346 0.110 -2.004*** -0.206 -4.628* -0.762 0.202 -0.214 
X Female (0.141) (0.379) (0.809) (0.265) (0.229) (0.602) (0.143) (1.948) (0.609) (0.315) (0.221) 
Quota Years -0.002 0.012 -0.009** 0.005 0.001 -0.114** 0.016** -0.002 0.022 0.012 . 
 (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.035) (0.006) (0.006) (0.012) (0.012) . 
Quota Years 0.005 -0.021*** 0.003 -0.007 0.002 -0.030*** -0.007 0.074 0.022 0.008 . 
X Female (0.002) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.008) (0.005) (0.038) (0.016) (0.013) . 
Economic 
Development -0.003 0.011 -0.030*** 0.000 -0.002 0.090** 0.029** -0.000 -0.004 0.009 -0.002 
 (0.004) (0.010) (0.009) (0.002) (0.004) (0.032) (0.010) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) 
Legislation Authored -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.000 0.000 -0.001* -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000 0.001** 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 0.084 -0.231 0.069 0.011 0.039 1.030*** -0.564** 0.007 0.111 -0.213 0.044* 
 (0.101) (0.241) (0.230) (0.068) (0.088) (0.201) (0.197) (0.014) (0.143) (0.130) (0.022) 
Observations 788 361 355 285 199 279 329 298 198 100 244 
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Table A2 cont.: Determinants of Gender Cosponsorship Score by Province: Whole Chamber, Women’s Domain   
 
Province Jujuy Mendoza H. Mendoza S. Misiones Rio Negro Salta Santa Cruz Santa Fe S. Tucuman Santa Fe H. 
Year 1992-2009 1992-2009 1992-2009 1992-2009 1996-2008 1992-2009 1992-2009 1992-2009 1992-2009 1992-2009 
Female Legislator 0.005 0.073 0.071 0.039 0.190** 0.073 0.034 0.001 0.113* -0.018 
 (0.065) (0.047) (0.062) (0.061) (0.069) (0.044) (0.044) (0.019) (0.044) (0.037) 
% Women -0.161 -0.070 -0.558* -0.450*** -0.520 -0.261* -0.235** 0.031 -0.280* -0.415*** 
 (0.195) (0.157) (0.230) (0.129) (0.269) (0.116) (0.087) (0.028) (0.121) (0.064) 
% Women 0.056 0.402 -0.436 -0.197 0.630 -0.212 -0.063 -0.006 -0.020 0.495** 
X Female (0.271) (0.316) (0.458) (0.248) (0.425) (0.279) (0.285) (0.208) (0.259) (0.158) 
Quota Years . -0.001 0.002 0.005* -0.001 0.000 0.001 . -0.006 0.006** 
 . (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) . (0.004) (0.002) 
Quota Years . -0.008** 0.007 0.002 -0.026*** -0.003 0.000 . -0.008* -0.009*** 
X Female . (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) . (0.003) (0.002) 
Economic Development -0.001 0.004 -0.000 0.001 -0.004 -0.002 -0.001 0.001 -0.007** 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.000) (0.002) (0.005) 
Legislation Authored -0.000 0.001*** -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant -0.018 -0.139 0.038 -0.025 0.114 0.054 -0.011 -0.012 0.187** -0.013 
 (0.090) (0.110) (0.137) (0.096) (0.123) (0.061) (0.051) (0.007) (0.063) (0.088) 
Observations 423 422 329 349 283 526 213 170 354 436 
 
!!
"#$ 
Table A3: Determinants of Gender Cosponsorship Score by Province: Other Party, All Legislation    
 
Province 
Buenos 
Aires H. 
Buenos 
Aires S. 
Capital 
Federal Chaco Chubut 
Cordoba 
Unicameral 
Cordoba 
H. 
Cordoba 
S. 
Corrientes 
H. 
Corrientes 
S. 
Entre 
Rios 
Year 1992-2009 1992-2009 1998-2008 
1992-
2009 
1994-
2008 2002-2008 1992-2000 1992-2000 1992-2009 1992-2009 
1992-
2009 
Female Legislator 0.346*** 0.174 0.502 0.071 -0.126 0.598 0.134* -0.104 0.236 -0.135 0.010 
 (0.073) (0.150) (0.511) (0.081) (0.312) (0.627) (0.062) (0.117) (0.142) (0.196) (0.088) 
% Women 0.523* 0.474 0.680 -0.002 -0.548 1.992 0.901*** 1.558 -0.746 0.576 0.072 
 (0.219) (0.607) (0.925) (0.211) (0.594) (2.221) (0.215) (1.463) (0.719) (0.556) (0.225) 
% Women -0.797* 0.721 -1.395 -0.076 0.783 -0.641 -0.533 -1.382 -1.878 -1.357 -0.327 
X Female (0.343) (0.928) (1.474) (0.420) (1.102) (1.393) (0.346) (7.198) (1.215) (1.286) (0.719) 
Quota Years 0.003 0.010 -0.011 -0.002 0.010 0.100 0.052*** -0.009 0.020 0.009 . 
 (0.006) (0.016) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.080) (0.016) (0.025) (0.024) (0.044) . 
Quota Years 0.003 -0.007 0.004 0.001 0.002 -0.015 0.029* 0.061 0.022 0.077 . 
X Female (0.006) (0.016) (0.006) (0.007) (0.015) (0.019) (0.012) (0.141) (0.031) (0.055) . 
Economic 
Development 0.009 0.008 -0.019 0.002 0.005 -0.097 0.101*** -0.002 -0.006 0.020 -0.007* 
 (0.011) (0.025) (0.016) (0.003) (0.021) (0.073) (0.025) (0.003) (0.009) (0.017) (0.003) 
Legislation 
Authored -0.001* -0.008* 0.001 -0.000 0.002 -0.000 -0.001* 0.009** 0.003* 0.004** 0.001 
 (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant -0.257 -0.213 0.032 -0.005 -0.015 -0.004 -2.080*** -0.002 0.138 -0.523 0.131 
 (0.248) (0.590) (0.412) (0.106) (0.454) (0.469) (0.501) (0.057) (0.272) (0.429) (0.070) 
Observations 682 249 334 280 146 271 320 240 135 61 211 
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Table A3 cont.: Determinants of Gender Cosponsorship Score by Province: Other Party, All Legislation    
 
Province Jujuy Mendoza H. Mendoza S. Misiones Rio Negro Salta Santa Cruz Santa Fe S. Tucuman Santa Fe H. 
Year 1992-2009 1992-2009 1992-2009 1992-2009 1996-2008 1992-2009 1992-2009 1992-2009 1992-2009 1992-2009 
Female Legislator 0.053 0.137 0.280* 0.018 0.988*** 0.232* 0.082 -0.383*** 0.031 0.045 
 (0.162) (0.141) (0.129) (0.134) (0.217) (0.102) (0.083) (0.083) (0.103) (0.100) 
% Women -1.137* 0.963* -0.819 -0.491 1.980* -0.374 -0.152 -0.342** -0.159 -0.457** 
 (0.486) (0.473) (0.476) (0.285) (0.872) (0.279) (0.162) (0.125) (0.301) (0.162) 
% Women -0.186 -0.189 -1.171 -0.458 -0.825 -0.580 0.351 7.720*** 0.507 1.092** 
X Female (0.669) (0.950) (0.954) (0.543) (1.338) (0.650) (0.522) (0.958) (0.614) (0.418) 
Quota Years . -0.003 0.007 -0.006 0.013 -0.007 0.002 . 0.008 0.006 
 . (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.007) (0.002) . (0.010) (0.007) 
Quota Years . -0.000 0.002 0.017*** -0.050** -0.008 -0.009 . -0.006 -0.026*** 
X Female . (0.008) (0.009) (0.004) (0.018) (0.007) (0.005) . (0.008) (0.006) 
Economic Development -0.017** 0.017 0.010 -0.026*** 0.031* -0.014** -0.004 -0.001 0.006 -0.016 
 (0.005) (0.011) (0.010) (0.007) (0.015) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.006) (0.013) 
Legislation Authored 0.003** 0.002* -0.001 -0.001*** -0.001** 0.002*** -0.001 0.003*** -0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Constant 0.641** -0.482 -0.102 0.816*** -1.022* 0.454** 0.113 -0.013 -0.145 0.296 
 (0.218) (0.323) (0.286) (0.223) (0.396) (0.147) (0.098) (0.029) (0.164) (0.252) 
Observations 377 377 312 344 263 451 207 162 301 404 
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Table A3: Determinants of Gender Cosponsorship Score by Province: Other Party, Women’s Domain  
 
Province 
Buenos 
Aires H. 
Buenos 
Aires S. 
Capital 
Federal Chaco Chubut 
Cordoba 
Unicameral 
Cordoba 
H. 
Cordoba 
S. 
Corrientes 
H. 
Corrientes 
S. 
Entre 
Rios 
Year 1992-2009 1992-2009 1998-2008 
1992-
2009 
1994-
2008 2002-2008 1992-2000 1992-2000 1992-2009 1992-2009 
1992-
2009 
Female Legislator 0.276*** -0.049 0.571 0.057 -0.024 1.797*** 0.110*** 0.136* 0.033 0.043 -0.021 
 (0.046) (0.083) (0.451) (0.073) (0.119) (0.455) (0.032) (0.059) (0.090) (0.125) (0.032) 
% Women -0.255 0.257 1.648* -0.472* 0.014 -4.220** -0.213 0.013 -1.633*** -0.464 -0.758*** 
 (0.139) (0.334) (0.817) (0.192) (0.227) (1.610) (0.112) (0.742) (0.456) (0.355) (0.082) 
% Women -1.031*** 1.354** -1.612 0.158 0.032 -3.415*** -0.184 -6.669 -1.020 -0.890 0.591* 
X Female (0.218) (0.511) (1.302) (0.382) (0.421) (1.010) (0.180) (3.651) (0.770) (0.821) (0.261) 
Quota Years -0.000 0.006 -0.011* 0.003 -0.003 -0.110 0.016 -0.003 0.035* 0.036 . 
 (0.004) (0.009) (0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.058) (0.008) (0.013) (0.015) (0.028) . 
Quota Years 0.006 -0.017* 0.008 -0.007 0.003 -0.056*** -0.008 0.101 0.020 0.057 . 
X Female (0.004) (0.009) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.014) (0.006) (0.071) (0.020) (0.035) . 
Economic 
Development 0.001 0.016 -0.027* -0.001 0.025** 0.094 0.028* 0.003 -0.003 0.020 -0.003* 
 (0.007) (0.014) (0.014) (0.003) (0.008) (0.053) (0.013) (0.002) (0.006) (0.011) (0.001) 
Legislation 
Authored -0.001*** -0.007*** 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.002*** -0.001** -0.001 0.003*** 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
Constant -0.024 -0.386 -0.330 0.062 -0.504** 0.912** -0.562* -0.054 0.061 -0.476 0.076** 
 (0.158) (0.325) (0.363) (0.097) (0.173) (0.340) (0.261) (0.029) (0.172) (0.274) (0.025) 
Observations 682 249 334 280 146 271 320 240 135 61 211 
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Table A3 cont.: Determinants of Gender Cosponsorship Score by Province: Other Party, Women’s Domain  
 
Province Jujuy Mendoza H. Mendoza S. Misiones Rio Negro Salta Santa Cruz Santa Fe S. Tucuman Santa Fe H. 
Year 1992-2009 1992-2009 1992-2009 1992-2009 1996-2008 1992-2009 1992-2009 1992-2009 1992-2009 1992-2009 
Female Legislator 0.072 0.076 0.200 0.041 0.311*** 0.085 0.031 0.005 0.041 0.018 
 (0.089) (0.094) (0.102) (0.084) (0.087) (0.063) (0.048) (0.032) (0.056) (0.067) 
% Women -0.124 -0.359 -0.473 -0.552** -1.102** -0.326 -0.235* 0.035 -0.462** -0.473*** 
 (0.268) (0.316) (0.379) (0.179) (0.349) (0.172) (0.093) (0.049) (0.162) (0.110) 
% Women -0.169 0.482 -1.388 -0.245 1.110* -0.147 -0.056 -0.104 0.344 0.650* 
X Female (0.370) (0.635) (0.758) (0.342) (0.536) (0.402) (0.300) (0.372) (0.332) (0.282) 
Quota Years . -0.003 0.007 0.004 0.005 -0.000 0.002 . -0.004 0.006 
 . (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) . (0.005) (0.005) 
Quota Years . -0.011 0.014* 0.003 -0.045*** -0.005 0.000 . -0.009* -0.014*** 
X Female . (0.006) (0.007) (0.003) (0.007) (0.004) (0.003) . (0.004) (0.004) 
Economic Development 0.000 -0.004 0.010 -0.003 -0.004 -0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.007* -0.003 
 (0.003) (0.007) (0.008) (0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.009) 
Legislation Authored 0.001 0.003*** -0.001 -0.001*** -0.001** 0.001* 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.001*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant -0.048 0.109 -0.213 0.114 0.199 0.043 -0.037 0.002 0.219* 0.044 
 (0.121) (0.216) (0.227) (0.140) (0.159) (0.091) (0.056) (0.011) (0.088) (0.170) 
Observations 377 377 312 344 263 451 207 162 301 404 
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Table A4: Determinants of Gender Cosponsorship Score with Province and Year Fixed 
Effects  
 
 All Legislation Women's Domain  
 Whole Chamber Other Party  Whole Chamber Other Party  
Female Legislator 0.038 0.051** 0.031 0.045 
 (0.027) (0.016) (0.038) (0.024) 
% Women -0.503*** -0.319*** -0.281 -0.360*** 
 (0.121) (0.073) (0.175) (0.107) 
(% Women)^2 0.933** -0.173 0.546 -0.195 
 (0.292) (0.175) (0.423) (0.259) 
% Women 0.316 -0.061 0.798* 0.321 
X Female (0.249) (0.149) (0.357) (0.218) 
(% Women)^2 -1.347** -0.028 -2.469*** -0.981* 
X Female (0.519) (0.311) (0.747) (0.458) 
Quota Years 0.004 0.002 0.004 0.002 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) 
(Quota Years)2 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000* -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Quota Years 0.016*** 0.002 0.018*** 0.002 
X Female (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) 
(Quota Years)2 -0.001*** -0.000 -0.001*** -0.000 
X Female (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Economic Development 0.001 -0.003*** 0.003* -0.002*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Legislation Authored -0.000* -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant -0.002 0.064*** -0.044 0.055** 
 (0.021) (0.012) (0.030) (0.019) 
Observations 7246 7246 6377 6377 
Provinces 23 23 23 23 
Sessions 181 181 181 181 
These models were estimated using province and year fixed effects. Fixed effects parameters are omitted from table.  
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Appendix B: The Impact of Electoral Incentives: Sensitivity Analyses   
Table B1: Determinants of Gender Cosponsorship Score, Sensitivity Analyses for Large 
Districts  
 All Legislation  All Legislation  
 Whole Chamber Other Party  
 
Whole 
Chamber  
Without 
Buenos 
Aires 
Without 
Federal 
District  
Without 
Santa Fe 
H.  
Whole 
Chamber  
Without 
Buenos 
Aires 
Without 
Federal 
District  
Without 
Santa Fe 
H. 
Female Legislator 0.023 0.011 0.023 0.033 0.071*** 0.067** 0.067*** 0.085*** 
 (0.034) (0.037) (0.036) (0.037) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021) 
% Women -0.274 -0.263 -0.317 -0.243 -0.350* -0.342* -0.315* -0.327* 
 (0.209) (0.223) (0.215) (0.226) (0.143) (0.149) (0.143) (0.152) 
(% Women)^2 0.663 0.620 0.744 0.590 -0.050 -0.067 -0.169 -0.123 
 (0.495) (0.530) (0.516) (0.529) (0.338) (0.353) (0.341) (0.356) 
% Women 0.387 0.438 0.372 0.297 -0.291 -0.319 -0.233 -0.428* 
X Female (0.307) (0.325) (0.324) (0.330) (0.177) (0.187) (0.181) (0.190) 
(% Women)^2 -1.778** -1.830** -1.824** -1.618* 0.440 0.581 0.265 0.704 
X Female (0.635) (0.670) (0.693) (0.682) (0.367) (0.385) (0.387) (0.391) 
Quota Years 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.001 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
(Quota Years)2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Quota Years 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.022*** 0.019*** 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.001 
X Female (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
(Quota Years)2 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
X Female (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Economic 
Development 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
GDI -0.015 -0.029 0.066 0.013 -0.046 -0.084 -0.371 -0.066 
 (0.360) (0.380) (0.471) (0.377) (0.249) (0.250) (0.293) (0.261) 
Legislation Authored -0.000** -0.000* -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 0.020 0.032 -0.042 -0.001 0.088 0.116 0.345 0.110 
 (0.305) (0.322) (0.390) (0.319) (0.210) (0.212) (0.243) (0.220) 
Random-effects Parameters       
Province -3.618*** -3.578*** -3.545*** -3.558*** -3.986*** -4.022*** -4.081*** -3.913*** 
 (0.296) (0.308) (0.289) (0.298) (0.289) (0.312) (0.311) (0.297) 
Year -3.335*** -3.264*** -3.348*** -3.327*** -3.624*** -3.586*** -3.640*** -3.638*** 
 (0.108) (0.107) (0.114) (0.114) (0.092) (0.094) (0.094) (0.098) 
Residual -1.932*** -1.938*** -1.914*** -1.908*** -2.485*** -2.495*** -2.499*** -2.467*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Observations 4603 3919 4248 4167 4603 3919 4248 4167 
Provinces 17 16 16 15 17 16 16 15 
Legislative Sessions 129 120 123 114 129 120 123 114 
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Table B2: Determinants of Gender Cosponsorship Score, Sensitivity Analysis for Large 
Districts Continued 
 Women's Domain Women's Domain 
 Whole Chamber Other Party 
 
Whole 
Chamber  
Without 
Buenos 
Aires 
Without 
Federal 
District  
Without 
Santa Fe 
H. 
Whole 
Chamber 
Without 
Buenos 
Aires 
Without 
Federal 
District 
Without 
Santa Fe 
H. 
Female Legislator 0.019 -0.038 0.025 0.034 0.077** 0.040 0.071* 0.092** 
 (0.048) (0.051) (0.050) (0.051) (0.029) (0.030) (0.029) (0.030) 
% Women 0.189 0.156 0.143 0.253 -0.234 -0.252 -0.189 -0.224 
 (0.267) (0.279) (0.272) (0.290) (0.191) (0.198) (0.184) (0.204) 
(% Women)^2 -0.385 -0.382 -0.335 -0.533 -0.368 -0.349 -0.534 -0.427 
 (0.627) (0.660) (0.653) (0.677) (0.448) (0.468) (0.441) (0.477) 
% Women 0.670 0.949* 0.569 0.510 -0.060 0.126 0.041 -0.208 
X Female (0.427) (0.443) (0.447) (0.452) (0.256) (0.263) (0.257) (0.268) 
(% Women)^2 -2.395** -2.734** -2.213* -2.116* -0.190 -0.404 -0.538 0.071 
X Female (0.882) (0.912) (0.953) (0.933) (0.529) (0.540) (0.549) (0.554) 
Quota Years 0.001 -0.000 0.002 0.001 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.005 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
(Quota Years)2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Quota Years 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.029*** 0.023*** 0.003 0.006 0.003 0.001 
X Female (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
(Quota Years)2 -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.000 -0.001* -0.000 -0.000 
X Female (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Economic 
Development 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
GDI 0.144 0.158 0.211 0.169 0.240 0.217 -0.198 0.208 
 (0.383) (0.409) (0.504) (0.411) (0.298) (0.309) (0.320) (0.324) 
Legislation Authored -0.000 -0.000 -0.000* -0.000* -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant -0.138 -0.143 -0.186 -0.152 -0.162 -0.143 0.178 -0.127 
 (0.330) (0.353) (0.422) (0.353) (0.255) (0.265) (0.270) (0.275) 
Random-effects Parameters        
Province -3.802*** -3.707*** -3.635*** -3.659*** -3.916*** -3.895*** -4.214*** -3.758*** 
 (0.465) (0.452) (0.389) (0.426) (0.358) (0.371) (0.462) (0.348) 
Year -3.109*** -3.067*** -3.166*** -3.097*** -3.368*** -3.325*** -3.397*** -3.376*** 
 (0.115) (0.116) (0.125) (0.120) (0.098) (0.099) (0.102) (0.104) 
Residual -1.655*** -1.675*** -1.643*** -1.641*** -2.170*** -2.202*** -2.198*** -2.167*** 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Observations 4093 3507 3759 3689 4093 3507 3759 3689 
Provinces 17 16 16 15 17 16 16 15 
Legislative Sessions 129 120 123 114 129 120 123 114 
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Figure B1: Explaining Women’s Gender Cosponsorship Score as the Proportion of 
Women in the Legislature Increases, Sensitivity Analysis for Large Districts 
 
 
 
 
This figure illustrates that the results shown in Chapter 3 for big districts are robust to 
multiple model specifications. Specifically, the figure demonstrates that none of the 
largest chambers in the sample are driving the results.  
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Table B 3: Determinants of Gender Cosponsorship Score, Sensitivity Analysis for Small 
Districts  
 All Legislation  All Legislation  
 Whole Chamber Other Party  
 
Whole 
Chamber  
Without 
Cordoba S.  
Without 
Mendoza H. 
Without 
Salta House 
Whole 
Chamber  
Without 
Cordoba S.  
Without 
Mendoza H. 
Without 
Salta House 
Female Legislator 0.006 0.017 -0.033 0.004 -0.023 -0.010 -0.034 -0.039 
 (0.044) (0.048) (0.047) (0.056) (0.028) (0.030) (0.029) (0.036) 
% Women -0.533* -0.497 -0.399 -0.559* -0.227 -0.189 -0.169 -0.243 
 (0.258) (0.275) (0.267) (0.273) (0.125) (0.129) (0.136) (0.136) 
(% Women)^2 0.688 0.473 0.661 0.768 -0.333 -0.506 -0.396 -0.289 
 (0.638) (0.674) (0.641) (0.670) (0.313) (0.322) (0.329) (0.339) 
% Women 1.011* 0.723 1.649** 1.048 0.899** 0.618 0.958** 1.053** 
X Female (0.487) (0.534) (0.542) (0.598) (0.310) (0.334) (0.340) (0.388) 
(% Women)^2 -1.285 -0.456 -2.596* -1.311 -1.564* -0.786 -1.822* -1.910* 
X Female (1.062) (1.158) (1.151) (1.251) (0.675) (0.725) (0.722) (0.810) 
Quota Years 0.013** 0.013* 0.006 0.012* 0.000 0.001 -0.002 -0.000 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
(Quota Years)2 -0.001* -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Quota Years -0.003 0.002 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 0.001 -0.005 
X Female (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
(Quota Years)2 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
X Female (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Economic Development 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
GDI -0.789 -0.726 -0.182 -0.860 -0.026 0.027 0.177 -0.001 
 (0.615) (0.642) (0.725) (0.643) (0.280) (0.314) (0.382) (0.314) 
Legislation Authored 0.000** 0.000* 0.000 0.000* -0.000** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 0.628 0.578 0.109 0.700 0.048 0.007 -0.120 0.035 
 (0.495) (0.518) (0.583) (0.515) (0.225) (0.252) (0.307) (0.251) 
Random-effects Parameters        
Province -3.595*** -3.599*** -3.592*** -3.595*** -4.440*** -4.272*** -4.191*** -4.331*** 
 (0.391) (0.448) (0.388) (0.441) (0.455) (0.401) (0.407) (0.453) 
Year -3.218*** -3.200*** -3.236*** -3.196*** -4.176*** -4.292*** -4.131*** -4.144*** 
 (0.118) (0.127) (0.128) (0.122) (0.177) (0.227) (0.183) (0.184) 
Residual -2.006*** -1.981*** -2.002*** -1.985*** -2.449*** -2.435*** -2.460*** -2.406*** 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Observations 2643 2221 2205 2345 2643 2221 2205 2345 
Provinces 12 11 11 11 12 11 11 11 
Legislative Sessions 86 81 77 77 86 81 77 77 
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Table B 4: Determinants of Gender Cosponsorship Score, Sensitivity Analysis for Small 
Districts  
 Women's Domain Women's Domain 
 Whole Chamber Other Party 
 
Whole 
Chamber  
Without 
Cordoba 
S.  
Without 
Mendoza 
H. 
Without 
Salta 
House 
Whole 
Chamber  
Without 
Cordoba 
S.  
Without 
Mendoza 
H. 
Without 
Salta 
House Female Legislator -0.042 -0.033 -0.073 -0.098 -0.066 -0.053 -0.081 -0.094 
 (0.068) (0.071) (0.071) (0.085) (0.043) (0.044) (0.045) (0.054) 
% Women -0.467 -0.503 -0.374 -0.494 -0.290 -0.259 -0.239 -0.316 
 (0.333) (0.354) (0.360) (0.354) (0.168) (0.188) (0.180) (0.185) 
(% Women)^2 1.238 1.155 1.211 1.352 -0.158 -0.251 -0.171 -0.091 
 (0.836) (0.882) (0.875) (0.878) (0.424) (0.467) (0.436) (0.458) 
% Women 2.381** 2.245** 2.671** 2.988** 1.713*** 1.452** 1.742*** 1.992*** 
X Female (0.758) (0.792) (0.835) (0.927) (0.474) (0.486) (0.525) (0.587) 
(% Women)^2 -3.924* -3.587* -4.679** -5.003* -3.244** -2.616* -3.519** -3.897** 
X Female (1.680) (1.756) (1.800) (1.969) (1.051) (1.076) (1.132) (1.247) 
Quota Years 0.020** 0.021** 0.014 0.019** 0.004 0.003 -0.000 0.003 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
(Quota Years)2 -0.001** -0.001** -0.001* -0.001** -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Quota Years -0.017 -0.008 -0.008 -0.024* -0.009 -0.006 0.002 -0.008 
X Female (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.011) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
(Quota Years)2 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
X Female (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Economic 
Development 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
GDI -0.289 -0.341 0.073 -0.385 0.063 0.122 0.401 0.072 
 (0.627) (0.706) (0.834) (0.636) (0.266) (0.316) (0.377) (0.282) 
Legislation Authored 0.001* 0.000 0.000 0.001* -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 0.185 0.225 -0.126 0.273 -0.068 -0.115 -0.337 -0.071 
 (0.508) (0.572) (0.672) (0.513) (0.217) (0.258) (0.305) (0.228) 
Random-effects Parameters        
Province -3.941*** -3.710*** -3.784*** -4.044*** -17.209 -5.254* -19.383* -12.010 
 (0.756) (0.615) (0.678) (0.994) (0.000) (2.446) (9.005) (666.690) 
Year -2.997*** -2.985*** -2.951*** -2.959*** -3.815*** -3.659*** -3.782*** -3.760*** 
 (0.137) (0.145) (0.142) (0.140) (0.186) (0.175) (0.213) (0.188) 
Residual -1.618*** -1.645*** -1.624*** -1.603*** -2.079*** -2.129*** -2.079*** -2.050*** 
 (0.015) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.015) (0.017) (0.019) (0.016) 
Observations 2284 1907 1909 2044 2284 1907 1909 2044 
Provinces 12 11 11 11 12 11 11 11 
Legislative Sessions 86 81 77 77 86 81 77 77 
!!
"#$ 
Figure B 2: Explaining Women’s Gender Cosponsorship Score as the Proportion of 
Women in the Legislature Increases, Small Districts   
 
 
This figure illustrates that the results shown in Chapter 3 for small districts are robust to 
multiple model specifications. Specifically, the figure demonstrates that none of the three 
largest chambers with small districts in the sample are driving the results. In the top left 
panel it is clear that the sample without the Mendoza House has a more positive trend 
than the samples including the Mendoza House, however this difference does not emerge 
in the other graphs that consider only Women’s Domain legislation or the figure 
considering all legislation for women crossing party lines.  
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